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THE 


DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL 


TH.   RIBOT 


PROFESSOR  OF  COMPARATIVE  AND  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY  IN 
THE  COLLEGE  DE  FRANCE 


AUTHORISED  TRANSLATION  FROM  THE  EIGHTH  FRENCH  EDITION 


MERWIN-MARIE   SNELL 


FOURTH  ENLARGED  ENGLISH  EDITION 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1915 


copyright  by 
The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co, 

1894 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  A  UTHOR. 


AUTHORIZED  TRANSLATIONS. 


The  Psychology  of  Attention. 
Cloth.  75c;  Paper.  30c. 
(See  No.  5  of  Religion  of  Science  Library.) 

The  Diseases  of  Personality. 
Cloth.  75c;  Paper.  30c. 
(See  No.  4  of  Religion  of  Science  Library.) 

The  Diseases  of  the  Will. 

Translated  by  Merwin-Marie  Snell.    Cloth,  75c; 

Paper.  30c. 

(See  No.  10  of  Religion  of  Science  Library.) 

The  Evoldtion  of  General  Ideas. 

Translated  by  Frances  A,  Welby.    Cloth,  $1.25, 

Essay  on  the  Creative  Imagination. 

Translated  by  A.  H.  N.  Baron.    Cloth,  $1.75. 

The  Diseases  of  Memory. 

Cloth.  $1.50, 


The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company, 
Chicago.  III. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PAQB 

Statement  of  the  question. — On  the  will  as  impulsive  power. — 

On  the  will  as  inhibitory  power. — Role  of  the  individual 
character. — On  choice  ;  its  nature i 

CHAPTER  I. 

IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE  WILL.    I.  DEFECT  OF  IMPULSE. 

Division  of  the  diseases  of  the  will. — On  abulia,  or  incapacity 
for  willing:  example  of  Thomas  DeQuincy. — Case  reported 
by  Billod. — Probable  causes  of  this  state. — Two  hypoth- 
eses :  weakness  of  impulse,  alteration  of  motor  images  ; 
comparison  with  psychic  paralyses. — Analogous  states  ; 
agoraphobia  ;  doubting  madness  ;  cases  which  border  on 
extinction. — Incapacity  for  effort.  Its  two  forms. — Where 
is  its  source  ? 26 

CHAPTER  II. 

IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE  WILL,    II.  EXCESS  OF  IMPULSE. 

Sudden  and  unconscious  impulses. — Irresistible  impulses  with 
consciousness. — Imperceptible  transition  from  the  healthy 
to  the  morbid  state:  fixed  ideas. — Dislocation  of  the  will. — 
Its  probable  causes. —  Impairments  by  intoxication,  by 
cerebral  lesion 54 

CHAPTER  III. 

IMPAIRMENTS   OF  VOLUNTARY  ATTENTION. 

Intellectual  power  and  volitional  impotence. — Coleridge:  his 
portrait  by  Carlyle. — Two  forms  of  impairment. — Nature 
of  the  attention.  It  has  its  source  in  the  feelings. — How 
it  is  maintained 72 


vi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  REALM  OF  CAPR.CES. 

PAGE 

Incapacity  of  the  will  to  form  itself  :  absence  of  its  conditions 
of  existence. — The  hysterical  character. — Whence  the  in- 
stability comes 86 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE  WILL. 

Two  states  of  extinction.  —  Ecstasy.  Its  description  by  St. 
Teresa. — Anomaly  of  this  mental  state. — Somnambulism  : 
cases  of  absolute  extinction. — Doubtful  cases.  Examples 
of  resistance. — Illusion  of  volitional  power  in  some  hyp- 
notised persons 94 

CONCLUSION. 

The  will  is  the  final  term  of  a  progressive  evolution  of  which 
the  simple  reflex  is  the  first. — It  is  a  hierarchic  co-ordina- 
tion.— Law  of  dissolution  of  the  will  :  its  course. — Verifi- 
cation by  pathological  facts. — Material  conditions  of  voli- 
tional co-ordination.  Its  physiological  development.  Its 
psychological  development.  Principal  forms  of  this  co- 
ordination.— The  will  in  idiots.  The  will  is  the  result  of 
a  co-ordination  and  an  evolution. — General  conclusion  : 
The  will  is  a  mere  state  of  consciousness  which  has  in  it- 
self no  efficacy  to  produce  a  movement  or  an  inhibition. .   112 


Index. 


135 


THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 


INTRODUCTION. 

In  recent  years  several  authors,  especially  in  for- 
eign countries,  have  given  a  detailed  exposition  of  cer- 
tain branches  of  psychology  according  to  the  principle 
of  evolution.  It  has  seemed  to  me  that  there  would 
be  some  profit  in  treating  these  questions  in  the  same 
spirit,  but  under  another  form,  that  of  dissolution. 

I  propose,  then,  in  this  work  to  attempt  for  the  will 
what  I  have  formerly  done  for  the  memory  ;  to  study 
its  anomalies,  and  to  draw  from  this  study  conclusions 
regarding  its  normal  state.  In  very  many  respects  the 
question  is  less  easy  ;  the  term  will  designates  some- 
thing more  vague  than  the  term  memory.  Whether 
one  considers  memory  as  a  function,  a  property,  or  a 
faculty,  it  remains  none  the  less  a  stable  mode  of  be- 
ing, a  psychic  disposition,  regarding  which  all  the 
world  can  come  to  an  agreement.  The  will,  on  the 
contrary,  resolves  itself  into  volitions,  each  one  of 
which  is  an  element,  an  unstable  form  of  activity,  a  re- 
sultant varying  according  to  the  causes  that  produce  it. 

Beyond  this  first  difficulty  there  is  another  which 
may  appear  greater  still,  but  of  which  we  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  summarily  disembarrass  ourselves.  Can  the 
pathology  of  the  will  be  studied  without  touching  upon 
the  inextricable  problem  of  free  will?    This  abstention 


2  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

appears  to  us  possible  and  even  necessary.  It  is  imposed 
not  by  timidity,  but  by  method.  Like  every  other  experi- 
mental science,  psychology  ought  to  rigorously  forbid 
itself  all  research  relative  to  first  causes.  The  problem 
of  free  will  is  of  this  order.  One  of  the  great  services 
of  the  criticism  of  Kant  and  his  successors  hasfpeen  to 
show  that  the  problem  of  liberty  reduces  itself?. to  the 
question  whether  one  can  go  outside  the  chain  of  effects 
and  causes  so  as  to  posit  an  absolute  beginning.  That 
power  "which  calls  up,  suspends,  or  banishes,"  as  it 
is  defined  by  a  contemporary  who  has  studied  it  pro- 
foundly,* can  be  affirmed  only  on  the  condition  of  en- 
tering into  metaphysics. 

Here  we  have  nothing  of  the  sort  to  attempt.  Ex- 
perience, internal  and  external,  is  our  sole  object ;  its 
limits  are  our  limits.  We  take  the  volitions  as  facts, 
with  their  immediate  causes,  that  is  to  say,  the  motives 
which  produce  them,  without  investigating  whether 
these  causes  suppose  other  causes  ad  hifinitu7ti,  or 
whether  there  is  added  to  them  some  degree  of  spon- 
taneity. The  question  is  thus  placed  in  a  form  equally 
acceptable  to  the  determinists  and  their  adversaries, 
and  reconcilable  with  either  hypothesis.  We  hope, 
moreover,  to  conduct  our  researches  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  absence  of  any  solution  of  this  point  will  not 
even  so  much  as  once  be  noticed. 

I  shall  try  to  show  at  the  conclusion  of  this  study 
that  in  every  voluntary  act  there  are  two  entirely  dis- 
tinct elements  :  the  state  of  consciousness,  the  **  I 
will,"  which  indicates  a  situation,  but  which  has  in  itself 
no  efficacy ;  and  a  very  complex  psycho-physiological 
mechanism,  in  which  alone  resides  the  power  to  act  or 
to  restrain.   As  this  general  conclusion  can  only  be  the 

*Renouvier,  Essai  de  critique  genSrale,  second  edition,  i,  395-406, 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

result  of  partial  conclusions  furnished  by  pathology,  I 
will  avoid  provisionally  in  this  introduction  any  sys- 
tematic view ;  I  shall  limit  myself  to  studying  the  will 
in  its  double  mechanism  of  impulse  and  inhibition,  and 
in  its  source — the  individual  character — neglecting  all 
the  details  which  do  not  concern  our  subject.* 


The  fundamental  principle  which  dominates  the 
psychology  of  the  will  under  its  impulsive  form,  in  the 
healthy  as  well  as  in  the  morbid  state,  is  that  every 
state  of  consciousness  always  has  a  tendency  to  express 
itself,  to  manifest  itself  by  a  movement,  an  act.  This 
principle  is  only  one  particular  case,  peculiar  to  psy- 
chology, of  this  fundamental  law  :  that  the  reflex  is 
the  sole  type  of  all  neural  action,  of  all  relational  life. 
Properly  speaking,  activity  in  the  animal  is  not  a  be- 
ginning but  an  end,  not  a  cause  but  an  effect,  not  an 
initiation  but  a  continuation.  That  is  the  most  essen- 
tial point,  which  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  and  which 
alone  explains  the  physiology  and  the  pathology  of  the 
will,  because  this  tendency  of  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness to  expend  itself  in  a  psychological  or  physiological 
act,  conscious  or  unconscious,  is  the  simple  fact  to 
which  all  the  highest  combinations  and  complications 
of  voluntary  activity  are  reducible. 

The  new-born  child  is,  as  Virchow  has  defined  it, 
"a  mere  spinal  being."  Its  activity  is  purely  reflex, 
and  manifests  itself  by  such  a  profusion  of  movements 

♦There  will  be  found  in  Schneider's  recent  work,  Der  metischliche  IVilU 
vont  Standpunkte  der  neueren  Eniwickelungstheorien  (Berlin,  1882),  a  good 
monograph  on  the  will  in  its  normal  state  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  evo- 
lution. We  regret  not  to  have  made  its  acquaintance  before  this  work  was  al- 
most completed. 


4  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

that  the  work  of  education  will  consist  for  a  long  time 
in  suppressing  or  restraining  the  greater  number  of 
them.  This  diffusion  of  reflexes,  which  has  its  ground 
in  anatomical  relations,  manifests  in  all  its  simpli- 
city the  transformation  of  excitation  into  movement. 
Though  they  be  conscious  or  awaken  a  rudiment  of 
consciousness,  in  any  case  they  do  not  represent  a  vol- 
untary activity  ;  they  properly  express  only  the  activ- 
ity of  the  species,  what  has  been  acquired,  organised 
and  fixed  by  heredity ;  but  they  are  the  materials  out 
of  which  the  will  is  to  be  built  up. 

Desire  marks  an  ascending  stage  between  the  re- 
flex and  the  voluntary  conditions.  We  understand  by 
desire  the  most  elementary  forms  of  the  affective  life, 
the  only  ones  that  can  be  produced  so  long  as  the  in- 
tellect is  not  born.  Physiologically  they  do  not  differ 
from  reflex  movements  of  a  complex  kind.  Psycho- 
logically they  differ  from  them  only  by  the  state  of  con- 
sciousness, often  very  intense,  which  accompanies 
them.  Their  tendency  to  express  themselves  in  acts  is 
immediate  and  irresistible,  like  that  of  reflexes.  In  the 
natural  state,  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  yet  free  from  all  ad- 
mixture, desire  tends  to  satisfy  itself  immediately ; 
that  is  its  law,  it  is  inscribed  in  the  organism.  Little 
children  and  savages  furnish  excellent  examples  of  it. 
In  the  adult,  desire  is  no  longer  in  the  natural  state  ; 
education,  habit,  and  reflexfon  modify  or  restrain  it. 
But  it  often  reasserts  its  rights,  and  history  shows  us 
that  in  the  case  of  despots,  placed  by  their  own  opin- 
ion and  that  of  others  above  the  law,  it  always  retains 
them. 

Pathology  will  show  us  that  this  form  of  activity  is 
augmented  when  the  will  grows  weak,  and  persists 
when  it  disappears.      It  marks,  however,  a  progress 


INTR  OD  UCTJON.  5 

beyond  the  first  period,  for  it  denotes  a  commencement 
of  individuality.  On  the  common  ground  of  the  spe- 
cific activity,  the  desires  outhne  vaguely  the  individual 
character  ;  they  reflect  the  mode  of  reaction  of  a  par- 
ticular organism. 

As  soon  as  a  sufficient  accumulation  of  experiences 
has  permitted  intellect  to  arise,  there  is  produced  a 
new  form  of  activity,  for  which  the  epithet  of  ideo- 
tnoior  is  most  convenient,  ideas  being  causes  of  move- 
ments. That  name  has,  moreover,  the  advantage  of 
showing  its  relationship  with  reflexes,  of  which  it  is 
only  an  improvement. 

How  can  an  idea  produce  movement?  That  is  a 
question  which  very  much  embarrassed  the  old  psy- 
chology, but  which  becomes  simple  when  the  facts  are 
considered  in  their  true  nature.  It  is  a  truth  now  ac- 
cepted in  cerebral  physiology  that  the  anatomical  basis 
of  all  our  mental  states  includes  both  motor  and  sen- 
sory elements.  I  will  not  dwell  upon  a  question  which 
has  been  treated  elsewhere  in  detail  *  and  would  neces- 
sitate a  digression.  Let  us  simply  remember  that  our 
perceptions,  in  particular  the  important  ones,  those  of 
sight  and  touch,  imply  as  integral  elements  movements 
of  the  eye  or  the  members  ;  and  that  if  movement  is  an 
essential  element  when  we  see  an  object  really,  it  must 
play  the  same  role  when  we  see  it  ideally.  Images 
and  ideas,  even  abstract,  suppose  an  anatomical  sub- 
stratum in  which  the  movements  are  in  some  measure 
represented. 

It  is  true  that,  on  pressing  the  point  more  closely, 
it  might  be  said  that  it  is  neceSsary  to  distinguish  two 
kinds  of  motor  elements :  those  which  serve  to  consti- 
tute a  state  of  consciousness,  and  those  which  serve  to 

* Rtvue philosophique,  October,  1879,  p.  371,  et  seq. 


6  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL, 

expend  it ;  the  first  intrinsic,  the  others  extrinsic.  The 
idea  of  a  ball,  for  example,  is  the  resultant  of  impres- 
sions of  surfaces  and  of  special  muscular  adjustments  ; 
but  the  latter  are  the  result  of  muscular  sensibility, 
and,  in  this  aspect,  are  sensations  of  movement  rather 
than  movements  properly  so  called  ;  they  are  constit- 
uent elements  of  our  idea  rather  than  a  manner  of  ex- 
pressing it  outwardly. 

At  the  same  time,  this  close  relation  established  by 
physiology  between  the  idea  and  the  movement  per- 
mits us  in  some  degree  to  perceive  how  one  produces 
the  other.  In  reality,  an  idea  does  not  produce  a 
movement :  that  sudden  and  remarkable  change  of 
function  would  be  a  marvellous  thing.  The  sudden 
production  of  a  play  of  the  muscles  by  an  idea,  such 
as  defined  by  metaphysicians,  would  be  scarcely  less 
than  a  miracle.  It  is  not  the  state  of  consciousness  as 
such,  but  rather  the  corresponding  physiological  state 
which  transforms  itself  into  an  act.  In  short,  the  re- 
lation is  not  between  a  psychical  event  and  a  move- 
ment, but  between  two  states  of  the  same  kind,  be- 
tween two  physiological  states,  two  groups  of  nervous 
elements,  one  sensory  and  the  other  motor.  If  one 
insists  upon  making  of  consciousness  a  cause,  all  re- 
mains obscure  ;  but  if  it  is  considered  as  simply  the 
accompaniment  of  a  nervous  process,  which  alone  is 
the  essential  element,  all  becomes  clear  and  the  imag- 
inary difficulties  vanish. 

This  admitted,  we  can  classify  ideas  roughly  into 
three  groups,  according  as  their  tendency  to  transform 
themselves  into  action*  is  strong,  moderate,  or  weak 
and  even,  in  a  certain  sense,  null. 

i)  The  first  group  includes  extremely  intense  in- 
tellectual states,  of  which  fixed  ideas  may  serve  as  a 


JNTR  OD  UCTION.  7 

type.  They  pass  into  action  with  a  fatality  and  rapid- 
ity almost  equal  to  those  of  reflexes.  These  are  the 
ideas  which  "take  hold  of  us."  The  old  psychology, 
affirming  a  fact  of  common  experience,  said  in  its  own 
language  that  the  intellect  acts  upon  the  will  only 
through  the  mediation  of  sensibility.  Leaving  aside 
those  entities,  this  signifies  that  the  nervous  state  corre- 
sponding to  an  idea  expresses  itself  so  much  the  better 
in  movements  according  as  it  is  accompanied  by  those 
other  nervous  states,  whatever  they  may  be,  which  cor- 
respond to  sentiments.  The  phraseology  thus  changed, 
it  can  be  understood  why,  in  the  case  before  us,  we 
are  so  near  the  preceding  phase,  and  why  the  nervous 
action  is  more  energetic  and  affects  a  greater  number 
of  elements. 

Most  of  the  passions,  as  soon  as  they  transcend 
the  level  of  mere  appetite,  enter  into  this  group  as 
principles  of  action.  The  whole  difference  is  one  of 
degree,  according  as  the  affective  elements  predomi- 
nate in  the  complex  thus  formed  or  the  reverse.* 

2)  The  second  group  is  the  most  important  for  us. 
It  represents  the  rational  activity,  the  will  in  the  usual 
sense  of  the  word.  The  conception  is  followed  by  an 
act  after  a  short  or  long  deliberation.  It  will  be  found, 
upon  reflexion,  that  the  greater  part  of  our  actions  fall 
under  this  type,  leaving  aside  habits  and  the  forms 
already  described.    Whether  I  rise  up  in  order  to  take 


*  The  relative  independence  of  the  idea  and  the  feeling  as  causes  of  move- 
ment is  clearly  established  by  certain  pathological  cases.  It  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  the  idea  of  a  movement  is  by  itself  alone  incapable  of  producing 
it,  but  if  emotion  ensue  it  is  produced.  A  man  stricken  with  paralysis  cannot 
move  his  arm  by  any  effort  of  will ;  while  it  will  be  observed  to  be  violently 
agitated  under  the  influence  of  an  emotion  caused  by  the  arrival  of  a  friend. 
In  cases  of  softening  of  the  spinal  marrow  inducing  paralysis,  an  emotion,  or 
a  question  addressed  to  the  patient,  may  cause  most  violent  movements  in  the 
lower  members  over  which  bis  will  has  no  control. 


8  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

the  air  at  my  window  or  enlist  in  order  to  become  one 
day  a  general,  there  is  only  the  difference  between  a 
less  and  a  greater,  a  volition  very  complex  and  at  long 
range  like  the  last  necessarily  resolving  itself  into  a 
series  of  simple  volitions  successively  adapted  to  times 
and  places. 

In  this  group  the  tendency  to  the  act  is  neither  in- 
stantaneous nor  violent.  The  concomitant  affective 
state  is  moderate.  Very  many  actions  which  form  the 
ordinary  routine  of  our  life  were  at  first  accompanied 
by  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  curiosity,  etc.  Now  the  prim- 
itive sentiment  has  become  enfeebled,  but  the  bond 
between  the  idea  and  the  act  has  been  established  ; 
when  the  one  arises  the  other  follows. 

3)  In  abstract  ideas,  the  tendency  to  movement  is 
at  its  minimum.  These  ideas  being  representations 
of  representations,  pure  schemata,  extracts  fixed  by  a 
symbol,  the  motor  element  is  diminished  in  the  same 
degree  as  the  representative  element.  If  all  the  forms 
of  activity  which  we  have  just  passed  in  review  be  con- 
sidered as  successive  complications  of  the  simple  re- 
flex, we  might  say  that  abstract  ideas  are  a  collateral 
ramification,  which  is  attached  feebly  to  the  principal 
trunk,  and  has  developed  in  its  own  way.  Their  motor 
tendency  is  reduced  to  that  interior  utterance,  slight 
as  it  may  be,  which  accompanies  them,  or  to  the 
awakening  of  some  other  state  of  consciousness.  For 
just  as  in  physiology  the  centrifugal  period  of  a  reflex 
does  not  always  end  in  a  movement,  but  as  likely  in 
the  secretion  of  a  gland  or  a  trophic  action ;  in  the 
same  way,  in  psychology,  a  state  of  consciousness  ends 
not  always  in  a  movement  but  in  the  resurrection  of 
other  states  of  consciousness  accordmg  to  the  well* 
known  mechanism  of  association. 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

The  contrast  so  often  noted  between  the  specula- 
tive minds  that  dwell  among  abstractions,  and  prac- 
tical people,  is  only  the  visible  and  palpable  expression 
of  those  psychological  conditions  that  we  have  just 
pointed  out.  Let  us  recall  again,  by  way  of  elucida- 
tion, a  few  well-worn  truths  :  the  difference  between 
knowing  the  good  and  practising  it,  seeing  the  absurd- 
ity of  a  belief  and  getting  rid  of  it,  condemning  a  pas- 
sion and  renouncing  it.  All  this  is  explained  by  the 
extremely  feeble  motor  tendency  of  an  isolated  idea. 
We  are  ignorant  of  the  anatomical  and  physiological 
conditions  necessary  for  the  production  of  an  abstract 
idea,  but  we  can  affirm  without  temerity  that  by  the 
time  it  becomes  a  motive  of  action  other  elements  are 
added  to  it ;  which  happens  with  those  who  "are  de- 
voted to  an  idea."     Man  is  led  by  his  feelings  alone. 

II. 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  observations,  voluntary 
activity  appears  to  us  as  a  stage  in  that  ascending  evo- 
lution which  goes  from  the  simple  reflex,  whose  ten- 
dency to  movement  is  irresistible,  to  the  abstract  idea, 
where  the  tendency  to  act  is  at  its  minimum.  Neither 
the  commencement  nor  the  end  can  be  rigorously  fixed, 
the  transition  from  one  form  to  the  other  being  almost 
insensible. 

Designedly,  and  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  we  have 
not  examined  the  problem  in  all  its  complexity.  We 
have  even  eliminated  one  of  the  essential  and  charac- 
teristic elements  of  will.  As  it  has  hitherto  been  con- 
sidered it  might  be  defined  :  A  conscious  act  more  or 
less  deliberate,  in  view  of  an  end  simple  or  complex, 
near  or  remote.     It  is  thus  that  contemporary  authors 


lo    THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

such  as  Maudsley  and  Lewes  appear  to  understand 
it,  when  they  define  it  as  "impulse  by  ideas  "  or  "the 
motor  reaction  of  feehngs  and  ideas."  Thus  under- 
stood, volition  would  simply  be  a  laisser-faire.  But  it 
is  quite  another  thing.  It  is  also  a  power  of  arresta- 
tion,  or,  in  the  language  of  physiology,  an  inhibitive 
power. 

For  the  psychology  founded  upon  interior  observa- 
tion alone,  this  distinction  between  permitting  and 
preventing  has  little  importance ;  but  for  the  psychology 
which  asks  from  the  physiological  mechanism  some 
enlightenment  on  the  operations  of  the  mind, — and 
which  considers  the  reflex  as  the  type  of  all  activity, — 
it  is  of  capital  importance. 

The  prevailing  doctrine  supposes  that  the  will  is  a 
fiat  which  the  muscles  obey,  one  knows  not  how.  In 
this  hypothesis,  it  matters  little  whether  the  fiat  com- 
mands a  movement  or  a  cessation  of  movement.  But 
if  it  be  admitted,  with  all  contemporary  physiologists, 
that  the  reflex  is  the  type  and  basis  of  all  action,  and  if, 
consequently,  there  is  no  room  to  inquire  why  a  state  of 
consciousness  transforms  itself  into  movement,  since 
that  is  the  law,  it  must  be  explained  why  it  does  not  so 
transform  itself.  Unhappily  physiology  is  full  of  ob- 
scurities and  indecisions  upon  this  point. 

The  most  simple  case  of  the  phenomenon  of  stop- 
ping or  inhibition  consists  in  the  suspension  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  heart  by  an  excitation  of  the  pneumogas- 
tric  or  vagus  nerve.  The  heart  is  known  to  be  inner- 
vated, independently  of  the  intra-cardiac  nerve-ganglia, 
by  filaments  coming  from  the  great  sympathetic,  which 
accelerate  its  pulsations,  and  by  filaments  from  the 
vagus. 

The  section  of  these  last  augments  the  movements ; 


INTRODUCTION.  ii 

the  excitation  of  the  central  terminus,  on  the  contrary, 
suspends  them  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time.  It  is  then 
a  nerve  of  arrestation,  and  the  inhibition  is  generally 
considered  as  the  result  of  an  interference.  The  reflex 
activity  of  the  cardiac  centres  is  retarded  or  suspended 
by  the  excitations  coming  from  the  medulla.  In  other 
words,  the  motor  action  of  the  pneumogastric  expends 
itself  in  the  cardiac  centres  which  are  in  a  state  of  ac- 
tivity, and  produces  an  inhibition.  All  this  has  no 
immediate  psychological  bearing,  but  here  is  some- 
thing that  concerns  us  more. 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  reflex  excitability  of 
the  spinal  cord  increases  when  it  is  withdrawn  from 
the  action  of  the  brain.  The  condition  of  decapitated 
animals  furnishes  striking  proofs  of  it.  Without  hav- 
ing recourse  to  these  extreme  cases,  we  know  that  re- 
flexes are  much  more  intense  during  sleep  than  in  the 
waking  state.  In  order  to  explain  this  fact  some  au- 
thors have  supposed  the  existence  in  the  brain  of  cen- 
tres of  arrest.  Setschenow  placed  them  in  the  optic 
thalami  and  the  region  of  the  corpora  quadrigemina. 
He  relied  upon  the  fact  that  by  exciting  those  parts  by 
chemical  or  other  means  he  produced  a  depression  of 
reflex  activity.  Goltz  places  these  inhibiting  centres 
in  the  brain  proper. 

These  and  other  analogous  hypotheses*  have  been 
very  much  criticised,  and  many  physiologists  suppose 
merely  that  in  the  normal  state  the  excitations  distrib- 
ute themselves  at  the  same  time  in  the  brain  by  an 
ascending  course,  and  in  the  spinal  cord  by  a  trans- 
verse course  ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  in  cases  where 

•  For  the  complete  history  of  the  question  may  be  consulted  Eckhard, 
Pkysiologie  des  RUcktnmarks,  in  Hermann's  Physiologie  (Leipsic,  1879),  vol.  ii, 
part  ii,  p.  33  et  seq.,  where  will  be  found  the  experiments  and  interpretations 
of  Setschenow,  Goltz,  Schiff,  Herzen,  Cyon,  etc.,  etc. 


12     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

the  brain  can  plaj'  no  part,  the  excitations  finding  only 
a  single  way  open  there  thence  results  a  sort  of  accumu- 
lation, the  effect  of  which  is  an  exaggerated  reflex  ex- 
citability. 

Recently,  Ferrier,  *  placing  himself  at  a  point  of  view 
the  psychological  importance  of  which  is  evident,  has 
supposed  the  existence  in  the  frontal  lobes  of  moderat- 
ing centres,  which  would  be  the  essential  factor  of  at- 
tention. 

Without  entering  into  more  details,  it  is  seen  that 
for  the  explanation  of  the  mechanism  of  inhibition 
there  is  no  clear  and  universally  accepted  theory  like 
that  for  the  reflexes.  Some  suppose  that  the  arresta- 
tion  comes  from  two  contrary  tendencies  which  impede 
or  annihilate  each  other.  Others  postulate  inhibiting 
centres,  and  even  inhibiting  nerves,  capable  of  sup- 
pressing a  transmitted  action  instead  of  reinforcing  it. 
There  are  still  other  hypotheses,  which  it  is  useless  to 
mention. I  In  this  state  of  ignorance  let  us  examine  the 
question  as  best  we  may. 

In  all  voluntary  inhibition  there  are  two  things  to 
be  considered  :  the  mechanism  that  produces  it,  of  which 
we  have  just  spoken  ;  and  the  state  of  consciousness 
that  accompanies  it,  of  which  we  are  now  tO  speak. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  cases  where  the  arresta- 
tion  does  not  need  to  be  explained,  those  in  which  the 
voluntary  incitation  ceases  of  itself ;  when  we  throw 
aside,  for  example,  a  decidedly  tiresome  book. 

Other  cases  appear  to  be  explainable  by  one  of  the 
hypotheses  given  above.  We  voluntarily  arrest  laugh- 
ter, yawning,  coughing,  and  certain  passionate  move- 

*  Ferrier  (David),  The  Functions  of  the  Brain  (New  York,  1886),  pp.  103,  104. 
+  See  Wundt  (Wilhelm),  Mechanik  der  Nerven  (Stuttgart,  1876),   part  ii,  p. 
84,  et  seq.;  Lewes,  Physical  Basis  of  Mind,  pp.  300-301. 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  1 3 

ments,  by  putting  in  action,  as  it  would  seem,  the  an- 
tagonistic muscles. 

In  the  cases  where  we  do  not  know  how  the  inhibi- 
tion is  produced,  where  the  physiological  mechanism 
remains  unknown,  pure  psychology  can  still  teach  us 
something.  Let  us  take  the  most  commonplace  ex- 
ample :  a  fit  of  anger  stopped  by  the  will.  In  order 
not  to  exaggerate  the  voluntary  power,  let  us  remark 
in  the  first  place  that  this  restraint  is  far  from  being 
the  rule.  Certain  individuals  appear  altogether  inca- 
pable of  it.  Others  are  so  very  unequally;  their  re- 
straining power  varies  according  to  the  time  and  the 
circumstances.  Very  few  are  always  masters  of  them- 
selves. 

There  is  necessary  for  the  production  of  the  re- 
straint one  first  condition  :  time.  If  the  incitationbe 
so  violent  that  it  passes  immediately  into  action,  all  is 
over  ;  whatever  folly  ensues,  it  is  too  late.  If  the  con- 
dition of  time  be  fulfilled,  if  the  state  of  consciousness 
give  rise  to  antagonistic  states,  if  these  be  sufficiently 
stable,  the  restraint  takes  place.  The  new  state  of 
consciousness  tends  to  suppress  the  other,  and,  by  en- 
feebling the  cause,  checks  the  effects. 

It  is  of  prime  importance  for  the  pathology  of  the 
will  to  investigate  the  physiological  phenomenon  which 
occurs  in  such  a  case.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
quantity  of  the  nervous  influx  (whatever  opinion  may 
be  held  as  to  its  nature)  varies  from  one  individual  to 
another,  and  from  one  moment  to  another  in  the  same 
individual.  Neither  can  it  be  doubted  that  at  a  given 
moment  in  any  particular  individual  the  disposable 
quantity  may  be  distributed  in  a  variable  manner.  It 
is  clear  that  in  the  metaphysician  who  is  speculating, 
and  the  man  who  is  satisfying  a  physical  passion,  the 


14     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

quantity  of  nervous  influx  is  not  expended  in  the  same 
manner,  and  that  one  form  of  expenditure  prevents 
the  other,  the  disposable  capital  not  being  able  to 
be  employed  at  the  same  time  for  two  different  pur- 
poses. 

"We  see,"  says  a  physiologist,*  "that  the  excita- 
bility of  certain  nervous  centres  is  reduced  by  calling 
certain  others  into  action,  if  the  excitations  which 
reach  the  latter  possess  a  certain  intensity ;  such  is 
the  fact. 

"  If  we  consider  the  normal  functioning  of  the  ner- 
vous system,  we  observe  that  there  exists  a  necessary 
equilibrium  between  its  different  structures.  We  know 
that  this  equilibrium  can  be  broken  only  by  the  abnor- 
mal predominance  of  certain  centres,  which  seem  to 
divert  to  their  own  profit  too  large  a  part  of  the  ner- 
vous activity;  thenceforth  the  functioning  of  the  other 
centres  shows  itself  to  be  disturbed.  .  .  .  There  are 
general  laws  which  preside  over  the  apportionment  of 
the  nervous  activity  in  the  different  points  of  the 
system,  as  there  are  mechanical  laws  governing  the 
circulation  of  the  blood  in  the  vascular  system  ;  if  a 
great  perturbation  arises  in  an  important  vascular  de- 
partment, the  effect  cannot  fail  to  be  felt  at  all  other 
points  in  the  system.  These  laws  of  hydrodynamics 
we  perceive,  because  the  fluid  in  circulation  is  accessi- 
ble to  us,  and  we  know  the  properties  of  the  vessels 
that  contain  it,  and  the  effects  of  elasticity,  muscular 
contraction,  etc.  But  the  laws  of  the  distribution  of 
nervous  activity,  of  that  species  of  circulation  of  what 
has  been  named  the  nervous  fluid, — who  knows  them? 
We  observe  the  effects  of  rupture  of  the  equilibrium  of 

*  Franck  (Francois) ,  Dictionnaire  encyclopSdique  des  sciences  midicales 
(Paris,  1878),  art.  "  Nerveux,"  p.  572. 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

nerve-action,  but  they  are  essentially  variable  distur- 
bances, which  still  refuse  to  lend  themselves  to  any 
theory.  We  can  only  take  note  of  their  production, 
and  keep  account  of  the  conditions  that  accompany 
them." 

If  we  apply  these  general  considerations  to  our  par- 
ticular case,  what  do  we  see?  The  original  state  of  con- 
sciousness (anger)  has  awakened  antagonistic  states, 
varying  necessarily  from  one  man  to  another  :  the  idea 
of  duty,  or  the  fear  of  God,  of  opinion,  of  the  laws,  of 
disastrous  consequences,  etc. 

There  is  thus  produced  a  second  centre  of  action, 
that  is  to  say,  in  physiological  terms,  a  derivation  of 
the  nervous  afHux,  an  impoverishment  of  the  first  state 
to  the  profit  of  the  second.  Is  this  derivation  sufficient 
to  re-establish  the  equilibrium?  The  event  alone  gives 
the  answer. 

But  when  the  inhibition  takes  place  it  is  never 
more  than  relative,  and  its  only  result  is  to  lead  to  a 
diminished  action.  What  remains  of  the  original  im- 
pulse expends  itself  as  it  can,  by  half-restrained  ges- 
tures, visceral  agitations,  or  some  artificial  derivation, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  soldier  who  while  he  was  being  shot 
chewed  a  bullet,  so  that  he  might  not  cry  out.  Very 
few  are  sufficiently  well  endowed  by  nature  and  fash- 
ioned by  habit  as  to  reduce  the  reflexes  to  imperceptible 
movements.  This  derivation  of  the  nervous  influx  is 
not  then  a  primitive  fact,  but  a  state  of  secondary  forma- 
tion, established  at  the  expense  of  the  first  by  means 
of  an  association. 

Let  us  remark  again  that,  besides  the  birth  of  these 
two  antagonistic  centres  of  action,  there  are  other 
causes  which  tend  to  enfeeble  directly  the  primitive 
impulses. 


1 6  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

But  we  ought  here  to  examine  the  difficulty  more 
closely,  for  the  co-existence  of  these  two  contrary  states 
of  consciousness,*  though  sufficient  to  produce  indeci- 
sion, uncertainty,  and  inaction,  is  not  enough  to  cause 
a  voluntary  arrestation,  in  the  real  sense  of  the  word, 
an  "I  will  not."  A  further  condition  is  necessary.  It 
is  found  in  an  affective  element  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance of  which  we  have  said  nothing.  Feelings  are 
not  all  stimulants  to  action.  Many  of  them  have  a  de- 
pressive character.  Terror  may  be  considered  as  their 
extreme  type.  In  its  highest  degree  its  effect  is  pros- 
trating. A  man  suddenly  stricken  with  a  great  sorrow 
is  incapable  of  any  reaction,  voluntary  or  reflex.  The 
cerebral  anaemia,  the  arresting  of  the  heart  sometimes 
bringing  on  death  by  syncope,  the  perspiration  with 
coldness  of  the  skin,  the  relaxation  of  the  sphincters  : 
all  shows  that  the  excitability  of  the  muscular,  vaso- 
motor, secretory,  and  other  centres  is  temporarily  sus- 
pended. This  case  is  extreme,  but  it  gives  an  enlarge- 
ment to  our  view.  Below  it  we  have  all  possible  de- 
grees of  fear,  with  all  the  corresponding  degrees  of 
depression. 

Descending  from  this  maximum  to  moderate  fear, 
the  depressive  effect  diminishes,  but  without  changing 
in  nature.  Pray  how  are  the  movements  of  anger 
stopped  in  the  child?  By  threats  and  reproofs  ;  that  is 
to  say,  by  the  production  of  a  new  state  of  consciousness 
of  a  depressive  character,  and  calculated  to  paralyse 
the  action.  "A  child  of  three  months  and  a  half,"  says 
B.  Perez,  "understands,  from  the  expression  of  the 
countenance  and  the  tone  of  the  voice,  that  it  is  being 
reprimanded  ;  then  its  forehead  contracts,  its  lips  twitch 

*It  is  well  understood  that  we  do  not  separate  them  from  their  physio- 
logical conditions,  which  are  the  principal  element. 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  1 7 

convulsively  and  pout  an  instant,  its  eyes  become  moist 
with  tears,  and  it  is  on  the  point  of  sobbing."* 

The  new  state  tends,  then,  to  supplani;  the  other, 
not  only  by  its  own  strength,  but  by  the  enfeeblement 
that  it  inflicts  upon  the  entire  being. 

If,  in  spite  of  repeated  menaces,  the  inhibition  be 
not  produced,  the  individual  is  little  or  not  at  all  edu- 
cable  in  this  respect.  If  it  be  produced,  the  result  is 
that,  in  virtue  of  a  well-known  law,  an  association  tends 
to  be  established  between  the  two  states ;  the  first 
awakens  the  second, — its  corrective, — and,  by  habit, 
the  restraint  becomes  more  and  more  easy  and  rapid. 
In  those  who  are  masters  of  themselves  the  restraint 
takes  place  with  that  certainty  which  is  the  mark  of 
every  perfect  habit.  It  is  clear,  moreover,  that  the  tem- 
perament and  the  character  are  of  yet  more  significance 
here  than  education. 

It  is  then  not  surprising  that  a  tempest  should  give 
way  before  cold  ideas,  before  states  of  consciousness 
whose  motor  tendency  is  quite  weak  ;  it  is  because 
there  is  behind  them  an  accumulated,  latent,  uncon- 
scious force,  such  as  we  have  just  observed. 

For  an  understanding  of  this  apparent  miracle,  the 
educated  and  reflecting  adult  must  not  be  considered, 
but  the  child.  With  the  latter  (the  savage,  and  the 
unpolished  or  uneducable  man  approximate  to  it)  the 
tendency  to  act  is  immediate.  The  work  of  education 
consists  precisely  in  arousing  these  antagonistic  states  ; 
and  by  education  must  be  understood  that  which  the 
child  owes  to  its  own  experience  as  well  as  that  which 
it  receives  from  others. 

I  believe  it  needless,  moreover,  to  point  out  that 

*  Bernard  Perez,  Les  trots  premieres  annies  de  I' enfant,  p.  33.  Translated 
by  Alice  M.  Christi,  The  First  Three  Years  of  Childhood  (London,  1885),  p.  29. 


1 8  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE    WILL. 

all  the  sentiments  which  produce  an  arrest :  fear  or 
respect  for  persons,  laws,  customs,  or  God,  have  been 
in  origin  and  always  remain  depressive  states,  tending 
to  diminish  action. 

In  short,  the  phenomenon  of  inhibition  can  be  ex- 
plained in  a  way  sufficient  for  our  purpose,  by  an  anal- 
ysis of  the  psychological  conditions  under  which  it  is 
produced,  whatever  opinion  one  may  have  regarding 
the  physiological  mechanism.  It  would  doubtless  be 
desirable  to  see  into  it  more  distinctly,  to  have  a  clearer 
idea  of  the  fnodus  operandi  by  which  two  nearly  simul- 
taneous excitations  neutralise  each  other.  If  this  ob- 
scure question  were  settled  our  conception  of  the  will 
as  a  restraining  power  would  become  more  precise,  and 
perhaps  be  greatly  modified.  We  must  resign  our- 
selves to  waiting  ;  we  shall,  moreover,  meet  with  this 
most  difficult  problem  again,  in  other  forms. 

III. 

We  have  hitherto  considered  the  voluntary  activity 
under  an  exclusively  analytical  form,  which  is  unable 
to  give  an  exact  idea  of  it,  or  show  it  in  its  totality.  It 
is  neither  a  simple  transformation  of  some  states  of 
consciousness  or  other  into  movement,  nor  a  simple 
power  of  restraint ;  it  is  the  distinctive  reaction  of  an 
individual.  We  must  insist  upon  this  point,  without 
which  the  pathology  is  incomprehensible. 

The  first  characteristic  of  voluntary  movements  is 
that  they  are  adapted;  but  this  is  a  mark  they  have  in 
common  with  the  immense  majority  of  physiological 
movements ;  the  difference  is  only  in  degrees. 

Leaving  aside  the  movements  of  a  pathological  order 
(convulsions,  St.  Vitus's  dance,  epilepsy,  etc.)  which 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  19 

occur  in  the  form  of  a  violent  and  irregular  discharge, 
adaptation  is  to  be  met  with  from  the  lowest  to  the 
highest. 

Ordinary  reflexes  are  reactions  of  the  spinal  cord, 
adapted  to  conditions  which  are  very  general,  and  con- 
sequently very  simple,  uniform,  and  invariable  from 
one  individual  to  another  (save  in  exceptional  cases). 
They  have  a  specific  character. 

Another  group  of  reflexes  represents  the  reactions 
of  the  base  and  the  medial  portion  of  the  encephalon, 
—  the  medulla,  corpora  striata,  and  optic  thalami. 
These  reactions  also  are  adapted  to  general  conditions 
which  are  only  slightly  variable,  but  of  an  order  very 
much  more  complex  :  it  is  the  "sensory-motor"  activity 
of  certain  authors.  They  have  still  a  character  rather 
more  specific  than  individual,  so  great  is  their  resem- 
blance in  different  individuals  of  the  same  species. 

Cerebral  reflexes,  especially  the  highest,  consist  in 
a  reaction  adapted  to  conditions  which  are  very  com- 
plex, very  variable,  very  unstable,  differing  from  one 
individual  to  another,  and  from  one  instant  to  another 
in  the  same  individual.  These  are  the  ideo-motor  re- 
actions, the  volitions.  However  perfect  it  may  be,  this 
adaptation  is  still  not  the  thing  that  is  of  importance  to 
us.  It  is  only  an  effect,  the  cause  of  which  is  not  voli- 
tion but  intellectual  activity. 

The  intellect  being  a  correspondence,  a  continual 
adjustment  of  internal  to  external  relations,  and  in  its 
highest  form  a  perfectly  co-ordinated  adjustment ;  the 
co-ordination  of  these  states  of  consciousness  implies 
that  of  the  movements  which  express  them.  As  soon 
as  an  end  is  chosen,  it  acts  after  the  manner  of  what 
metaphysicians  call  a  final  cause  :  it  brings  about  the 
selection  of  the  means  proper  for  attaining  it.     The 


20  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL, 

adaptation  is  then  a  result  of  the  mechanism  of  the  in- 
tellect.    We  need  not  dwell  upon  this  point. 

But  what  interests  us  is  this  cJwicc,  this  preference 
declared  after  a  longer  or  shorter  comparison  of  mo- 
tives. It  is  this  that  represents  the  individual  reac- 
tion, which  is  distinct  from  the  specific  reactions,  and, 
as  we  shall  see  in  the  pathology,  sometimes  inferior, 
sometimes  superior  to  them. 

What  is  this  choice  ?  Considered  in  its  form,  it  is 
nothing  more  than  a  practical  affirmation,  a  judgment 
that  accomplishes  itself.  Let  it  be  well  remarked: 
From  the  physiological  and  exterior  side  nothing  dis- 
tinguishes a  voluntary  movement  from  an  involuntary 
one ;  the  mechanism  is  the  same,  whether  I  wink  my 
eye  by  reflex  action  or  designedly  in  order  to  warn  an 
accomplice.*  From  the  psychological  and  interior 
side  nothing  distinguishes  the  judgment,  in  the  logical 
sense  of  the  word,  that  is,  a  theoretical  affirmation, 
from  volition  ;  except  that  the  latter  expresses  itself  by 
an  act,  and  is  thus  a  judgment  put  in  execution. 

But  what  is  it,  considered  in  its  essence  instead 
of  in  its  form?  Let  us  dwell  upon  this  fundamental 
point  and  try  to  clear  it  up.  By  descending  to  some 
very  lowly  biological  facts,  we  shall  perhaps  see  better 
in  what  a  choice  consists.  In  order  not  to  lose  my- 
self in  remote  analogies,  I  will  say  nothing  of  physi- 
cal affinity  (for  example,  that  of  the  magnet  for  iron). 
In  the  vegetable  kingdom,  I  will  simply  recall  that  the 
insectivorous  plants,  like  the  Dioncea  (Venus's  fly-trap), 

*  In  physiology  a  distinction  is  made  between  voluntary  and  involuntary 
muscles,  although  it  is  understood  that  this  distinction  has  in  it  nothing  abso- 
lute. There  are  persons,  like  the  physiologist  E.  F.  Weber,  who  can  at  will  stop 
the  motions  of  their  heart ;  others,  like  Fontana,  can  produce  a  contraction  of 
the  iris,  etc.  A  movement  is  voluntary,  when,  as  a  result  of  successive  and  re- 
peated efforts,  it  is  linked  to  a  state  of  consciousness  and  under  its  control. 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

select  certain  bodies  which  come  into  contact  with 
them  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  The  amoeba  chooses 
in  the  same  way  certain  organic  fragments,  with  which 
it  nourishes  itself.  These  facts  are  incontestable,  but 
their  interpretation  is  difficult.  They  are  explained,  in 
general,  by  a  relation  of  molecular  composition  be- 
tween what  chooses  and  what  is  chosen.  Without 
doubt,  choice  is  here  exerted  in  a  very  limited  field  ;  but 
it  is  also  no  more  than  its  rudest  form,  almost  physical. 
By  the  origin  and  development  of  a  more  and  more 
complex  nervous  system,  this  blind  affinity  is  developed 
into  a  conscious  tendency,  then  into  several  contradic- 
tory tendencies,  one  of  which  prevails  —  that  which 
represents  the  maximum  of  affinity  (the  dog  which 
hesitates  between  several  messes  and  ends  in  choosing 
one).  But  in  all  cases  choice  expresses  the  nature 
of  the  individual,  at  a  given  minute,  under  given  cir- 
cumstances, and  in  a  given  degree ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
more  feeble  the  affinity  the  less  marked  is  the  pre- 
ference. Hence  we  are  able  to  say  that  choice,  let  it 
result  from  a  single  tendency,  from  several  tendencies, 
from  a  present  sensation,  from  images  recalled,  from 
complex  ideas,  or  from  complicated  calculations  reach- 
ing out  into  futurity,  is  always  founded  on  an  affinity, 
an  analogy  of  nature,  an  adaptation.  This  is  true  in 
the  case  of  the  animal,  lower  or  higher,  and  of  man, 
for  vice  or  virtue,  for  science  or  pleasure  or  ambition. 
To  limit  ourselves  to  man,  two  or  more  states  of  con- 
sciousness arise  as  possible  ends  of  action  ;  after  some 
oscillations,  one  is  preferred,  chosen.  Why,  if  not  be- 
cause that  between  that  state  and  the  sum  of  conscious, 
sub-conscious,  and  unconscious  (purely  physical)  states 
which  at  the  moment  constitute  the  person,  the  ego, 
there  is  conformity,  analogy  of  nature,  affinity?    This 


22  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

is  the  only  possible  explanation  of  choice,  unless  to 
admit  that  it  is  without  cause.  It  is  proposed  to  me 
to  kill  a  friend ;  this  tendency  is  repulsed  with  horror, 
excluded ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  in  contradiction  with  my 
other  tendencies  and  sentiments,  there  is  no  possible 
association  between  it  and  them,  and  by  that  very  fact 
it  is  annihilated. 

In  the  criminal,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  estab- 
lished between  the  representation  of  murder  and  the 
feelings  of  hatred  or  cupidity  a  bond  of  congruity,  that 
is  to  say,  of  analogy;  it  is  consequently  chosen,  affirmed 
as  having  ought  to  be.  Considered  as  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness, volition  is,  then,  nothing  more  than  an  affirma- 
tion (or  a  negation).  It  is  analogous  to  the  judgment, 
with  this  difference,  that  one  expresses  a  relation  of 
congruity  (or  incongruity)  between  ideas,  the  other 
the  same  relation  between  tendencies  ;  that  one  is  a 
repose  for  the  mind,  the  other  a  stage  on  the  way  to 
action  ;  that  one  is  an  acquisition,  the  other  an  aliena- 
tion ;  for  the  intellect  is  an  economy,  and  the  will  an 
expenditure.  But  volition  by  itself,  as  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness, has  no  more  efficacy  to  produce  an  act  than 
a  judgment  to  produce  truth.  The  efficacy  comes  from 
elsewhere.  We  will  return  in  the  conclusion  to  this 
very  important  point.*  The  ultimate  reason  of  the 
choice  is  then  in  the  character,  that  is  to  say,  in  what 
constitutes  the  peculiar  mark  of  the  individual  in  the 

*  We  have  just  expressed  under  another  form  this  evident  fact  that  the 
choice  proceeds  always  in  the  direction  of  the  greatest  pleasure.  No  animal, 
endowed  vyith  reason  or  deprived  of  it,  healthy  or  diseased,  can  will  anything 
but  what  seems  to  it  at  the  moment  its  greatest  good  or  its  least  ill.  Even  the 
man  who  prefers  death  to  dishonor  or  apostasy  chooses  the  least  disagreeable 
part.  The  individual  character  and  the  degree  of  development  of  the  reason 
cause  the  choice  sometimes  to  mount  very  high,  sometimes  to  fall  very  low ;  but 
it  always  tends  towards  what  pleases  the  most.  The  contrary  is  impossible. 
That  is  a  psychological  truth  so  clear  that  the  ancients  had  already  laid  it  down 
as  an  axiom,  and  it  has  taken  volumes  of  metaphysics  to  obscure  it. 


INTRODUCTION,  23 

psychological  sense   and   differentiates  him  from  all 
other  individuals  of  his  species. 

The  character,  or,  to  employ  a  more  general  term, 
the  person,  the  ego,  which  is  to  us  a  cause,  is  it  in  its 
turn  an  effect?  No  doubt ;  but  we  need  not  occupy 
ourselves  here  with  the  causes  which  produce  it.  The 
science  of  character,  which  John  Stuart  Mill  called 
for,  more  than  forty  years  ago,  under  the  name  of 
ethology,  is  not  yet  in  existence,  nor  is  it,  it  seems  to 
me,  near  to  being  formed.  Were  it  so,  we  should  only 
have  to  accept  its  results,  without  attempting  an  ex- 
cursion into  its  domain  ;  for  to  ascend  forever  from 
effects  to  causes,  in  an  endless  progression,  would  be 
to  follow  the  vagaries  of  metaphysics.  Yet  again,  for 
the  subject  which  occupies  us,  the  character  is  an  ulti- 
mate fact,  a  true  cause,  even  though  for  investigations 
of  another  kind  it  be  an  effect.  Let  us  remark  in  pass- 
ing, and  merely  by  way  of  suggestion,  that  the  charac- 
ter— that  is  to  say,  the  ego,  in  so  much  as  it  reacts — 
is  an  extremely  complex  product,  that  heredity,  pre- 
natal and  post-natal  physiological  conditions,  educa- 
tion, and  experience  have  contributed  to  form.  It  can 
be  stated  also  without  temerity,  that  what  constitutes 
it  are  much  rather  affective  states,  a  peculiar  manner 
of  feeling,  than  an  intellectual  activity.  It  is  this  gen- 
eral manner  of  feeling,  this  permanent  tone  of  the  or- 
ganism, which  is  the  first  and  true  motor.  If  it  is 
lacking,  man  can  no  more  will ;  pathology  will  show  us 
this.  It  is  because  this  fundamental  state  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  constitution  of  the  individuals,  stable  or 
fluctuating,  continuous  or  variable,  energetic  or  feeble, 
that  there  are  three  principal  types  of  will,  strong, 
weak,  and  intermittent,  with  all  the  degrees  and  shades 
of  which  these  types  admit ;    but,   we  again  repeat. 


24  THE  DISEASES  OE  THE   WILL. 

these  differences  arise  from  the  character  of  the  indi- 
vidual, which  depends  upon  his  special  constitution ; 
there  is  nothing  to  be  sought  for  beyond  that. 

We  are,  then,  completely  in  accord  with  those  who 
deny  that  the  predominance  of  one  motive  is  sufficient 
to  explain  volition.  The  preponderating  motive  is 
but  a  part  of  the  cause,  and  always  the  least,  although 
the  most  visible  ;  and  it  only  has  efficacy  in  so  far  as 
it  is  chosen,  that  is  to  say,  as  it  enters  as  an  integral 
part  into  the  sum  of  states  which  constitute  the  ego  at 
a  given  moment,  and  as  its  tendency  to  act  is  added 
to  that  group  of  tendencies  which  spring  from  the  char- 
acter, to  be  consolidated  with  them.  It  is  then  in  no 
wise  necessary  to  make  of  the  ego  an  entity,  or  to  place 
it  in  a  transcendental  region  in  order  to  recognise  in  it  a 
true  causality.  It  is  a  fact  of  experience,  very  simple, 
very  clear  ;  the  contrary  is  not  comprehensible. 

Physiologically,  this  signifies  that  the  voluntary 
act  differs  both  from  the  simple  reflex,  where  a  single 
impression  is  followed  by  a  single  contraction,  and 
from  more  complex  forms,  where  a  single  impression 
is  followed  by  a  number  of  contractions ;  that  it  is  the 
result  of  the  entire  nervous  organisation,  which  itself 
reflects  the  nature  of  the  whole  organism  and  reacts  in 
consequence.  Psychologically,  it  signifies  that  the 
voluntary  act,  in  its  complete  form,  is  not  the  simple 
transformation  of  a  state  of  consciousness  into  move- 
ment, but  that  it  supposes  the  participation  of  the 
whole  group  of  conscious  or  sub-conscious  states  which 
constitute  the  ego  at  a  given  moment. 

We  are  therefore  justified  in  defining  the  will  to  be 
an  individual  reaction,  and  in  holding  it  for  that  which 
is  the  very  inmost  in  us.     The  ego,  although  an  effect, 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  25 

is  a  cause.  It  is  so  in  the  most  rigorous  sense,  in  such 
a  way  as  to  satisfy  all  exigencies. 

To  sum  up,  we  have  seen  that  from  the  lowest  re- 
flex to  the  highest  will,  the  transition  is  insensible,  and 
that  it  is  impossible  to  say  exactly  at  what  moment 
there  commences  the  volition  proper,  that  is  to  say, 
the  personal  reaction.  From  one  extreme  of  the  series 
to  the  other,  the  difference  is  reduced  to  two  points  : 
on  one  hand,  an  extreme  simplicity;  on  the  other,  an 
extreme  complexity; — on  one  hand,  a  reaction  always 
the  same  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  same  species  ; 
on  the  other,  a  reaction  which  varies  according  to  the 
individual,  that  is  to  say,  according  to  a  particular 
organism  limited  in  time  and  space.  Simplicity  and 
permanence,  complexity  and  mutation,  go  together. 

It  is  clear  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  evolution, 
all  reactions  have  been  in  their  origin  individual.  They 
have  become  organic,  specific,  by  numberless  repeti- 
tions in  the  individual  and  the  race.  The  origin  of  will 
is  in  the  property  which  living  matter  has  of  reacting, 
its  end  is  in  the  property  which  living  matter  has  of 
acquiring  habits ;  and  it  is  that  involuntary  activity 
forever  fixed  which  serves  as  support  and  instrument 
to  the  individual  activity. 

But  among  the  higher  animals  the  hereditary  leg- 
acy, the  accidents  of  birth,  the  continual  adaptation 
to  conditions  varying  at  every  instant,  do  not  permit 
the  individual  reaction  to  become  fixed  or  to  take  the 
same  form  in  all  individuals.  The  complexity  of  their 
environment  is  a  safeguard  against  automatism. 

We  here  bring  to  an  end  these  preliminaries,  with 
the  reminder  that  their  single  aim  was  to  prepare  for 
the  pathological  study  upon  which  we  are  now  to  enter. 


CHAPTER  I. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  CHE  WILL.     I.  DEFECT  OF 
IMPULSE. 

We  have  seen  that  this  term  7vill  applies  to  acts 
which  differ  considerably  in  regard  to  the  conditions 
of  their  genesis,  but  which  all  have  this  character  in 
common,  of  being,  in  some  form  and  degree,  a  re- 
action of  the  individual.  Without  returning  to  that 
analysis,  let  us  note,  for  the  sake  of  clearness  and  pre- 
cision, two  exterior  characters  by  which  true  volition 
is  recognisable  :  it  is  a  definitive  state  ;  it  expresses 
itself  by  an  act. 

Irresolution,  which  is  the  beginning  of  a  morbid 
state,  has  interior  causes  that  pathology  will  enable  us 
to  understand  :  it  arises  from  the  weakness  of  the  in- 
citations  or  from  their  ephemeral  action.  Among  ir- 
resolute characters,  some — a  very  small  number — are 
so  on  account  of  a  wealth  of  ideas.  The  comparison  of 
motives,  reasoning,  the  calculation  of  consequences, 
constitute  an  extremely  complex  cerebral  state  wherein 
the  tendencies  to  action  counteract  one  another.  But 
this  opulence  of  ideas  taken  alone  is  not  a  sufficient 
cause  of  irresolution  ;  it  is  only  an  adjuvant  cause. 
The  true  cause  here  as  everywhere  is  in  the  character. 

In  the  irresolute  who  are  poor  in  ideas,  this  can  be 
seen  more  clearly.     If  they  act  it  is  always  in  the  di- 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  27 

rection  of  the  least  action  or  of  the  most  feeble  resist- 
ance. Deliberation  leads  with  difficulty  to  choice,  and 
choice  with  more  difficulty  to  an  act. 

Volition,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  definitive  state;  it 
closes  the  debate.  By  its  means  a  new  state  of  con- 
sciousness— the  selected  motive — enters  into  the  ego 
as  an  integral  portion  to  an  exclusion  of  other  states. 
The  ego  is  thus  constituted  in  a  set  manner.  In  fickle 
natures  this  definitive  state  is  always  provisional,  that 
is  to  say,  the  willing  ego  is  so  unstable  a  compound 
that  the  most  insignificant  state  of  consciousness  that 
may  spring  up  modifies  or  vv'holly  changes  it.  The 
compound  formed  at  each  instant  has  no  force  of  resis- 
tance at  the  instant  which  follows.  In  that  sum  of  con- 
scious and  unconscious  states  which  from  moment  to 
moment  represents  the  causes  of  volition,  the  part 
played  by  the  individual  character  is  a  minimum,  the 
share  of  the  exterior  circumstances  a  maximum.  We 
fall  back  into  that  inferior  form  of  volition  studied 
above  which  consists  in  a  "letting  go." 

After  all  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that  to  will  is 
to  act,  that  volition  is  a  transition  to  action.  To  re- 
duce the  will,  as  has  sometimes  been  done,  to  a  simple 
resolution,  that  is,  to  the  theoretical  affirmation  that  a 
thing  is  to  be  done,  is  to  content  oneself  with  an  ab- 
straction. Choice  is  but  one  stage  in  the  process  of 
volition.  If  it  does  not  translate  itself  into  action,  im- 
mediately, or  in  due  time,  there  is  no  longer  anything 
to  distinguish  it  from  a  logical  operation  of  the  mind. 
It  resembles  those  written  laws  which  are  not  enforced. 

These  remarks  made,  we  enter  upon  the  domain  of 
pathology.  We  may  divide  the  diseases  of  the  will  into 
two  great  classes,  according  as  it  is  impaired  or  extin- 
guished. 


28    THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

The  impairments  of  the  will  constitute  the  most 
important  part  of  its  pathology  ;  they  show  the  mech- 
anism out  of  order.  We  shall  subdivide  them  into 
two  groups. 

1.  Impairment  by  defect  of  impulse  ; 

2.  Impairment  by  excess  of  impulse. 

3.  Because  of  their  importance  we  shall  examine 
separately  the  impairments  of  voluntary  attention. 

4.  Finally,  under  the  title  of  "The  Realm  of  Ca- 
prices," we  shall  study  a  peculiar  state  in  which  the 
will  never  succeeds  in  forming  itself,  or  does  so  only 
by  accident. 


The  first  group  contains  facts  of  a  simple  and  clear 
character,  the  examination  of  which  is  instructive.  In 
the  normal  state  a  suggestion  of  it  is  found  in  those 
easy-going  characters  who,  in  order  to  act,  need  to 
have  another  will  added  to  their  own  ;  but  disease  will 
show  us  this  state  prodigiously  exaggerated. 

Guislain  has  described  in  general  terms  that  im- 
pairment which  physicians  designate  by  the  name  of 
abulia.  "The  patients  know  how  to  will  interiorly, 
mentally,  according  to  the  dictates  of  reason.  They 
may  experience  the  desire  to  do  something,  but  are 
powerless  to  act  accordingly.  There  is  at  the  bottom 
of  their  understanding  an  incapacity.  They  would 
wish  to  work  and  they  cannot.  .  .  .  Their  will  cannot 
go  beyond  certain  limits ;  one  would  say  that  this 
power  of  action  undergoes  an  inhibition:  the  I  will 
does  not  transform  itself  into  impelling  volition,  into 
active  determination.  Some  patients  are  themselves 
astonished  at  the  impotence  with  which  their  will  is 
stricken.  .  .  .  When  they  are  left  to  themselves  they 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE    WILE  29 

pass  entire  days  in  their  bed  or  on  a  chair.  When  any 
one  addresses  and  arouses  them,  they  express  them- 
selves suitably,  although  in  a  short  manner ;  and  they 
judge  of  things  fairly  well."* 

As  those  patients  whose  intellect  is  intact  are  the 
most  interesting,  we  shall  cite  only  cases  of  this  kind. 
One  of  the  oldest  and  best-known  observations  is  due 
to  Esquirol : 

"A  magistrate,  very  distinguished  for  his  learning 
and  power  of  language,  was,  as  a  result  of  troubles, 
attacked  with  a  fit  of  monomania.  .  .  .  He  has  recov- 
ered the  entire  use  of  his  reason  ;  but  he  will  not  go 
into  the  world  again,  although  he  recognises  that  he  is 
wrong  ;  nor  take  care  of  his  business,  although  he 
knows  well  that  it  suffers  on  account  of  his  whim.  His 
conversation  is  both  rational  and  clever.  When  one 
speaks  to  him  of  travelling,  or  of  looking  after  his 
affairs,  he  answers  :  '  I  know  that  I  ought  to  do  it,  and 
yet  I  cannot.  Your  counsels  are  very  good ;  I  would 
like  to  follow  your  advice.  I  am  convinced,  but  only 
make  me  able  to  will  with  that  volition  which  deter- 
mines and  executes.'  'It  is  certain,'  he  said  to  me 
one  day,  '  that  I  have  no  will  except  not  to  will ;  for  I 
have  all  my  reason ;  I  know  what  I  ought  to  do  ;  but 
strength  fails  me  when  I  ought  to  act.'  "f 

The  English  Dr.  Bennett  reports  the  case  of  a  man 
"who  frequently  could  not  carry  out  what  he  wished 
to  perform.  Often,  in  endeavoring  to  undress,  he  was 
two  hours  before  he  could  get  off  his  clothes,  all  his 
mental  faculties,  volition  excepted,  being  perfect.     On 

*  Joseph  Guislain,  Leqons  orales  sur  les  phrenopathies  (Paris,  i?8o),  vol.  i, 
pp.  256,  479.  See  also  Wilhelm  Griesinger,  Traiti  des  maladies  tneniales 
(translated  from  the  German  by  Dr.  Doumie,  Paris,  1865),  p.  86  ;  Leubuscher, 
Zeitschrift  filr  Psyckiatrtc,  iv,  1847,  "  Ueber  Abulie,"  pp.  562-578. 

t  E.  Esquirol,  Des  maladies  mentahs  (Paris,  1838),  i,  421. 


30     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

one  occasion,  having  ordered  a  glass  of  water,  it  was 
handed  to  him  on  a  tray,  but  he  could  not  take  it,  al- 
though anxious  to  do  so ;  he  kept  a  servant  standing 
before  him  half  an  hour  before  the  obstruction  was 
overcome.  It  seemed  to  him,  he  said,  'as  if  another 
person  had  taken  possession  of  his  will.'  "* 

An  author  who  must  always  be  cited  for  the  facts 
of  morbid  psychology,  Thomas  De  Quincey,  has  de- 
scribed for  us  from  his  own  experience  this  paralysis 
of  the  will.  The  observation  is  so  much  the  more  val- 
uable that  it  is  due  to  a  subtle  mind  and  a  skilful  writer. 

Owing  to  a  prolonged  abuse  of  opium  he  was  com- 
pelled to  abandon  studies  that  he  had  formerly  fol- 
lowed with  great  interest.  He  shrank  from  them  with 
a  sense  of  powerlessness  and  infantine  feebleness,  with 
an  anguish  so  much  the  greater  from  remembering  the 
time  when  he  had  consecrated  to  them  hours  of  delight. 
One  unfinished  work  to  which  he  had  given  the  best 
of  his  intellect  brought  to  him  no  longer  aught  but  a 
"tomb  of  hopes  defeated,  of  baffled  efforts,  of  materials 
uselessly  accumulated,  of  foundations  laid  that  were 
never  to  support  a  superstructure."  In  "this  state  of 
volitional  but  not  intellectual  weakness,"  he  applied 
himself  to  political  economy,  a  study  for  which  he  had 
been  once  eminently  qualified.  After  having  discov- 
ered very  many  errors  in  the  current  doctrines,  he 
found  in  the  treatise  of  Ricardo  a  satisfaction  for  his 
intellectual  thirst,  and  a  pleasure  and  an  activity  which 
for  a  long  time  he  had  not  known.  Thinking  that  some 
important  truths  had,  however,  escaped  the  scrutinis- 
ing eye  of  Ricardo,  he  conceived  the  project  of  a  "  Pro- 

*Prof.  J.  H.  Bennett  (on  the  authority  of  Sir  Robert  Chrlstison),  The  Mes- 
meric Mania  of  iSji,  p.  i6,  cited  by  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology  (London 
1874).  p.  385. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  31 

legomena  of  Future  Systems  of  Political  Economy." 
Arrangements  were  made  for  printing  and  publishing 
the  work,  and  it  was  twice  announced.  But  he  had  to 
write  a  preface  and  a  dedication  to  Ricardo,  and  he 
found  himself  entirely  incapable  of  doing  it ;  so  the 
arrangements  were  countermanded  and  the  work  re- 
mained on  his  table. 

''This  state  of  intellectual  torpor  I  experienced 
more  or  less  throughout  the  four  years  during  which  I 
was  under  the  Circean  spells  of  opium.  But  for  the 
mental  suffering  I  might  indeed  be  said  to  have  ex- 
isted in  a  dormant  state.  I  seldom  could  prevail  upon 
myself  to  write  a  letter  :  an  answer  of  a  few  words  to 
any  that  I  received  was  the  utmost  that  I  could  accom- 
plish, and  often  this  not  until  the  letter  had  lain  weeks, 
or  even  months,  on  my  writing-table.  Without  the 
aid  of  M.,  all  records  of  bills  paid  or  to  be  paid  must 
have  perished,  and  my  whole  domestic  economy — 
whatever  became  of  political  economy — must  have 
gone  into  an  irretrievable  confusion.  I  shall  not  after- 
wards allude  to  this  part  of  the  case.  It  is  one,  how- 
ever, which  the  opium-eater  will  find  in  the  end  as 
oppressing  and  tormenting  as  any  other,  from  the 
sense  of  incapacity  and  feebleness,  from  the  direct 
embarrassment  incident  to  the  neglect  or  procrastina- 
tion of  each  day's  appropriate  duties,  and  from  the  re- 
morse which  must  often  exasperate  the  stings  of  these 
evils  to  a  reflective  and  conscientious  mind. 

"The  opium-eater  loses  none  of  his  moral  sensibili- 
ties or  aspirations ;  he  wishes  and  longs  as  earnestly 
as  ever  to  realise  what  he  believes  possible  and  feels 
to  be  exacted  by  duty;  but  his  intellectual  apprehen- 
sion of  what  is  profitable,  infinitely  outruns  his  power 
not  only  of  carrying  out  but  even  of  attempting.      He 


32     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

lies  under  the  weight  of  incubus  and  nightmare  ;  he 
lies  in  sight  of  all  that  he  would  fain  perform,  just  as 
a  man  forcibly  confined  to  his  bed  by  the  mortal  lan- 
guor of  a  relaxing  disease  who  is  compelled  to  witness 
injury  or  outrage  offered  to  some  object  of  his  tender- 
est  love  :  he  curses  the  spells  which  chain  him  down 
from  motion  ;  he  would  lay  down  his  life  if  he  might 
but  get  up  and  go  out ;  but  he  is  powerless  as  an  in- 
fant and  cannot  even  attempt  to  rise."  * 

I  will  close  with  one  final  observation — a  little  long, 
the  longest  I  know  of,  but  one  which  will  show  the 
malady  under  all  its  aspects.  It  is  reported  by  Billod 
in  the  Annales  mcdico-psychologiqiies. 

It  is  the  case  of  a  man  sixt3'-five  years  old,  "of  a 
strong  constitution,  lymphatic  temperament,  a  well- 
developed  intellect,  especially  in  all  that  concerns  busi- 
ness matters,  and  a  moderate  degree  of  sensitiveness." 
Being  very  much  attached  to  his  profession  of  notary 
it  was  only  after  long  hesitations  that  he  determined 
upon  selling  his  practice.  Afterwards  he  fell  into  a 
state  of  profound  melancholy,  refusing  nourishment, 
believing  himself  ruined,  and  pushing  despair  to  the 
point  of  an  attempt  at  suicide.  I  neglect,  in  what  fol- 
lows, only  some  details  which  are  purely  medical  or 
without  interest  for  us,  and  I  permit  the  observer  to 
speak. 

"The  faculty  which  appeared  to  us  the  most  seri- 
ously impaired  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  was  the  will. 
....  The  patient  frequently  manifests  an  incapacity 
of  willing  to  execute  certain  acts,  although  he  has  the 
desire  to  do  so  and  his  healthy  judgment  by  a  wise 
liberation  makes  him  see  their  expediency  and  often 
even  their  necessity." 

*  Confessions  of  an  Opium  Eater  (Boston,  1851),  p.  106  et  seq. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  33 

He  was  confined  in  the  asylum  at  Ivry;  it  was  de- 
cided that  he  should  undertake  with  Mr.  Billed  a  trip 
to  Italy. 

"When  his  approaching  departure  was  announced 
to  him,  'I  shall  never  be  able  to,'  he  said,  'though  I 
find  it  dull  here  ;  will  I  then  remain  all  my  life  at 
Ivry?'  The  day  before  starting,  he  announced  anew 
that  he  never  could.  On  the  day  itself  he  arose  at  six 
in  the  morning  to  go  and  make  this  declaration  to  Mr. 
Mitivie.  More  or  less  resistance  was  therefore  appre- 
hended, but  when  I  presented  myself,  he  did  not  make 
the  least  opposition  ;  only,  as  if  he  felt  his  will  ready 
to  escape  him,  he  said  :  'Where  is  the  cab?  let  me  hurry 
and  get  into  it.' 

"  It  would  be  idle  to  take  the  reader  with  us,  and 
make  him  a  witness  of  all  the  phenomena  presented 
by  the  patient  during  this  trip.  These  phenomena 
may  very  well  be  resumed  in  three  or  four  principal 
ones  that  I  shall  give  as  a  criterion  of  all  the  others. 

"The  first  presented  itself  at  Marseilles.  The  pa- 
tient, before  setting  out,  had  to  execute  a  power  of 
attorney  to  authorise  his  wife  to  sell  a  house.  He  draws 
it  up  himself,  copies  it  upon  headed  paper  and  pre- 
pares to  sign  it,  when  there  arises  a  difficulty  upon 
which  we  were  far  from  counting.  After  having  writ- 
ten his  name,  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  him  to  make 
the  paraph.  There  is  question,  it  is  true,  of  a  com- 
plicated paraph,  but  Mr.  P.  had  always  executed  it 
with  ease.  Vainly  did  the  patient  struggle  with  this 
difficulty.  A  hundred  times  at  least  he  makes  with  his 
hand  above  the  sheet  of  paper  the  movement  neces- 
sary to  the  act,  which  proves  conclusively  that  the  ob- 
stacle is  not  in  the  hand  ;  a  hundred  times  the  restive 
will  is  unable   to  command  the  fingers  to  apply  the 


34  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

pen  to  the  paper.  Mr.  P.  does  his  utmost ;  he  stands 
up  impatiently,  stamps  on  the  ground,  then  sits  down 
again  and  makes  new  attempts  :  the  pen  is  still  unable 
to  apply  itself  to  the  paper.  Will  any  one  deny  here 
that  Mr.  P.  had  an  earnest  desire  to  finish  his  signa- 
ture, and  that  he  understood  the  importance  of  this 
act  ?  Will  any  one  deny  the  integrity  of  the  organ 
charged  with  executing  the  paraph?  It  is  evidently 
impossible  to  deny  it.  The  agent  appears  as  sound 
as  the  instrument ;  but  the  first  cannot  bring  itself  to 
bear  upon  the  second.  The  will — that  power  by  which 
the  hand  should  be  set  to  performing  the  act  conceived 
and  judged  necessary  by  the  intellect — is  evidently 
wanting.  This  struggle  lasted  three  quarters  of  an 
hour  ;  the  succession  of  efforts  ended  at  last  in  a  result 
of  which  I  had  despaired  :  the  paraph  was  very  im- 
perfect, but  it  was  executed.  I  was  witness  of  this 
struggle  ;  I  took  the  keenest  interest  in  it,  as  the  reader 
may  well  imagine,  and  I  testify  that  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  establish  more  clearly  an  incapacity  of  willing 
in  spite  of  a  desire  to  do  so.* 

"■  I  observed  some  days  afterwards  an  incapacity  of 
the  same  kind.  There  was  question  of  going  out  a 
little  after  dinner.  Mr.  P.  had  the  keenest  desire  to 
do  so  ;  he  had  wished,  he  said  to  me,  to  have  an  idea 
of  the  appearance  of  the  city.  For  five  days  in  succes- 
sion, he  took  his  hat,  arose  and  prepared  to  set  out ; 
but,  vain  hope,  his  will  could  not  command  his  legs 
to  put  themselves  in  motion  in  order  to  take  him  into 
the  street.  .  .  .  'Evidently  I  am  my  own  prisoner,' 
said  the  patient,  '  it  is  not  you  who  prevent  me  from 
going  out,  it  is  not  my  legs  that  oppose  it  ...  .  what 

*  I  transcribe  this  observation  literally,  without  any  reflexion  upon  the 
psychological  doctrine  of  the  author. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE    WILL.  35 

is  It  then?'  Mr.  P.  complained  thus  of  not  being  able 
to  will,  in  spite  of  the  wish  that  he  had  to  do  so.  At 
last,  after  five  days,  making  a  final  effort,  he  succeeded 
in  going  out,  only  to  return  five  minutes  afterwards 
perspiring  and  panting  as  if  he  had  been  running  sev- 
eral kilometers,  and  very  much  astonished  himself  at 
what  he  had  just  done. 

"  Instances  of  this  incapacity  reappeared  every  mo- 
ment. If  the  patient  had  the  desire  of  witnessing  a 
play,  he  could  not  will  to  go  to  it  ;  when  at  table  among 
amiable  companions  he  would  have  wished  to  take  part 
in  conversation,  but  the  same  powerlessness  always 
followed  him.  It  is  true  that  this  impotence  often  ex- 
isted only,  so  to  speak,  in  apprehension  ;  the  patient 
feared  that  he  would  not  be  able,  and  yet  succeeded 
even  more  than  he  expected  ;  but  often,  too,  it  must 
be  said,  his  apprehension  was  justified." 

After  six  days  passed  at  Marseilles,  the  patient  and 
the  doctor  set  off  for  Naples  ;  "but  it  was  not  without 
extraordinary  difficulty."  During  these  six  days  "the 
patient  formally  expressed  a  refusal  to  embark,  and  a 
desire  to  return  to  Paris,  being  frightened  in  advance  at 
the  idea  of  finding  himself  with  his  diseased  will  In  a 
foreign  country,  and  declaring  that  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  handcuff  him  in  order  to  take  him.  On  the  day 
of  departure  he  did  not  make  up  his  mind  to  leave  the 
hotel  until  he  believed  me  determined  to  resort  to  a 
forcing  apparatus ;  and  having  gone  out  of  the  hotel 
he  stopped  in  the  street,  where  he  would  doubtless 
have  remained  if  I  had  not  sent  for  some  seamen  that 
an  employ^  of  the  packet-boat  office  had  the  kindness 
to  place  at  my  disposition,  who,  however,  needed  only 
to  show  themselves.  .  .  . 


36  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

"Another  circumstance  tends  to  bring  out  still  more 
the  lesion  of  the  will.  We  were  at  Rome,  where  we 
arrived  the  very  day  of  the  election  of  Pope  Pius  IX. 
My  patient  said  to  me,  'This  is  a  circumstance  that  I 
would  call  fortunate,  if  I  were  not  sick.  I  should  like 
to  be  able  to  witness  the  coronation ;  .  .  •  but  I  do  not 
know  whether  I  can;  I  will  try.'  The  day  having 
come,  the  patient  rose  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
took  out  his  black  coat  from  his  trunk,  shaved  him- 
self, etc.,  and  said  to  me  :  'You  see,  I  am  doing  very 
much,  I  do  not  yet  know  whether  I  shall  be  able  to 
go.'  At  last,  at  the  hour  of  the  ceremony,  he  made  a 
great  effort  and  succeeded  with  much  difficulty  in  go- 
ing down.  But  ten  days  afterwards,  at  the  feast  of 
St.  Peter,  the  same  preparations  and  the  same  efforts 
led  to  no  result.  'You  see  well,' the  patient  said  to 
me,  'that  I  am  still  my  own  prisoner.  It  is  not  the 
desire  that  is  lacking  to  me,  since  I  have  been  getting 
ready  for  three  hours  ;  here  I  am  shaved,  dressed,  and 
gloved,  and  yet  I  am  no  longer  able  to  leave  this 
place.' 

"In  short,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  attend  the 
ceremony.  I  had  insisted  very  much,  but  I  did  not 
think  that  I  ought  to  compel  him. 

*'  I  will  bring  to  an  end  this  already  rather  extended 
observation  by  a  single  remark ;  it  is,  that  the  instinc- 
tive movements,  the  kind  not  subject,  properly  speak- 
ing, to  the  will,  were  not  impeded  in  our  patient  like 
those  which  may  be  called  directed.  Thus,  on  arriving 
at  Lyons,  upon  our  return,  our  mail-coach  running  over 
a  woman  whom  the  horses  had  knocked  down,  my  pa- 
tient recovered  all  his  energy,  and,  without  waiting  for 
the  carriage  to  stop,  threw  off  his  cloak,  opened  the 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL,  37 

door,  and  was  the  first  to  descend  to  the  woman's 
side." 

The  author  adds  that  the  trip  did  not  have  the 
efficacy  that  he  expected  ;  that  the  patient  felt  better, 
however,  in  a  carriage,  especially  when  it  was  hard 
and  the  road  bad  ;  and  that  he  finally  returned  to  his 
family  in  just  about  the  same  condition  as  at  first.* 

The  cases  above  cited  represent  a  very  definite 
group.  There  spring  from  them  some  very  clear  facts 
and  some  very  probable  inductions.  Let  us  look,  in 
the  first  place,  at  the  facts. 

1.  The  muscular  system  and  the  organs  of  move- 
ment are  intact.  From  this  side  there  is  no  impedi- 
ment. The  automatic  activity,  that  which  constitutes 
the  ordinary  routine  of  life,  persists. 

2.  The  inteUigence  is  perfect ;  at  least,  nothing 
authorises  one  to  say  that  it  has  suffered  the  least  im- 
pairment. The  end  is  clearly  conceived,  the  means 
likewise,  but  the  transition  to  act  is  impossible. 

Here,  then,  we  have  a  disease  of  the  will  in  the 
most  rigorous  sense.  We  may  remark  in  passing  that 
disease  makes  for  us  a  curious  experiment.  It  creates 
exceptional  conditions,  which  could  not  be  produced 
in  any  other  way  :  it  divides  the  man,  annihilates  the 
individual  reaction,  leaves  the  rest  intact ;  it  produces 
for  us,  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  a  being  reduced  to 
pure  intelligence. 

Whence  comes  this  impotence  of  the  will?  Here 
the  inductions  begin.  There  are  only  two  hypotheses 
possible  regarding  its  immediate  cause  ;  it  consists  in 

*.Dr.  E.  Billed,  "  Maladies  de  la  volonte,"  part  ii,  in  Annales  midico-psy- 
chologigues,  vol.  x,  p.  172  et  seq.  The  author  cites  several  other  cases  of  a 
much  less  olear  character,  which  we  shall  not  describe  (see  pp.  184,  319,  et 
seq.) 


38    THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

an  impairment  either  of  the  motor  centres*  or  of  the 
incitations  that  they  receive. 

Let  us  examine  these  two  hypotheses,  beginning 
with  the  second,  which  seems  to  me  the  more  plaus- 
ible. 

Esquirol  has  preserved  for  us  the  remarkable  an- 
swer that  a  patient  made  to  him  after  he  had  been 
cured.  "This  lack  of  activity  arose  from  the  fact  that 
my  sensations  were  too  weak  to  exert  an  influence 
upon  my  will."  The  same  author  has  also  noted  the 
profound  change  that  these  patients  experience  in  their 
general  sense  of  life.  "My  existence,"  one  of  them 
writes  to  him,  "is  incomplete  ;  the  functions  and  acts 
of  ordinary  life  have  remained  to  me,  but  in  each  of 
them  there  is  something  lacking,  to  wit,  the  sensation 
which  is  proper  to  them  and  the  joy  which  follows  them. 
.  .  .  Each  one  of  my  senses,  each  part  of  myself,  is, 
so  to  speak,  separated  from  me,  and  can  no  longer 
procure  for  me  any  sensation."  Would  a  psychologist 
better  express  to  what  degree  the  affective  life  is 
stricken,  in  that  which  is  most  general  in  it? 

Billod  reports  the  case  of  a  young  Italian  woman 
"of  brilliant  education,"  who,  having  become  insane 
through  disappointment  in  love,  was  healed,  but  only 
to  fall  into  a  profound  apathy  regarding  everything. 
"She  reasons  soundly  upon  all  subjects,  but  she  no 
longer  has  any  will,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word, 
neither  power  to  will  or  to  love,  nor  consciousness  of 
what  happens  to  her,  of  what  she  feels,  or  of  what  she 
does.  .  .  .  She  says  that  she  finds  herself  in  the  state 
of  one  who  is  neither  dead  nor  alive,  who  lives  in  a 


*  We  would  remark  that  there  is  question  of  the  condition,  not  of  the  mo- 
tor organs,  but  of  the  centres,  whatever  opinion  may  be  held  regarding  their 
nature  and  localisation. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE  WILL.  39 

perpetual  sleep,  to  whom  objects  appear  as  though 
wrapped  in  a  cloud,  and  to  whom  persons  seem  to 
move  about  like  shadows,  and  words  to  come  from  a 
distant  world."* 

If,  as  we  shall  see  at  length  later  on,  the  voluntary 
act  is  composed  of  two  very  distinct  elements  :  a  state 
of  consciousness  totally  impotent  to  cause  or  prevent 
action,  and  organic  states  which  alone  have  this  power; 
it  must  be  admitted  that  the  two  events,  ordinarily 
simultaneous  because  they  are  the  effects  of  the  same 
cause,  are  here  disassociated.  The  inability  to  act  is 
a  fact.  Is  the  intensity  of  the  state  of  consciousness 
(which,  in  any  case,  is  intermittent)  also  a  fact?  In 
that  case  it  would  be  necessary  to  admit  that  the  neces' 
sary  and  sufficient  conditions  occur,  but  for  this  event 
alone.  Is  it  an  illusion  ?  I  am  inclined  to  think  that 
it  is.  The  ardent  desire  to  act,  that  some  of  these 
patients  believe  themselves  to  experience,  appears  to 
me  a  simple  illusion  of  their  consciousness.  The  in- 
tensity of  a  desire  is  something  entirely  relative.  In 
that  state  of  general  apathy,  a  given  impulse  that  ap- 
pears strong  to  them  is  in  fact  below  the  mean  inten- 
sity; whence  the  inaction.  In  studying  the  state  of  the 
will  in  somnambulism,  we  shall  see  later  on  that  certain 
subjects  are  persuaded  that  it  depends  wholly  upon 
themselves  to  act,  but  that  they  are  finally  compelled 
by  experience  to  admit  that  they  are  wrong  and  that 
their  consciousness  deceives  them  completely,  "j" 

On  the  contrary,  when  an  excitation  is  very  vio- 
lent, sudden  and  unexpected,  that  is  to  say,  unites  all 
the  conditions  of  intensity,  it  most  frequently  acts.   We 

*  Billed,  Annales  midico-psychoLigzques,  loc.  cit.,  p.  184. 
t  See  Chapter  V,  infra. 


40    THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

have  seen,  above,  a  patient  recover  his  energy  to  save 
a  woman  who  had  been  run  over.* 

Each  one  of  us  can,  moreover,  picture  to  himself 
this  state  of  abulia ;  for  there  is  no  one  who  has  not 
been  through  hours  of  dejection  in  which  all  incite- 
ments, exterior  and  interior,  sensations  and  ideas,  re- 
main inoperant,  leave  us  cold.  It  is  a  touch  of  abulia. 
There  is  only  the  difference  between  a  less  and  a 
greater,  between  a  transient  condition  and  a  chronic 
state. 

If  these  patients  cannot  will,  it  is  because  all  the 
projects  they  conceive  awaken  in  them  but  feeble  de- 
sires, insufificient  to  impel  them  to  action.  I  express 
myself  thus  in  order  to  conform  to  the  current  phrase- 
ology; for  it  is  not  the  weakness  of  the  desires,  con- 
sidered as  simple  psychic  states,  which  induces  the  in- 
action. That  would  be  to  reason  from  appearances 
only.  As  we  have  shown  above,  every  state  of  the  ner- 
vous system,  corresponding  to  a  sensation  or  an  idea, 
expresses  itself  so  much  the  better  in  movement  as  it 
is  accompanied  by  those  other  neural  states,  whatever 
they  may  be,  which  correspond  to  feelings.  It  is  from 
the  weakness  of  these  states  that  abulia  results,  not 
from  the  weakness  of  the  desires,  which  is  only  a  sign. 

The  cause  is  then  a  relative  insensibility,  a  general 
impairment  of  sensibility;  what  is  attacked  is  the  emo- 
tional life,  the  possibility  of  being  moved.  Whence 
does  this  morbid  state  itself  come?  The  problem  is 
chiefly  of  a  physiological  order.  Beyond  doubt  there 
is  in  patients  of  this  class  a  notable  depression  of  the 
vital  activities.  It  may  reach  such  a  point  that  all  the 
faculties  are  affected  and  the  individual  becomes  an 

*  I  have  learned  from  Dr.  Billed  that  this  patient  recovered  his  activity  in 
consequence  of  the  events  of  June,  1848,  and  the  emotions  they  caused  him. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  41 

inert  thing.  This  is  the  state  that  the  physicians  desig- 
nate by  the  names  of  melancholia,  lypemania,  and 
stupor,  whose  physical  symptoms  are  a  slackening  of 
the  circulation,  a  lowering  of  the  temperature  of  the 
body,  and  an  almost  complete  immobility.  These  ex- 
treme cases  go  beyond  our  subject ;  but  they  reveal  to 
us  the  ultimate  causes  of  the  impotences  of  the  will 
Every  depression  in  the  vital  tone,  slight  or  profound, 
fugitive  or  lasting,  has  its  effect.  The  will  so  little  re- 
sembles a  faculty  reigning  as  a  mistress  that  it  depends 
at  each  instant  upon  the  most  trivial  and  hidden  causes; 
it  is  at  their  mercy.  And  yet,  as  it  has  its  source  in 
the  biological  processes  that  take  place  in  the  inmost 
depths  of  our  tissues,  we  see  how  true  it  is  to  say  that 
it  is  our  very  self. 

We  may  venture  another  hypothesis  and  seek  the 
explanation  of  abulia  in  the  order  of  motor  manifesta- 
tions. Between  the  resolution  which  expresses  itself 
by  an  "I  will,"  and  which  is  a  purely  mental  act,  and 
the  execution  of  the  movements  willed,  which  is  a 
purely  physical  act,  there  is  an  intermediate  stage 
which  is  the  awakening  and  excitation  of  the  motor 
images.  All  our  movements,  executed  at  first  at  ran- 
dom, leave  after  them  traces,  residua,  which  constitute 
a  motor  memory,  thanks  to  which,  after  a  period  of 
gropings  and  apprenticeship,  the  will,  become  mistress 
of  its  instrument,  has  only  to  speak  to  be  obeyed. 
Might  it  not  be  supposed  that  these  motor  images  are 
impaired  or  lost  and  that  as  a  result  the  will  remains 
suspended  in  a  void  and  impotent  to  pass  into  action? 
As  specious  as  this  hypothesis  may  be,  it  is  not  ten- 
able. It  would  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  these  dis- 
eases of  the  will  are  diseases  of  the  memory;  but  abulia 
is  not  a  kind  of  amnesia.     The  agraphic  patient  who, 


42  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

through  loss  of  the  motor  images,  no  longer  knows 
how  to  write,  totally  differs  from  Billod's  patient  who, 
as  soon  as  he  succeeds  in  acting,  writes  like  any  one 
else. 

It  would  be  more  permissible  to  associate  abulia 
with  \^\Q  psychic  paralyses  studied  by  Reynolds,  Charcot, 
and  other  authors.  In  cases  of  this  kind,  the  patient 
is  paralysed  because  he  believes  himself  paralysed. 
The  whole  treatment  consists  in  extirpating  from  his 
mind  this  debilitating  image.  As  soon  as  he  believes 
himself  able  to  act  he  acts.*  Yet,  does  this  not  bring 
us  back  indirectly  to  the  first  hypothesis?  For  how  can 
the  idea  of  a  motor  impotence  act  except  through  the 
state  of  depression  which  accompanies  it,  that  is  to  say, 
through  a  diminishing  of  excitation. 

The  reader  may  choose  between  the  two  hypotheses 
which  have  been  propounded  ;  our  preferences  are  for 
the  first  one.f 

II. 

The  second  group  resembles  the  first  in  its  effects 
(enfeeblement  of  the  will)  and  in  its  causes  (depressive 
influences).  The  only  difference  is  that  the  incitation 
to  act  is  not  extinct.  The  first  group  presents  positive 
causes  of  inaction,  the  second  group  negative  causes. 
The  inhibition  results  from  an  antagonism. 

In  all  of  the  observations  which  are  to  follow,  the 
impairment  of  the  will  arises  from  a  sentiment  of  fear, 
without  a  reasonable  motive,  which  varies  from  simple 

*  These  psychical  paralyses  can  be  produced  by  suggestions  in  the  hyp- 
notic state.  One  can  paralyse  the  organs  of  speech,  an  arm,  a  leg,  etc.  An 
afiBrmation  creates  the  infirmities,  the  contrary  affirmation  destroys  them. 

t  For  a  very  detailed  study  of  a  case  of  abulia  (mania  of  doubt)  see  the 
articles  by  Mr.  Pierre  Janet,  in  the  Revue  philosophique,  March  and  April, 
i8gi.    That  author  explains  it  by  a  "psychic  disintegration." 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  43 

anxiety  to  anguish  and  stupefying  terror.  The  intel- 
lect appears  intact  in  certain  cases,  impaired  in  others. 
So  some  of  these  cases  are  of  a  doubtful  character,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  they  denote  a  malady  of 
the  will  alone.* 

The  following  observation  makes  the  transition 
from  one  group  to  the  other  ;  to  tell  the  truth  it  belongs 
to  both. 

A  man  thirty  years  of  age  finds  himself  mixed  up 
in  riots  which  cause  him  a  great  fright.  Thereafter, 
although  he  has  preserved  his  perfect  lucidity  of  mind, 
although  he  administers  his  fortune  very  well  and  directs 
an  important  business,  "he  cannot  remain  alone,  either 
in  the  street  or  in  his  room  ;  he  is  always  accom- 
panied. When  he  is  away  from  home  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  him  to  return  alone  to  his  domicile.  If  he 
does  go  out  alone,  which  very  rarely  occurs,  he  soon 
stops  in  the  middle  of  the  street,  and  would  remain 
there  indefinitely,  without  going  either  forwards  or 
backwards,  if  some  one  did  not  bring  him  back.  He 
appears  to  have  a  will,  but  it  is  that  of  the  people  who 
surround  him.  When  one  desires  to  overcome  this  re- 
sistance of  the  patient,  he  falls  into  a  swoon."  f 

Several  alienists  have  recently  described  under  the 
names  of  fear  of  spaces,  fear  of  places  (^Platzangsf),  and 
agoraphobia,  a  fantastic  anxiety  which  paralyses  the 
will,  and  against  which  the  individual  is  powerless  to 
react,  or  succeeds  in  doing  so  only  by  indirect  means. 

An  observation  by  Westphal  may  serve  as  a  type. 

*  It  is  well  to  remark  once  for  all  that,  studying  here  only  the  disorders 
exclusively  characteristic  of  the  will,  we  have  had  to  eliminate  the  cases 
where  the  psychic  activity  is  affected  in  its  totality,  and  those  in  which  de- 
rangements of  the  will  are  only  the  effect  and  the  manifestation  of  intellectual 
insanity. 

t  Billod,  loc.  cit.,  p.  191, 


44     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

A  robust  traveller,  perfectly  healthy  in  mind  and  pre- 
senting no  disturbance  of  motility,  finds  himself  seized 
with  a  sense  of  anguish  at  the  sight  of  a  public  place  or 
of  a  space  of  any  considerable  extent.  If  he  has  to  cross 
one  of  the  great  squares  of  Berlin,  he  has  the  feeling 
that  the  distance  is  one  of  several  miles,  and  that  he 
will  never  be  able  to  reach  the  other  side.  This  emo- 
tion diminishes  or  disappears  if  he  goes  around  the 
square  following  the  houses,  or  if  he  is  accompanied, 
or  even  if  he  simply  supports  himself  upon  a  cane. 

Carpenter  reports,  after  Bennett,*  a  '' paralysis  of 
the  will,"  which  seems  to  me  of  the  same  order. 
"When  a  certain  man  took  a  walk  in  the  street  and 
came  to  some  break  in  the  line  of  houses,  he  was  un- 
able to  go  on  any  further  ;  his  will  became  suddenly 
inactive.  The  encountering  of  a  square  never  failed 
to  stop  him.  To  cross  a  street  was  also  something  very 
difficult,  and  when  he  passed  the  threshold  of  a  door 
in  entering  or  going  out  he  was  always  arrested  for 
some  minutes." 

Others,  in  the  open  country,  feel  at  ease  only  when 
walking  beside  bushes  or  under  the  shelter  of  the  trees. 
Examples  might  be  multiplied,  but  without  profit,  as 
the  fundamental  fact  remains  the  same.f 

The  medical  discussions  regarding  this  morbid  state 
do  not  concern  us  here.  The  psychological  fact  re- 
duces itself  to  a  feeling  of  fear,  like  so  many  others 
that  are  met  with,  and  it  is  indifferent  that  this  feeling 
is  puerile   and  chimerical   as  regards  its  causes  ;  we 

»  Loc.  cit.,  p.  385. 

t  For  further  details,  see  Westphal,  Archiv  fiir  Psyckiatrie,  vol.  iii  (two 
articles);  Cordes,  ibid.;  Legrand  du  SauUe,  Annales  medico-psyckologigues, 
1876,  p.  405,  with  a  discussion  of  this  subject ;  Ritti,  Dictionnaire  encyclopidigue 
des  sciences  mSdicnles.  article  "  Folie  avec  conscience  ";  Maudsley,  Pathology 
of  Mind  (French  translation,  p.  339,  seq.). 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  45 

have  only  to  note  its  effect,  which  is  to  hinder  voH- 
tion.  But  we  must  inquire  whether  this  depressive 
influence  merely  arrests  the  volitional  impulse,  which 
remains  intact  in  itself,  or  whether  the  power  of  indi- 
vidual reaction  is  also  impaired.  The  second  hypoth- 
esis imposes  itself  upon  us,  for  the  feeling  of  fear  not 
being  insurmountable  (as  these  patients  prove  in  cer- 
tain cases)  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  individual's 
power  of  reaction  has  fallen  below  the  general  level ; 
in  such  wise  that  the  arrest  results  from  two  causes 
which  act  in  the  same  direction. 

Unfortunately  the  physiological  conditions  of  this 
impairment  are  not  known.  Numerous  conjectures 
have  been  made.  Cordes,  himself  stricken  with  this 
infirmity,  considers  it  "afunctional  paralysis,  symp- 
tomatic of  certain  modifications  of  the  motor  centres, 
and  capable  of  giving  rise  to  certain  impressions  within 
us.  Specifically,  it  would  be  an  impression  of  fear 
which  would  give  rise  to  a  transient  paralysis  ;  an  effect 
almost  null  if  the  imagination  alone  comes  into  play, 
but  carried  to  the  highest  degree  by  the  adjunction  of 
accessory  circumstances."  The  primitive  cause  would 
be  then  "a  paretic  exhaustion  of  the  motor  nervous 
system,  of  that  portion  of  the  brain  which  presides 
not  only  over  locomotion  but  also  over  muscular  sensi- 
bility." 

This  explanation,  if  it  were  well  established,  would 
be  of  great  importance  to  our  subject.  It  would  show 
that  the  impotence  of  the  will  depends  upon  an  im- 
potence of  the  motor  centres,  which  would  have  the 
advantage  of  giving  to  our  researches  a  secure  physio- 
logical basis.  But  it  would  be  premature  to  draw  here 
conclusions  which  would  be  better  placed  at  the  end 
of  our  work. 


46  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

I  shall  not  speak  at  length  regarding  the  mental 
state  called  doubting-insanity  or  fumbling-mania  {Grii- 
belsucht).  It  represents  the  pathological  form  of  the 
irresolute  character,  just  as  abulia  is  that  of  the  apa- 
thetic character.  It  is  a  state  of  constant  hesitation 
from  the  most  trivial  motives,  with  inability  to  reach 
any  definitive  result. 

The  hesitation  exists  at  first  in  the  purely  intellec- 
tual order.  The  patient  asks  himself  endless  ques- 
tions. I  borrow  an  example  from  Legrand  du  Saulle. 
"A  very  intelligent  woman  cannot  go  out  in  the  street 
without  asking  herself  :  '  Is  some  one  going  to  fall  out 
of  a  window  at  my  feet?  Will  it  be  a  man  or  a  wo- 
man? Will  the  person  be  wounded  or  killed?  If 
wounded,  will  it  be  in  the  head  or  the  legs?  Will 
there  be  blood  on  the  sidewalk  ?  If  the  person  is  killed 
how  shall  I  know  it  ?  Ought  I  to  call  for  help,  or  to 
run  away,  or  to  recite  a  prayer  ?  Shall  I  be  accused 
of  being  the  cause  of  this  occurrence?  Will  my  inno- 
cence be  recognised?  '  and  soon."  These  interroga- 
tions continue  without  end,  and  there  exist  a  great 
number  of  analogous  cases,  recorded  in  special  treat- 
ises.* 

If  there  were  nothing  more  than  this  "psychological 
rumination,"  as  the  author  cited  expresses  it,  we  should 
have  nothing  to  say  regarding  it ;  but  this  morbid  per- 
plexity of  the  intellect  expresses  itself  in  the  actions. 
The  patient  no  longer  dares  to  do  anything  without 
endless  precautions.  If  he  writes  a  letter,  he  reads  it 
over  several  times,  for  fear  he  may  have  forgotten  a 
word  or  offended  against  orthography. 

♦  Consult  in  particular:  Legrand  du  Saulle,  La  folic  du  doute  avec  dilire 
du  toucher,  1875;  Griesinger,  Archiv  fUr  Psychiatric,  1869;  Berger,  ibid.,  1876; 
Ritti,  Dictionnaire  encyclopidique,  loc.  cit. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE  WILL.  47 

If  he  is  shutting  up  a  piece  of  furniture  he  verifies 
several  times  over  the  success  of  his  operation.  In 
the  same  way  for  his  apartment ;  there  is  a  repeated 
verification  of  the  fastenings,  of  the  presence  of  the 
key  in  his  pocket,  of  the  state  of  his  pocket,  etc. 

In  a  graver  form,  the  patient,  pursued  by  a  puerile 
fear  of  dirtiness  or  unwholesome  contact,  no  longer 
dares  to  touch  pieces  of  money,  door-knobs,  window- 
fastenings,  etc.,  and  lives  amid  perpetual  apprehen- 
sions. Such  was  the  cathedral  beadle  mentioned  by 
Morel,  who,  worried  for  twenty-five  years  by  absurd 
fears,  no  longer  dares  to  touch  his  halberd,  reasons 
with  himself,  rails  at  himself,  and  triumphs  over  him- 
self, but  by  a  sacrifice  that  he  is  apprehensive  of  being 
unable  to  make  the  next  time.* 

This  malady  of  the  will  results  in  part  from  weak- 
ness of  character,  in  part  from  the  intellectual  state. 
It  is  quite  natural  that  this  flux  of  chimerical  ideas 
should  express  itself  in  useless  acts,  not  adapted  to 
reality;  but  the  impotence  of  the  individual  reaction 
plays  an  important  role.  So  we  find  a  lowering  of  the 
vital  tone.  The  proof  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the 
causes  of  this  morbid  state  (hereditary  neuropathies, 
debilitating  maladies);  in  the  crises  and  the  syncope 
to  which  the  effort  to  act  may  lead ;  and  in  the  ex- 
treme forms  of  the  disease  where  these  miserable  per- 
sons, consumed  by  hesitations  without  respite,  no 
longer  write,  no  longer  listen,  no  longer  speak,  "but 
talk  to  themselves  in  a  low  voice,  then  in  an  under- 
tone, and  in  some  cases  end  by  simply  moving  the 
lips,  expressing  their  ideas  by  a  sort  of  murmur  (nuts- 
sit  at  io7i). 

Finally,  let  us  note  the  cases  in  which  the  impair- 

♦  Archives  ginirales  de  tnidecine,  1866. 


48  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL, 

ment  of  the  will  borders  on  extinction.  When  a  per- 
manent and  obtrusive  state  of  consciousness  is  accom- 
panied by  a  feeling  of  intense  terror,  there  occurs  an 
almost  absolute  inhibition,  and  the  patient  appears 
stupid  without  being  so.  Of  this  character  is  the  case 
reported  by  Esquirol  of  a  young  man  who  appeared  to 
be  an  idiot,  who  had  to  be  dressed,  put  to  bed,  and 
fed,  and  who,  after  his  recovery,  acknowledged  that 
an  interior  voice  used  to  say  to  him  :  "Do  not  move, 
or  you  are  dead."  * 

Guislain  also  reports  a  curious  fact,  but  one  in 
which  the  absence  of  psychological  data  leaves  us  in  a 
quandary  and  permits  only  an  equivocal  interpreta- 
tion. "A  young  lady,  courted  by  a  young  man,  was 
seized  with  a  mental  alienation,  whose  true  cause  was 
unknown  and  whose  distinctive  feature  was  a  strong 
contrariness  of  disposition,  which  was  soon  transformed 
into  a  morbid  mutism.  During  twelve  years  she  made 
answer  to  questions  only  twice  ;  the  first  time,  under 
the  influence  of  her  father's  imperative  words ;  the 
second,  on  her  entrance  into  our  establishment.  In 
both  cases  she  was  strangely,  surprisingly  laconic." 

For  two  months  Guislain  devoted  himself  to  re- 
peated attempts  to  effect  a  cure.  "My  efforts  were 
vain  and  my  exhortations  without  effect.  I  persisted, 
and  very  soon  I  noticed  a  change  in  the  features,  a 
more  intelligent  expression  in  the  eyes ;  a  little  later 
she  would  utter  from  time  to  time  some  sentences, 
clear,  categorical  explanations,  interrupted  by  long  in- 
tervals of  silence  ;  for  the  patient  showed  an  extreme 
repugnance  to  yielding  to  my  entreaties.  ...  It  could 
be  seen  that  each  time  her  self-love  was  gratified  by 
the  victory  that  she  obtained  over  herself.     In  her  an- 

♦  Esquirol,  vol.  ii,  p.  287. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  49 

swers  there  could  never  be  observed  the  shghtest  in- 
sane idea  ;  her  alienation  was  exclusively  a  malady  of 
the  impulsive  will.  Often  a  sort  of  bashfulness  seemed 
to  restrain  this  patient,  whom  I  began  to  consider  as 
decidedly  convalescent.  For  two  or  three  days  she 
ceased  to  speak  ;  then,  as  a  result  of  renewed  solicita- 
tions, speech  returned  to  her  again,  until  at  last  she 
took  part,  of  her  own  accord,  in  the  conversations  go- 
ing on  around  her.  .  .  .  This  recovery  is  one  of  the 
most  astonishing  that  I  have  seen  in  my  life."* 

The  author  adds  that  the  restoration  was  complete 
and  lasting. 

This  state  of  morbid  inertia,  of  which  abulia  is  the 
type,  where  the  "I  will"  is  never  followed  by  action, 
shows  that  volition,  considered  as  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness, and  the  efficient  power  of  acting  are  two  distinct 
things.  Without  insisting  for  the  moment  on  this 
point,  let  us  dwell  upon  this  fact  of  effort,  which  is  of 
prime  importance  in  the  psychology  of  the  will,  and 
which  is  lacking  here. 

The  feeling  of  muscular  effort  has  been  studied  by 
Mr.  William  Jamesf  in  a  manner  so  profound  and  so 
rigorous  that  there  is  no  need  of  going  over  it  again, 
and  it  is  sufficient  to  recall  briefly  his  conclusions. 
That  physiologist  has  shown  that  the  sense  of  the  mus- 
cular energy  expended  in  any  act  whatever  is  *'a  com- 
plex afferent  sensation,  which  comes  from  the  con- 
tracted muscles,  the  tense  ligaments,  the  compressed 
articulations,  the  firm  chest,  the  closed  glottis,  the 
contracted  eye-brow,  the  set  jaws,  etc."  He  has  dis- 
cussed, point  by  point,  supporting  himself  on  the  results 
of  experiment,  the  opinion  which  makes  of  it  an  effer- 

*Guislain,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  227,  228. 
t  The  Feeling  of  Effort,  Boston,  1880. 


50  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

ent  sensation,  connected  with  the  motor  discharge  and 
coinciding  with  the  outgoing  current  of  nervous  energy. 
He  has  notably  shown,  after  Ferrier  and  others,  how, 
in  cases  of  paralysis,  if  the  sense  of  effort  is  preserved, 
although  the  paralysed  member  cannot  be  moved  in 
the  slightest  degree,  it  is  because  the  conditions  of  the 
consciousness  of  effort  continue  to  exist,  the  patient 
moving  the  member  or  organ  of  the  opposite  side. 

But  Mr.  James  rightly  distinguishes  the  muscular 
from  the  volitional  effort,  which  latter,  in  many  cases, 
implies  no  immediate  movement  or  no  more  than 
an  extremely  feeble  muscular  energy.  Such,  to  bor- 
row from  him  one  of  his  illustrations,  is  the  case  of 
the  man,  who,  after  a  long  hesitation,  decides  to  put 
arsenic  into  his  wife's  glass  in  order  to  poison  her. 
Every  one  knows  moreover  by  his  own  experience  this 
state  of  struggle  in  which  the  effort  is  all  internal. 
Here  we  take  issue  with  regret  from  that  author,  who 
locates  this  effort  in  a  region  apart  and  supersensible. 
To  us  it  seems  to  differ  from  the  other  only  in  one 
point :  its  physiological  conditions  are  little  known, 
and  only  hypotheses  can  be  ventured. 

There  are  two  types  of  this  volitional  effort :  one 
which  consists  in  arresting  the  movements  of  instinct, 
or  passion,  or  habit ;  the  other,  in  overcoming  languor, 
torpor,  or  timidity;  the  first  is  an  effort  with  a  nega- 
tive result,  the  other,  an  effort  with  a  positive  result ; 
one  produces  an  inhibition,  the  other  an  impulsion. 
These  two  types  can  themselves  be  reduced  to  a  single 
formula.  There  is  effort  when  the  volition  follows  the 
line  of  greatest  resistance.  This  volitional  effort  never 
takes  place  when  the  impulse  (or  inhibition)  and  the 
choice  coincide,  when  our  natural  tendencies  and  the 
<'IwiU"go  in  the  same  direction;  in  clearer  terms, 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  51 

when  what  is  immediately  agreeable  to  the  individual 
and  what  is  chosen  by  him  are  but  one.  It  always 
occurs  when  two  groups  of  antagonistic  tendencies  are 
struggling  each  to  supplant  the  other.  In  fact,  as 
every  one  knows,  this  struggle  takes  place  between 
the  lower  tendencies,  whose  adaptation  is  limited,  and 
the  higher  tendencies,  whose  adaptation  is  complex. 
The  first  are  always  the  stronger  by  nature  ;  the  sec- 
ond are  sometimes  so  by  art.  The  first  represent  a 
power  enregistered  in  the  organism,  the  others  an  ac- 
quisition of  recent  date. 

How,  then,  can  these  sometimes  triumph?  It  is 
because  the  "I  will  "  is  a  reinforcement  for  them.  Not, 
of  course,  as  a  simple  state  of  consciousness,  but  be- 
cause, under  this  volition,  which  is  an  effect,  there  are 
causes,  known,  partly  known,  and  unknown,  which  we 
have  so  often  summed  up  in  one  word  :  the  individual 
character.  All  these  little  active  causes  which  consti- 
tute the  physical  and  psychic  individual  are  not  ab- 
stractions. They  are  physiological  or  psycho-physio- 
logical processes  :  they  presuppose  work  done  in  the 
nervous  centres,  whatever  they  may  be.  Is  it  rash  to 
maintain  that  the  sense  of  volitional  effort  is  itself  also 
an  effect  of  these  physiological  processes  ?  The  only 
objection  that  can  be  made  is  our  present  inability  to 
determine  its  mechanism.  This  point  is  all  the  more 
obscure  because  the  mechanism  must  differ  according 
as  it  is  an  impulse  or  an  inhibition  that  is  to  be  pro- 
duced :  so  the  feeling  ,of  volitional  effort  is  not  identi- 
cal in  the  two  cases. 

The  inward  struggle  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of 
fatigue  often  intense.  Although  we  do  not  know  all 
about  the  nature  and  causes  of  this  state,  it  is  generally 
supposed  that  even  in  muscular  effort  the  seat  of  the 


52     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

fatigue  is  in  the  neural  centres  which  direct  the  con- 
traction, not  in  the  muscles ;  that  there  is  a  nervous, 
not  a  muscular,  exhaustion.  In  reflex  contractions 
there  is  no  fatigue  perceived.  In  hysterical  persons, 
contractions  are  seen  to  persist  almost  indefinitely, 
without  the  patient  experiencing  the  least  sense  of 
lassitude ;  it  is  then  the  voluntary  effort  which  wearies, 
and  not  the  contraction  of  the  muscle.* 

We  have,  therefore,  no  reason  except  our  ignorance 
for  attributing  to  volitional  effort  a  character  apart. 
Are  the  neural  elements  capable  of  furnishing,  in  all 
the  cases  where  this  effort  must  go  forth,  an  increase 
of  work  during  a  given  period?  or  else  are  they,  by 
nature  or  by  lack  of  education  and  exercise,  quickly 
exhausted  and  incapable  of  regaining  new  strength? 
Have  they,  or  have  they  not,  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
disponible  force  stored  up  in  them?  The  problem  of 
action  in  the  direction  of  the  greatest  resistance  is  there 
reduced  to  its  lowest  terms.  It  is  this  hidden,  almost 
unknown  labor  which  manifests  itself  in  the  feeling  of 
volitional  effort.  The  feeling  of  effort  in  all  its  forms 
is,  accordingly,  a  subjective  state  corresponding  to 
certain  operations  going  on  in  the  nerve-centres  and 
other  parts  of  the  organism,  but  resembling  them  as 
little  as  the  sensations  of  sound  and  of  light  resemble 
their  objective  cause.  To  produce  a  great  moral  or 
intellectual  effort,  it  is  necessary  for  the  appropriate 
nerve-centres  (whatever  they  may  be,  and  our  igno- 
rance on  this  point  is  almost  complete)  to  be  in  a  state 
to  perform  intense  and  repeated  work,  instead  of  be- 
coming exhausted  at  short  notice  and  without  recupera- 

*  Richet,  Physiologic  des  nerfs  et  des  muscles,  pp.  477-490.  Delboeuf,  "  Etude 
psychophysique,"  p.  92  et  se(}.,in  Elements  de  psychophysique,  vol.  i. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  53 

tive  power.     The  capacity  for  effort  is,  therefore,  in 
the  last  analysis  a  natural  gift. 

To  be  less  indefinite,  let  us  take  the  commonplace 
example  of  a  vicious  man.  If  he  has  never  in  his  life, 
either  spontaneously  or  under  the  influence  of  others, 
experienced  even  the  faintest  desire  for  conversion  (sup- 
posing that  such  a  case  occurs),  it  is  because  the  moral 
elements,  with  the  corresponding  physiological  condi- 
tions, are  completely  lacking  in  him.  If,  under  any 
circumstances,  the  idea  of  amendment  rises  up  in  him, 
we  may  remark  in  the  first  place  that  this  occurrence 
is  involuntary;  but  it  supposes  the  pre-existence  and 
the  calling  into  play  of  certain  psycho-physiological 
elements.  Should  this  end  be  chosen,  affirmed  as  hav- 
ing ought  to  be,  willed  ;  if  the  resolution  does  not  last 
it  is  because  the  individual  is  incapable  of  effort ;  it  is 
because  there  is  not  in  his  organisation  the  possibility 
of  repeated  work  of  which  we  have  spoken  ;  if  it  does 
last,  it  is  because  it  is  maintained  by  virtue  of  effort, 
by  that  interior  labor  which  produces  the  inhibition  of 
contrary  states.  Every  organ  develops  by  exercise ; 
it  is  the  same  here,  in  such  wise  that  repetition  be- 
comes easier.  But  if  a  first  element  is  not  given  by 
nature,  and  with  it  a  potential  energy,  nothing  re- 
sults. The  theological  dogma  of  grace  as  a  free  gift 
appears  to  us,  therefore,  founded  upon  a  much  more 
exact  psychology  than  the  contrary  opinion,*  and  we 
see  how  easily  it  may  be  made  to  undergo  a  physio- 
logical transformation.  To  return  to  the  morbid  cases 
with  which  we  are  dealing,  there  must  be  an  incapa- 
city for  effort,  temporary  and  accidental,  but  extending 
to  almost  the  entire  organism. 

*  The  doctrine  of  grace  is  already  met  with  among  the  Hindus,  notably  in 
the  Bhagavad-Gita,  xi,  53.    See  Earth,  Thf.  Religions  0/ India,  75,  219. 


CHAPTER  II. 


IMPAIRMENTS    OF   THE   WILL.      II.    EXCESS    OF 
IMPULSE. 


We  have  just  been  looking  at  cases  in  which  the 
intellectual  adaptation,  that  is  to  say,  the  correspond- 
ence between  the  intelligent  being  and  the  environ- 
ment, being  normal,  the  impulse  to  action  is  absent, 
very  weak,  or  at  least  insufficient.  In  physiological 
language,  the  cerebral  acts  which  are  the  basis  of  the 
intellectual  activity  (the  concept  of  an  end  and  of 
means,  choice,  etc.)  remain  intact,  but  there  is  lacking 
to  them  those  concomitant  states  which  are  the  physio- 
logical equivalents  of  the  feelings,  and  whose  absence 
occasions  the  defect  of  action. 

We  are  about  to  witness  cases  contrary  to  the  pre- 
ceding in  certain  respects.  The  intellectual  adapta- 
tion is  very  weak,  at  least  very  unstable  ;  rational  mo- 
tives are  powerless  to  act  or  restrain  from  action  ;  the 
impulses  of  an  inferior  order  gain  all  that  the  higher 
impulses  lose.  The  will,  that  is  to  say,  the  rational 
activity,  disappears,  and  the  individual  falls  back  into 
the  domain  of  instinct. 

There  are  no  examples  which  can  better  show  us 
that  the  will,  in  the  exact  sense,  is  the  crown,  the  last 
term  of  an  evolution,  the  result  of  a  great  number  of 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE  WILL.  55 

tendencies  disciplined  in  accordance  with  an  hierarchic 
order ;  that  it  is  the  most  perfect  species  of  that  genus 
which  is  called  activity;  in  such  wise  that  the  study 
which  is  to  follow  might  be  entitled  :  How  the  will  be- 
comes impoverished  and  disappears. 

Let  us  examine  the  facts.  We  will  divide  them  into 
two  groups  :  (i)  those  which,  being  hardly  conscious 
(even  if  they  are  so  at  all),  denote  an  absence  rather 
than  an  enfeeblement  of  the  will ;  (2)  those  which  are 
accompanied  by  full  consciousness,  but  in  which,  after 
a  longer  or  shorter  struggle,  the  will  succumbs  or  only 

recovers  itself  by  outside  assistance. 

* 
*  * 

I.  In  the  first  case  "the  impulse  may  be  sudden, 
unconscious,  followed  by  an  immediate  execution, 
without  the  understanding  having  even  had  time  to 
take  cognisance  of  it.  .  .  .  The  act  has  then  all  the 
characteristics  of  a  purely  reflex  phenomenon  which 
takes  place  inevitably,  without  any  connivance  of  the 
will.  It  is  a  true  convulsion  which  differs  from  the 
ordinary  convulsion  only  because  it  consists  of  move- 
ments associated  and  combined  in  view  of  a  determined 
result.  Such  is  the  case  of  that  woman  who,  seated 
on  a  bench  in  a  garden,  in  an  unaccustomed  state  of 
causeless  sadness,  gets  up  suddenly,  throws  herself  into 
a  ditch  full  of  water  as  if  to  drown  herself,  and  who, 
saved  and  restored  to  perfect  lucidity,  declares,  a  few 
days  after,  that  she  is  not  aware  of  having  wished  to 
commit  suicide,  nor  has  she  any  remembrance  of  the 
attempt  that  she  has  made."  * 

"  I  have  seen,"  says  Luys,f  "a  number  of  patients 

*  Foville,  Nouveau  dictionnaire  de  medicine,  article  "  Folie,"  p.  342. 
t  This  citation  is  given  in  the  earlier  French  editions,  though  omitted  in 
the  later  one^.— Trans. 


56  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

who  repeatedly  attempted  suicide  in  the  presence  of 
those  who  watched  them,  but  they  had  no  recollection 
of  the  fact  in  their  lucid  state.  And  what  proves  the 
unconsciousness  of  the  mind  under  these  conditions  is 
the  fact  that  the  patients  do  not  perceive  the  inefficacy 
of  the  methods  they  employ.  Thus  a  lady  who  at- 
tempted suicide  whenever  she  saw  a  table-knife,  did 
not  notice  one  day  when  I  was  watching  her  that  I 
had  substituted  for  the  knife  a  harmless  instrument. 
Another  patient  tried  to  hang  himself  with  a  half-rotten 
cord  that  was  not  strong  enough  to  bear  even  slight 
tension."  * 

Among  epileptics,  impulses  of  this  kind  are  so  fre- 
quent that  pages  might  be  filled  with  them.  Hysterical 
patients  would  also  furnish  innumerable  examples  ; 
they  have  a  frantic  tendency  to  the  immediate  satis- 
faction of  their  caprices  or  of  their  wants. 

Other  impulses  have  effects  less  grave,  but  denote 
the  same  psychic  state.  "  In  certain  patients,  the  sur- 
excitation  of  the  motor  forces  is  such  that  they  walk 
for  whole  hours  without  stopping,  without  looking 
around  them,  like  mechanical  apperatus  that  have  been 
set  in  motion."  A  marchioness  of  a  very  distinguished 
mind,  says  Billod,  in  the  middle  of  a  conversation 
"interrupts  a  sentence  that  she  afterwards  goes  on 
with,  in  order  to  address  to  some  one  in  the  company 
an  improper  or  obscene  epithet.  The  utterance  of  this 
word  is  accompanied  with  blushing,  with  a  confused 
and  abashed  air,  and  the  word  is  spoken  in  an  abrupt 
tone  like  an  arrow  leaving  the  string."  An  hysterical 
patient  of  long  standing,  very  intelligent  and  very  lucid, 
"experiences  at  certain  moments  the  need  of  going  into 
some  solitary  place  to  shout ;  she  unburdens  her  griefs, 

*  Maladies  meniales,  pp.  373,  439,  440. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   IVIIL.  S7 

her  complaints  against  her  family  and  her  environment. 
She  knows  perfectly  well  that  she  is  wrong  to  divulge 
certain  secrets  aloud ;  but,  as  she  insists,  she  is  com- 
pelled to  speak  and  satisfy  her  grudges."  * 

This  last  case  leads  us  to  the  irresistible  impulses 
with  consciousness.  Confining  ourselves  to  the  others, 
that  we  could  multiply  to  profusion,  they  show  us  the 
individual  reduced  to  the  lowest  degree  of  activity, 
that  of  pure  reflexes.  The  acts  are  unconscious  (at 
any  rate  not  deliberate),  immediate,  irresistible,  with 
an  adaptation  invariable  and  of  little  complexity.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  physiology  and  of  psychology, 
the  human  being  under  these  conditions  is  compara- 
ble to  an  animal  which  has  been  decapitated  or  at 
least  deprived  of  its  cerebral  lobes.  It  is  generally 
admitted  that  the  brain  can  dominate  the  reflexes  for 
the  following  reason  :  the  excitation,  starting  from  one 
point  in  the  body,  divides  its  self  on  its  arrival  in  the 
spinal  cord  and  follows  two  paths  ;  it  is  transmitted 
to  the  reflex  centre  by  a  transverse  route ;  to  the  brain 
by  a  longitudinal  and  ascending  one.  The  transverse 
route  offering  more  resistance,  transmission  in  this  di- 
rection requires  a  rather  long  time  (experiment  of  Ro- 
senthal). The  lengthwise  transmission  is,  on  the  con- 
trary, much  more  rapid.  The  suspensive  action  of  the 
brain  consequently  has  time  to  take  place  and  to  mod- 
erate the  reflexes.  In  the  foregoing  cases,  the  brain 
being  without  action,  the  activity  remains  in  its  inferior 
degree,  and,  in  default  of  its  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions,  volition  is  not  produced. 

II.  The  facts  of  the  second  group  deserve  to  be 
studied  at  greater  length  :  they  bring  out  the  defect  of 
the  will  or  the  artificial  means  which  maintain  it.   Here 

*  Billod,  loc.  cit.,  193  seqq. 


58  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

the  patient  has  full  consciousness  of  the  situation  ;  he 
feels  that  he  is  no  more  master  of  himself,  that  he  is 
dominated  by  an  interior  force,  irresistibly  impelled  to 
commit  acts  that  he  reprobates.  The  intellect  remains 
sufficiently  healthy,  the  madness  exists  only  in  the  acts. 

The  most  simple  form  is  that  oi  fixed  ideas  with  ob- 
session. Such  a  one  cannot  deliver  himself  from  the 
invincible  necessity  of  counting,  without  end  or  repose, 
all  that  he  sees  and  touches,  all  the  words  that  he  reads 
or  hears,  all  the  letters  of  a  book,  etc.  (arithmomania). 
He  is  conscious  of  the  absurdity  of  this  labor,  but  he 
must  count.  Another  is  obsessed  with  an  implacable 
need  of  knowing  the  name  of  all  the  unknown  per- 
sons that  he  meets  in  the  streets  or  while  travelling 
(onomatomania  of  Charcot  and  Magnan).  He  tries  in 
vain  to  escape  from  this  puerile  inquisitiveness ;  he 
must  know  them. 

These  obsessions,  and  analogous  ones  that  I  omit, 
have  at  least  one  advantage.  As  they  have  their  origin 
in  intellectual  states,  pure  ideas  (not  wants  or  feelings), 
their  satisfaction  is  without  danger. 

All  this,  even  in  action,  remains  theoretical,  spec- 
ulative. 

It  is  quite  otherwise  with  the  irresistible  impulses 
of  affective  origin,  springing  from  needs  and  instincts, 
of  which  we  are  about  to  speak. 

There  will  be  found  in  a  book  by  Marc,  now  some- 
what forgotten,*  an  ample  collection  of  facts  upon 
which  later  writers  have  often  drawn.  Let  us  cite  a 
few  of  them. 

A  lady  sometimes  attacked  with  homicidal  im- 
pulses used  to  ask  to  be  restrained  by  means  of  a  strait 

*De  la  folic  considirie  dans  ces  rapports  avec  Us  questions  midico-judiciaires 
(2  vol.  8vo.,  Paris,  1840). 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  59 

jacket,  announcing  afterwards  the  moment  when  all 
danger  was  past  and  when  her  liberty  of  movement 
could  be  restored. 

A  chemist  tormented  in  the  same  way  by  homicidal 
desires  caused  his  two  thumbs  to  be  tied  together  with 
a  ribbon,  and  found  in  this  simple  obstacle  the  means 
of  resisting  the  temptation. 

A  domestic  of  irreproachable  conduct  begged  her 
mistress  to  let  her  go  away,  because  when  she  saw 
naked  the  child  of  which  she  had  charge,  she  was  de- 
voured with  a  desire  to  disembowel  it. 

Another  woman,  of  great  intellectual  culture  and  full 
of  affection  for  her  parents,  "began  to  strike  them  in 
spite  of  herself  and  asked  some  one  to  come  to  her  aid 
by  holding  her  in  an  arm-chair." 

A  melancholic  patient  tormented  with  the  idea  of 
suicide  got  up  at  night,  went  and  knocked  at  his 
brother's  door  and  cried  to  him  :  "Come  quickly,  sui- 
cide pursues  me,  very  soon  I  shall  no  longer  resist."  * 

Calmeil,  in  his  "Traits  des  maladies  inflammatoires 
du  cerveau,"  reports  the  following  case,  of  which  he 
was  a  witness  and  which  I  will  report  at  full  length 
because  it  will  dispense  me  from  many  others  : 

"Glenadel,  having  lost  his  father  in  infancy,  was 
raised  by  his  mother  who  adored  him.  At  sixteen  years 
his  character,  until  then  good  and  submissive,  changed. 
He  became  sombre  and  taciturn.  Pressed  with  ques- 
tions by  his  mother,  he  at  last  decided  upon  an 
avowal:  *I  owe  everything  to  you,'  he  said  to  her, 
*  I  love  you  with  all  my  soul ;  however,  for  some  days 
an  incessant  idea  has  impelled  me  to  kill  you.  Do  not 
let  it  happen,  that,  I  being  at  last  vanquished,  so  great 
a  misfortune  shall  take  place  ;  let  me  enlist.*    In  spite 

<*'Guislain,  op.  cit.,  i,  479. 


6o  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

of  pressing  solicitations,  he  was  immovable  in  his  reso- 
lution, went  away  and  was  a  good  soldier.  How- 
ever, a  secret  will  continually  urged  him  to  desert,  so 
as  to  return  to  the  country  and  kill  his  mother.  At 
the  end  of  his  engagement,  the  idea  was  as  strong  as 
on  the  first  day.  He  contracted  a  new  engagement. 
The  homicidal  instinct  persisted,  but  accepted  the  sub- 
stitution of  another  victim.  He  thinks  no  more  of  kill- 
ing his  mother,  the  frightful  impulse  points  out  to  him 
day  and  night  his  sister-iu-law.  To  resist  this  second 
impulse,  he  condemns  himself  to  a  perpetual  exile. 

"Meanwhile  a  compatriot  arrives  at  his  regiment. 
Gl^nadel  confides  to  him  his  trouble.  '  Reassure  your- 
self,' the  other  says  to  him,  '  the  crime  is  impossible, 
your  sister-in-law  has  just  died.'  At  these  words, 
Gl^nadel  rises  up  like  a  delivered  captive  ;  he  is  filled 
with  joy;  he  sets  out  for  his  country,  which  he  had  not 
seen  since  his  childhood.  On  arriving,  he  perceives 
his  sister-in-law  alive.  He  cries  out,  and  the  terrible 
impulse  instantly  seizes  him  again  like  a  prey. 

"■  That  evening  he  made  his  brother  tie  him.  '  Take 
a  stout  rope,  tie  me  like  a  wolf  in  the  barn,  and  go  and 
notify  Mr.  Calmeil.  .  .  .'  He  obtained  from  him  his 
admission  into  an  asylum  for  the  insane.  The  day  be- 
fore his  entrance  he  wrote  to  the  director  of  the  estab- 
lishment :  '  Sir,  I  am  going  to  enter  your  house.  I 
shall  conduct  myself  there  as  at  the  regiment.  They 
will  think  me  healed  ;  perhaps  at  some  moments  I 
may  pretend  to  be  so.  Do  not  ever  believe  me;  I 
must  not  go  out  any  more  under  any  pretext.  When 
I  beg  for  my  release,  be  more  watchful  than  ever ;  I 
would  use  that  liberty  to  commit  a  crime  which  horri- 
fies me.'  " 

It  must  not  be  believed  that  this  example  is  unique 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE    WILL  6i 

or  even  rare,  and  in  the  alienists  we  find  several  cases 
of  individuals  who,  tormented  by  a  necessity  of  killing 
persons  who  are  dear  to  them,  fly  to  an  asylum  to 
make  themselves  prisoners. 

The  irresistible  and  yet  conscious  impulses  to  steal, 
to  commit  arson,  to  destroy  oneself  by  alcoholic  ex- 
cesses, enter  into  the  same  category.*  Maudsley  in 
his  "Pathology  of  Mind,"f  has  collected  so  full  a 
range  of  examples  that  the  best  thing  to  do  is  to  refer 
the  reader  to  it. 

All  those  fatal  tendencies  classed  under  the  names 
of  dipsomania,  kleptomania,  pyromania,  erotomania, 
homicidal  and  suicidal  monomania  are  to-day  no  longer 
considered  as  distinct  morbid  forms,  but  as  different 
manifestations  of  one  single  and  the  same  cause  :  de- 
generacy, that  is  to  say,  psychological  instability  and 
lack  of  co-ordination.  Nothing  is  more  frequent  than 
the  metamorphosis  of  one  impulse  into  another,  of  hom- 
icide into  suicide  or  inversely.  In  a  very  fine  case  re- 
ported by  Morel,  J  we  see  a  degenerated  person  who  is 
driven  in  turn  to  suicide,  homicide,  sexual  excesses, 
alcoholism  and  incendiary  attempts.  It  would  be 
curious  for  the  psychologist  to  know  why  the  unique 
cause  manifests  itself  in  effects  so  diverse,  here  in  one 
manner  and  there  in  another  ;  why  the  epileptic  is 
more  apt  to  be  a  thief,  the  imbecile  an  incendiary,  etc. 
It  seems  that  the  ultimate  reason  for  these  diversities 
is  found  in  the  idiosyncrasy  of  the  degenerate  person, 
in  his  mental  and  physical  constitution.  §  The  solution 

*  See  Trelat,  Folie  lucide;  Maudsley,  Crime  and  Insanity  (French  transla- 
tion, p.  186). 

t  French  translation,  chap,  vii,  p.  330  et  seqq. 

XMaladies  meniales,  p.  420. 

§  Upon  this  point  see  SchUle,  Maladies  meniales,  (translated  from  the  Ger- 
man), vol.  ii,  p.  423. 


62     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

of  this  problem  does  not  concern  us  here.  It  is  suffi- 
cient to  note  that  all  these  creatures  of  impulse  have 
the  same  characteristics :  they  are  conscious,  inco- 
ordinated,  incapable  of  struggle. 

II. 

It  must  be  remarked  in  the  first  place  that  there  is 
an  almost  insensible  transition  between  the  healthy 
state  and  these  pathological  forms.  The  most  reason- 
able people  have  foolish  impulses  cross  their  brain ; 
but  these  sudden  and  unusual  states  of  consciousness 
remain  without  effect,  do  not  pass  into  action,  because 
they  are  destroyed  by  contrary  forces,  the  general  habit 
of  the  mind  ;  because,  between  this  isolated  state  and 
its  antagonists  the  disproportion  is  so  great  that  there 
is  not  even  a  struggle. 

In  other  cases,  to  which  very  little  importance  is 
ordinarily  attached,  there  are  acts  which  are  fantastic, 
"but  which  have  nothing  in  themselves  reprehensible 
or  dangerous  ;  they  may  constitute  a  sort  of  a  whim, 
a  crochet,  a  mania,  using  this  last  word  in  its  usual  and 
vulgar  sense. 

*'At  other  times,  without  yet  being  very  compromis- 
ing, the  acts  are  already  more  serious  :  they  consist  in 
destroying,  in  striking  without  a  motive  an  inanimate 
object,  in  tearing  up  clothes.  We  have  just  now  un- 
der observation  a  young  woman  who  ruins  all  her 
dresses.  The  instance  is  cited  of  an  amateur  who, 
finding  himself  in  a  museum  in  front  of  a  valuable  pic- 
ture, feels  an  instinctive  impulse  to  break  in  the  can- 
vas. Very  often  these  impulses  pass  unperceived  and 
are  confided  only  to  the  consciousness  which  experi- 
ences them."* 

*  Foville,  op.  cit.,  p.  341. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  63 

Certain  fixed  ideas  of  a  useless  or  unreasonable  na- 
ture impose  themselves  upon  the  mind,  which  judges 
them  absurd,  but  is  powerless  to  prevent  them  from 
expressing  themselves  in  acts.  There  will  be  found  in 
a  work  by  Westphal  some  curious  facts  of  this  kind. 
One  man,  for  example,  is  pursued  by  this  idea,  that 
he  might  have  confided  to  a  paper  the  statement  that 
he  is  the  author  of  some  crime  or  other,  and  have  lost 
that  paper;  consequently  he  preserves  carefully  all  the 
pieces  of  paper  that  he  runs  across,  picks  up  scraps  of 
it  in  the  street,  assures  himself  that  they  contain  no 
writing,  takes  them  to  his  house  and  makes  a  collection 
of  them.  He  has,  moreover,  full  consciousness  of  the 
puerility  of  this  idea,  which  torments  him  all  the  time  ; 
he  does  not  believe  in  it,  but  yet  is  unable  to  rid  him- 
self of  it.* 

Between  the  most  silly  acts  and  the  most  danger- 
ous ones,  there  is  only  a  quantitative  difference  :  what 
the  first  give  on  a  small  scale  the  others  show  en- 
larged. Let  us  try  to  understand  the  mechanism  of 
this  disorganisation  of  the  will. 

In  the  normal  state  an  end  is  chosen,  affirmed,  car- 
ried out ;  that  is  to  say  that  all  or  most  of  the  elements 
of  the  ego  concur  in  it.  The  states  of  consciousness 
(feelings,  ideas,  with  their  motor  tendencies),  the 
movements  of  our  members  form  a  consensus  which 
converges  towards  the  end,  with  more  or  less  effort,  by 
a  complex  mechanism,  composed  at  once  of  impulses 
and  of  inhibitions. 

*  Westphal,  Ueber  Zwangsvorstcllungen  (Berlin,  1877).  It  may  be  re- 
marked that,  in  certain  cases,  the  fear  of  performing  an  act  irresistibly  leads 
to  it;  for  instance,  the  effects  of  vertigo,  people  who  throw  themselves  down 
in  the  street  for  fear  of  falling  in  it,  who  hurt  themselves  from  fear  of  hurting 
themselves,  etc.  All  these  facts  have  their  explanation  in  the  nature  of  the 
mental  representation,  which,  by  very  reason  of  its  intensity,  passes  into  ac- 
tion. 


64  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

Such  is  the  will  in  its  complete  and  typical  form; 
but  this  is  not  a  natural  product.  It  is  the  result  of 
art,  of  education,  of  experience.  It  is  an  edifice  con- 
structed slowly,  piece  by  piece.  Observation,  both 
objective  and  subjective,  shows  that  every  form  of 
voluntary  activity  is  the  fruit  of  a  conquest.  Nature 
furnishes  only  the  materials  ;  a  few  simple  movements 
in  the  physiological  order,  a  few  simple  associations  in 
the  psychological  order.  By  the  aid  of  these  simple 
and  almost  invariable  adaptations  there  must  be  formed 
adaptations  more  and  more  complex  and  variable. 
For  example,  the  child  has  to  acquire  his  power  over 
his  legs,  his  arms,  and  all  the  movable  parts  of  his 
body  by  means  of  gropings  and  trials,  in  which  the 
appropriate  movements  are  combined  and  the  useless 
ones  suppressed.  The  simple  groups  thus  formed  are 
combined  into  complex  groups,  those  into  still  more 
complex  ones,  and  so  on.  In  the  psychological  order 
an  analogous  operation  is  necessary.  Nothing  com- 
plex is  acquired  at  the  onset. 

But  it  is  very  clear  that,  in  an  edifice  thus  con- 
structed little  by  little,  the  primitive  materials  alone 
are  stable,  and  that  in  measure  as  the  complexity  is 
augmented  the  stability  decreases.  The  most  simple 
actions  are  the  most  stable  :  for  anatomical  reasons, 
because  they  are  congenital,  inscribed  in  the  organism  ; 
for  physiological,  because  they  are  perpetually  re- 
peated in  the  experience  of  the  individual,  and,  if  one 
wishes  to  bring  in  heredity,  which  opens  up  an  unlim- 
ited field,  in  the  numberless  experiences  of  the  exist- 
ing species  and  of  those  from  which  it  has  sprung.* 

*  Voluntary  power  coming  into  existence  when  certain  groups  of  move- 
ments are  obedient  to  certain  states  of  consciousness,  there  may  be  cited  by 
way  of  a  pathological  case  the  fact  reported  by  Meschede  (Correspondenz 
Blatt.  1874,  ii)  of  a  man  who  "found  himself  in  this  singular  condition  that, 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL  65 

Taking  all  together,  what  is  surprising  is  that  the 
will,  the  activity  of  a  complex  and  superior  order,  is  able 
to  become  dominant.  The  causes  which  elevate  it  to  this 
rank  and  maintain  it  there  are  the  same  which  in  man 
elevate  and  maintain  the  intellect  above  sensations  and 
instincts  :  and,  taking  humanity  as  a  whole,  the  facts 
prove  that  the  domination  of  the  one  is  as  precarious 
as  that  of  the  other.  The  great  development  of  the 
cerebral  mass  in  civilised  man,  the  influence  of  educa- 
tion and  of  the  habits  that  it  imposes,  explain  how,  in 
spite  of  so  many  contrary  chances,  the  rational  activity 
often  remains  mistress. 

The  preceding  pathological  facts  show  well  that  the 
will  is  not  an  entity  reigning  by  right  of  birth,  although 
sometimes  disobeyed,  but  a  resultant  always  unstable, 
always  ready  to  decompose  itself,  and,  to  say  truly,  a 
happy  accident.  These  facts,  and  they  are  innumera- 
ble, represent  a  state  which  can  be  called  equally  a 
dislocation  of  the  will  and  a  retrograde  form  of  ac- 
tivity. 

If  we  consider  the  cases  of  irresistible  impulses 
with  full  consciousness,  we  see  that  that  hierarchic 
subordination  of  tendencies  which  is  the  will  is  divided 
into  two  parts  :  for  the  consensus  which  alone  consti- 
tutes it  there  is  substituted  a  struggle  between  two 
groups  of  contrary  and  almost  equal  tendencies,  in  such 
sort  that  one  might  say  that  it  is  dislocated.* 

when  he  wished  to  do  a  thing,  of  his  own  accord  or  at  another's  orders,  he,  or 
rather  his  muscles,  did  just  the  contrary.  When  he  wished  to  look  to  the 
right,  his  eyes  turned  to  the  left,  and  this  anomaly  extended  to  all  his  other 
movements.  It  was  a  simple  contrariety  of  movement  without  any  mental  de- 
rangement and  which  differed  from  involuntary  movements  in  this  :  that  he 
never  produced  a  movement  except  when  he  wished  to,  but  that  this  move- 
ment was  always  the  contrary  of  what  he  wished." 

*  It  might  be  shown,  if  this  were  the  place  for  it,  how  fragile  and  untrust- 
worthy is  the  unity  of  the  ego.  In  this  case  of  struggle,  which  is  the  true  ego, 
that  which  acts  or  that  which  resists '    If  there  be  no  choice,  there  must  be 


66  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

If  we  consider  the  will  no  longer  as  a  constituted 
whole,  but  as  the  culminating  point  of  an  evolution, 
we  shall  say  that  the  inferior  forms  of  activity  are 
carrying  it  away,  and  that  the  human  activity  is  retro- 
grading. Let  us  remark  moreover  that  the  term  in- 
ferior implies  no  moral  preoccupation.  It  is  an  inferi- 
ority of  nature,  because  it  is  evident  that  an  activity 
which  expends  itself  entirely  in  satisfying  a  fixed  idea 
or  a  blind  impulse  is  by  nature  limited,  adapted  only 
to  the  present  and  to  a  very  small  number  of  circum- 
stances, while  the  rational  activity  goes  beyond  the 
present  and  is  adapted  to  a  great  number  of  circum- 
stances. 

It  must  indeed  be  admitted,  although  the  language 
does  not  lend  itself  to  it,  that  the  will  like  the  intellect 
has  its  idiots  and  its  geniuses,  with  all  the  possible  de- 
grees from  one  extreme  to  the  other.  From  this  point 
of  view,  the  cases  cited  in  the  first  group  (impulses 
without  consciousness)  would  represent  the  idiocy  of 
the  will  or  more  exactly  its  madness ;  and  the  facts  of 
the  second  group,  certain  cases  of  volitional  weakness, 
analogous  to  intellectual  debilities. 

In  order  to  pursue  our  study  it  is  necessary  to  pass 
from  the  analysis  of  the  facts  to  the  determination  of 
their  cause.  Is  it  possible  to  say  upon  what  conditions 
this  impairment  of  the  higher  activity  is  dependent  ? 
In  the  first  place,  one  should  ask  oneself  if  its  decline 
is  an  effect  of  the  predominance  of  the  reflexes,  or  if,  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  their  cause  ;  in  other  terms,  whether 
the  impairment  of  the  will  is  the  primary  or  the  second- 
two  of  them.  If  a  choice  be  made,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  preferred 
group  represents  the  ego  by  the  same  title  that  in  politics  a  small  majority  ob- 
tained with  great  difficulty  represents  the  State.  But  these  questions  cannot 
be  treated  in  passing;  I  hope  some  day  to  make  them  the  subject  of  a  mono- 
graph. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  67 

ary  fact.  This  question  does  not  admit  of  a  general 
answer.  Observation  shows  that  both  cases  are  to  be 
met  with  ;  and  consequently  one  can  only  give  a  spe- 
cial answer  for  a  special  case  whose  circumstances  are 
well  known. 

It  is  indubitable  that  often  the  irresistible  impulse 
is  the  origo  ?nali ;  it  constitutes  a  permanent  patholo- 
gical state.  There  takes  place  then  in  the  psychological 
order,  a  phenomenon  analogous  to  the  hypertrophy  of 
an  organ  or  to  the  exaggerated  proliferation  of  a  tissue 
in  one  part  of  the  body,  that,  for  example,  which  leads 
to  the  formation  of  certain  cancers.  In  the  two  cases, 
physical  and  psychical,  this  local  disorder  affects  the 
whole  organism. 

The  cases  in  which  the  voluntary  activity  is  attacked 
directly,  not  by  a  rebound,  are  for  us  the  more  inter- 
esting. What  takes  place  then?  Is  it  the  power  of  co- 
ordination which  is  attacked,  or  the  power  of  inhibition, 
or  both?  This  is  an  obscure  point  upon  which  only 
conjectures  can  be  offered. 

For  the  sake  of  seeking  some  light,  let  us  interro- 
gate two  new  groups  of  facts  :  artificial  and  momentary 
impairments  produced  by  intoxication  ;  and  chronic 
impairments  produced  by  cerebral  lesion. 

Everybody  knows  that  the  drunkenness  caused  by 
alcoholic  liquors,  hasheesh,  or  opium,  after  a  first  period 
of  superexcitation  brings  about  a  notable  weakening 
of  the  will.  The  individual  has  more  or  less  conscious- 
ness of  it ;  others  observe  it  still  better.  Very  soon 
(especially  under  the  influence  of  alcohol),  the  impulses 
are  exaggerated ;  the  extravagances,  violences,  or 
crimes  committed  in  this  state  are  without  number. 
The  mechanism  of  the  invasion  of  drunkenness  is  the 


68  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

subject  of  much  dispute.  It  is  generally  admitted  that 
it  commences  in  the  brain,  then  acts  on  the  spinal  cord 
and  the  medulla,  and  in  the  last  place  on  the  great 
sympathetic.  There  is  produced  an  intellectual  obtu- 
sion, that  is  to  say,  the  states  of  consciousness  are 
vague,  imperfectly  distinguished,  and  of  little  intensity; 
the  physio-psychological  activity  of  the  brain  has  di- 
minished. This  enfeeblement  extends  also  to  the  motor 
power.  Obersteiner  has  shown  by  experiments  that, 
under  the  influence  of  alcohol,  there  is  a  less  speedy 
reaction,  although  there  is  an  illusion  to  the  contrary.* 
That  which  is  affected  is  not  only  the  ideation  but  the 
ideo-motor  activity.  At  the  same  time  the  power  of  co- 
ordination becomes  null  or  ephemeral  and  without  en- 
ergy. The  co-ordination  consisting  at  the  same  time  in 
making  certain  impulses  converge  towards  a  single 
end  and  in  arresting  useless  or  antagonistic  impulses, 
it  must  be  concluded  from  the  fact  that  the  reflexes  are 
exaggerated  or  violent,  that  the  inhibitive  power,  what- 
ever be  its  nature  and  mechanism,  is  injured,  and  that 
its  role  in  the  constitution  and  maintenance  of  the  vol- 
untary activity  is  of  the  first  importance. 

Cerebral  pathology  furnishes  other  confirmatory 
facts,  more  striking,  because  they  show  in  the  individ- 
ual a  sudden  and  persistent  change. 

Ferrier  and  other  authors  cite  cases  where  the  le- 
sion of  the  frontal  convolutions  (particularly  the  first 
and  the  second)  brings  about  an  almost  total  loss  of 
will,  and  reduces  the  being  to  automatism,  or  at  least 
to  that  state  in  which  the  reflex  instinctive  activity 

*Brazn,  Jan.,  1879.  A  considerable  number  of  experiments  bearing  on 
this  point  have  been  made,  witli  concordant  results  :  Exner  in  PflUger' s  Archiv, 
1873;  Dietl  and  Vintschgau,  ibid.,  1877;  and  some  important  work  of  Krape- 
lin's,  done  in  Wundt's  psycho-physical  laboratory  and  published  in  the  Philo- 
sophische  Studien,  p.  573  seqq. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  69 

reigns  almost  alone,  without  the  possibility  of  inhibi- 
tion. 

A  child  is  wounded  by  a  knife  in  the  frontal  lobe. 
Seventeen  years  afterward  he  is  found  to  be  in  good 
physical  health,  "but  the  injured  man  is  incapable  of 
occupations  necessitating  mental  labor.  He  is  irrita- 
ble, especially  when  he  has  been  drinking  or  under- 
gone some  abnormal  excitation." 

A  patient  of  Lupine's,  stricken  with  an  abscess  in 
the  right  frontal  lobe,  "was  in  a  state  of  stupefaction. 
He  seemed  to  understand  what  was  said  to  him,  but  it 
was  only  with  difficulty  that  he  could  be  made  to  pro- 
nounce a  word.  He  sat  down  when  told  to  do  so  ;  if 
he  was  lifted  up  he  could  make  some  steps  without  as- 
sistance." 

A  man  who  had  received  a  violent  blow  which  de- 
stroyed the  greater  part  of  the  first  and  second  frontal 
lobes  "had  lost  his  will.  He  understood,  did  as  he 
was  directed,  but  in  an  automatic  and  mechanical  man- 
ner. " 

Several  cases  analogous  to  the  preceding  have  been 
reported,  but  the  most  important  for  us  is  that  of  the 
"American  quarryman."  An  iron  bar  thrown  by  a 
blast  went  through  his  skull,  injuring  only  the  pre- 
frontal region.  He  was  healed  and  lived  for  twelve 
years  and  a  half  after  the  accident  ;  but  here  is  what 
is  reported  of  the  mental  state  of  the  patient  after  his 
healing.  "  His  employers,  who  before  his  accident  had 
considered  him  as  one  of  their  best  and  most  skilful 
foremen,  found  him  so  changed  that  they  could  not 
confide  to  him  again  his  old  post.  The  equilibrium,  the 
balance  between  his  intellectual  faculties  and  his  in- 
stinctive inclinations,  seemed  destroyed.  He  is  ner- 
vous, disrespectful,  often  swears  in  the  coarsest  man- 


70  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

ner ;  which  was  not  one  of  his  habits  previously.  He 
is  hardly  polite  to  his  equals  ;  he  bears  contradiction 
impatiently,  and  does  not  listen  to  advice  when  it  is  in 
opposition  to  his  own  ideas.  At  certain  moments  he  is 
excessively  obstinate,  although  he  is  in  general  capri- 
cious and  undecided.  He  makes  plans  for  the  future 
that  he  abandons  immediately  for  others.  He  is  a 
child  in  intelligence  and  intellectual  manifestations,  a 
man  in  his  passions  and  instincts.  Before  his  acci- 
dent, although  he  had  not  received  any  schooling,  he 
had  a  well-balanced  mind  and  Vi^as  regarded  as  a  skil- 
ful, penetrating  man,  very  energetic  and  tenacious  in 
the  execution  of  his  plans.  In  this  respect  he  is  so 
changed  that  his  friends  say  that  they  no  longer  recog- 
nise him."  * 

This  case  is  very  clear.  In  it  the  will  is  seen  to 
be  impaired  in  measure  as  the  lower  activity  is  aug- 
mented. It  is  another  experiment,  since  it  involves  a 
sudden  change  produced  by  an  accident  under  well- 
determined  circumstances. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  we  have  not  many  obser- 
vations of  this  kind,  for  a  great  step  would  be  made  in 
our  interpretation  of  the  diseases  of  the  will.  Unfor- 
tunately the  labors  pursued  with  so  much  ardor  on 
cerebral  localisations  have  principally  been  directed  to 
the  motor  and  sensory  regions,  which,  as  is  well  known, 
leave  out  the  greater  part  of  the  frontal  region.  There 
would  be  necessary  also  a  critical  examination  of  the 
contrary  facts,  of  the  cases  where  no  impairment  of  the 

*  For  these  and  other  facts  see  Ferrier,  De  la  localisation  des  maladies 
ciribrales,  translated  by  Varigny,  pp.  43-56 ;  and  C.  De  Boyer,  Etudes  cli- 
niques  sur  les  Usions  corticales  des  hitnisphires  cir^braux  (1879),  pp.  48,  55,  56, 
71.  In  half  of  the  cases  (twenty-three  in  all)  of  tumors,  wounds,  and  abscesses 
of  the  frontal  lobes,  Allen  Starr  has  noticed  as  the  only  symptoms :  change  of 
character,  incapacity  for  self-control,  and  loss  of  the  faculty  of  attention. 
Brain,  No.  32,  p.  570. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  THE   WILL.  71 

will  appears  to  have  been  produced.  This  work  done, 
Ferrier's  thesis — that  in  the  frontal  lobes  there  exist 
centres  of  inhibition  for  intellectual  operations — would 
gain  more  consistency  and  would  furnish  a  solid  basis 
for  the  determination  of  causes.  As  it  is,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  go  beyond  the  domain  of  conjectures. 

In  comparing  irresistible  impulses  with  abulia  it 
will  be  noted  that  the  will  fails  as  a  result  of  entirely 
contrary  conditions.  In  one  case  the  intellect  is  in- 
tact and  impulse  is  lacking  ;  in  the  other,  the  power 
of  co-ordination  and  inhibition  being  absent,  the  im- 
pulse expends  itself  entirely  to  the  profit  of  automatism. 


CHAPTER  III. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  VOLUNTARY  ATTENTION. 

We  are  now  about  to  study  impairments  of  the  will 
of  a  less  striking  character,  those  of  voluntary  atten- 
tion. They  do  not  differ  in  nature  from  those  of  the 
last  group,  consisting  like  them  in  a  weakening  of  the 
power  of  direction  and  adaptation.  It  is  a  diminution 
of  the  will  in  the  strictest,  the  narrowest,  the  most 
limited  sense,  indisputable  even  by  those  who  confine 
themselves  obstinately  to  subjective  observation. 

Before  occupying  ourselves  with  acquired  weak- 
ness, let  us  examine  the  congenital  weakness  of  the 
voluntary  attention.  Let  us  leave  aside  the  narrow  or 
mediocre  minds  in  whom  the  feelings,  the  intellect,  and 
the  will  are  at  the  same  level  of  weakness.  It  is  more 
curious  to  take  a  great  mind,  a  man  endowed  with  a 
high  intelligence,  with  a  keen  delicacy  of  feeling,  but 
in  whom  the  directive  power  is  lacking,  in  such  wise 
that  the  contrast  between  thought  and  will  is  com- 
plete.    We  have  an  example  of  this  in  Coleridge. 

"There  was  probably  no  man  of  his  time,  or  per- 
haps of  any  time,"  says  Carpenter,*  "who  surpassed 
Coleridge  in  the  combination  of  the  reasoning  powers 
of  the  philosopher  with  the  imagination  of  the  poet 

*  Mental  Physiology,  pp.  266-'9. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  ATTENTION.         73 

and  the  inspiration  of  the  seer  ;  and  there  was  perhaps 
not  one  of  the  last  generation  who  has  left  so  strong 
an  impress  of  himself  in  the  subsequent  course  of 
thought  of  reflective  minds  engaged  in  the  highest 
subjects  of  human  contemplation.  And  yet  there  was 
probably  never  a  man  endowed  with  such  remarkable 
gifts  who  accomplished  so  little  that  was  worthy  of 
them,  the  great  defect  of  his  character  being  the  want 
of  will  to  turn  his  gifts  to  account ;  so  that,  with  nu- 
merous gigantic  projects  constantly  floating  in  his 
mind,  he  never  brought  himself  even  seriously  to  at- 
tempt to  execute  any  one  of  them.  It  used  to  be  said  of 
him,  that  whenever  either  natural  obligation  or  volun- 
tary undertaking  made  it  his  duty  to  do  anything,  the 
fact  seemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  his  not  doing  it.  Thus, 
at  the  very  outset  of  his  career,  when  he  had  found  a 
bookseller  (Mr.  Cottle)  generous  enough  to  promise  him 
thirty  guineas  for  poems  which  he  recited  to  him,  and 
might  have  received  the  whole  sum  immediately  on 
delivering  the  manuscript,  he  went  on,  week  after  week, 
begging  and  borrowing  for  his  daily  needs  in  the  most 
humiliating  manner,  until  he  had  drawn  from  his  pa- 
tron the  whole  of  the  promised  purchase-money,  with- 
out supplying  him  with  a  line  of  that  poetry  which  he 
had  only  to  write  down  to  free  himself  from  obligation. 

"  The  habit  of  recourse  to  nervine  stimulants  (alco- 
hol and  opium)  which  he  early  formed,  and  from  which 
he  never  seemed  able  to  free  himself,  doubtless  still 
further  weakened  his  power  of  volitional  self-control ; 
so  that  it  became  necessary  for  his  welfare  that  he 
should  yield  himself  to  the  control  of  others.  .  .  . 

"The  composition  of  the  poetical  fragment  '  Kubla 
Khan'  in  his  sleep,  as  told  in  his  'Biographia  Lite- 
raria,'  is  a  typical  example  of  automatic  mental  action. 


74    THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

He  fell  asleep  whilst  reading  the  passage  in  '  Pur- 
chas's  Pilgrimage '  in  which  the  '  stately  pleasure 
house'  is  mentioned  ;  and,  on  awaking,  he  felt  as  if  he 
had  composed  from  two  to  three  hundred  lines,  which 
he  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  write  down,  'the  images 
rising  up  as  things,  with  a  parallel  production  of  the 
correspondent  expressions,  without  any  sensation  or 
consciousness  of  effort.'  The  whole  of  this  singular 
fragment,  as  it  stands,  consisting  of  fifty-four  lines,  was 
written  as  fast  as  his  pen  could  trace  the  words ;  but 
having  been  interrupted  by  a  person  on  business,  who 
stayed  with  him  above  an  hour,  he  found,  to  his  sur- 
prise and  mortification,  that,  '  though  he  still  retained 
some  vague  and  dim  recollection  of  the  general  pur- 
port of  the  vision,  yet,  with  the  exception  of  some  eight 
or  ten  scattered  lines  and  images,  all  the  rest  had 
passed  away,  like  the  images  on  the  surface  of  a  stream 
into  which  a  stone  had  been  cast ;  but,  alas  !  without 
the  after-restoration  of  the  latter.'  " 

The  accounts  of  his  contemporaries  regarding  his 
indefatigable  conversation,  his  habit  of  dreaming  aloud, 
and  his  perfect  forgetfulness  of  his  hearers,  leave  the 
impression  of  an  exuberant  intelligence,  delivered  to 
an  unbridled  automatism.  Curious  or  amusing  anec- 
dotes on  this  point  abound.  I  will  not  give  any  of 
them  ;  I  prefer  to  leave  to  a  master  the  care  of  depict- 
ing the  man. 

Coleridge's  "whole  figure  and  air,  good  and  amia- 
ble otherwise,  might  be  called  flabby  and  irresolute  ; 
expressive  of  weakness  under  possibility  of  strength. 
He  hung  loosely  on  his  limbs,  with  knees  bent,  and 
stooping  attitude  ;  in  walking  he  rather  shuffled  than 
decisively  stepped  ;  and  a  lady  once  remarked,  he  never 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  A  TTENTION.         75 

could  fix  which  side  of  the  garden-walk  would  suit  him 
best,  but  continually  shifted,  in  corkscrew  fashion,  and 
kept  trying  both.  .  .  . 

''Nothing  could  be  more  copious  than  his  talk; 
and  furthermore  it  was  always,  virtually  or  literally,  of 
the  nature  of  a  monologue ;  suffering  no  interruption, 
however  reverent ;  hastily  putting  aside  all  foreign 
additions,  annotations,  or  most  ingenuous  desires  for 
elucidation,  as  well-meant  superfluities  which  would 
never  do.  Besides,  it  was  talk  not  flowing  anywhither 
like  a  river,  but  spreading  everywhither  in  inextricable 
currents  and  regurgitations  like  a  lake  or  sea ;  terribly 
deficient  in  definite  goal  or  aim,  nay  often  in  logical  in- 
telligibility; what  you  were  to  believe  or  do,  on  any 
earthly  or  heavenly  thing,  obstinately  refusing  to  appear 
from  it.  So  that,  most  times,  you  felt  logically  lost, 
swamped  near  to  drowning  in  this  tide  of  ingenious 
vocables,  spreading  out  boundless  as  if  to  submerge  the 
world.  .  .  . 

"He  began  anywhere:  you  put  some  question  to 
him,  made  some  suggestive  observation  :  instead  of 
answering  this,  or  decidedly  setting  out  towards  an- 
swer of  it,  he  would  accumulate  formidable  apparatus, 
logical  swim-bladders,  transcendental  life-preservers 
and  other  precautionary  and  vehiculatory  gear,  for  set- 
ting out;  perhaps  did  at  last  get  under  way, — but  was 
swiftly  solicited,  turned  aside  by  the  glance  of  some  ra- 
diant new  game  on  this  hand  or  that,  into  new  courses ; 
and  ever  into  new  ;  and  before  long  into  all  the  uni- 
verse, where  it  was  uncertain  what  game  you  would 
catch,  or  whether  any.  Plis  talk,  alas,  was  distin- 
guished, like  himself,  by  irresolution  :  it  disliked  to  be 
troubled  with  conditions,    abstinences,  definite  fulfil- 


76     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

ments ; — loved  to  wander  at  its  own  sweet  will  and 
make  its  auditor  and  his  claims  and  humble  wishes  a 
mere  passive  bucket  for  itself !  .  .  . 

"Glorious  islets,  too,  balmy,  sunny  islets  of  the 
blest  and  the  intelligible,  I  have  seen  rise  out  of  the 
haze,  but  they  were  few  and  soon  swallowed  in  the 
general  element  again.  .  .  . 

"Eloquent,  artistically  expressive  words  you  always 
had ;  piercing  radiances  of  a  most  subtle  insight  came 
at  intervals;  tones  of  noble  pious  sympathy,  recog- 
nisable as  pious  though  strangely  colored,  were  never 
wanting  long  ;  but  in  general  you  could  not  call  this 
aimless,  cloud-capt,  cloud-based,  lawlessly  meandering 
human  discourse  of  reason  by  the  name  of  '  excellent 
talk,'  but  only  of  'surprising';  and  were  reminded 
bitterly  of  Hazlitt's  account  of  it:  'Excellent  talker, 
very, — if  you  let  him  start  from  no  premises  and  come 
to  no  conclusion.'  "* 

Let  us  descend  now  to  commonplace  examples  of 
acquired  impairment  of  the  voluntary  attention.  It 
presents  itself  under  two  forms  : 

i)  The  first  is  characterised  by  excessive  intellec- 
tual activity,  a  superabundance  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness, an  abnormal  production  of  feelings  and  ideas  in 
a  given  time.  We  have  already  mentioned  it  in  con- 
nexion with  alcoholic  drunkenness.  This  cerebral  ex- 
uberance is  most  pronounced  in  the  more  intelligent 
intoxication  of  hasheesh  and  opium.  The  individual 
feels  himself  carried  away  by  the  uncontrollable  flood 
of  his  ideas,  and  language  is  not  rapid  enough  to  ex- 
press the  rapidity  of  thought ;  but  at  the  same  time 
the  power  of  directing  the  ideas  becomes  weaker  and 

*  Carlyle,  The  Life  of  John  Sterling,  (London,  1870)  part  i,  chap,  viii,  pp. 
65-68. 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  A  T  TENT  I  ON.         77 

weaker,  and  the  lucid  moments  shorter  and  shorter.  * 
This  state  of  psychic  exuberance,  whatever  be  its  cause, 
whether  fever,  cerebral  anaemia,  or  emotion,  always  has 
the  same  result. 

Between  this  state  and  attention  there  is,  then,  a 
complete  antagonism  ;  one  excludes  the  other.  It  is, 
furthermore,  no  more  than  a  particular  case  of  the  ex- 
aggeration of  reflexes  ;  only  there  is  question  here  of 
psychic  reflexes.  In  other  terms  every  present  state  of 
consciousness  tends  to  expend  itself,  and  it  can  do  so 
only  in  two  ways  :  either  in  producing  a  movement,  an 
act,  or  else  in  awakening  other  states  of  consciousness, 
according  to  the  laws  of  association.  This  last  case  is 
a  reflex  of  a  more  complex  kind,  a  psychical  reflex,  but 
it  is  like  the  other  only  a  form  of  automatism. 

2)  The  second  form  brings  us  back  to  the  abulia 
type :  it  consists  in  a  progressive  diminution  of  the 
directive  power  and  an  eventual  impossibility  of  intel- 
lectual effort. 

"In  the  incipient  stage  of  disease  of  the  brain  the 
patient  complains  of  an  incapacity  to  control  and  di- 
rect the  faculty  of  attention.  He  finds  he  cannot, 
without  an  obvious  and  painful  effort,  accomplish  his 
usual  mental  work,  read  or  master  the  contents  of  a 
letter,  newspaper,  or  even  a  page  or  two  of  a  favorite 
book.  The  ideas  become  restive,  and  the  mind  lapses 
into  a  flighty  condition,  exhibiting  no  capacity  for  con- 
tinuity of  thought. 

"Fully  recognising  his  impaired  and  failing  ener- 
gies, the  patient  repeatedly  tries  to  conquer  the  de- 
fect, and,  seizing  hold  of  a  book,  is  resolved  not  to 
succumb  to  his  sensations  of  intellectual  incapacity, 

*  Moreaii,  Du  hachich  et  de  I' alidnation  mentale,  p.  60.  Ricbet,  Les  pot- 
sons  di  I' intelligence^  p.  71. 


78     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

psychical  languor,  and  cerebral  weakness ;  but  he  often 
discovers  that  he  has  lost  all  power  of  healthy  mental 
steadiness,  normal  concentration,  or  co-ordination  of 
thought.  In  his  attempt  to  comprehend  the  meaning 
of  the  immediate  subject  under  consideration  he  reads 
and  re-reads  with  a  determined  resolution  and  appa- 
rently unflagging  energy,  certain  striking  passages  and 
pages  of  a  particular  book,  but  without  being  able  to 
grasp  the  simplest  chain  of  thought,  or  follow  success- 
fully an  elementary  process  of  reasoning  ;  neither  is 
he  in  a  condition  of  mind  fitting  him  to  comprehend 
or  retain  for  many  consecutive  seconds  the  outline  of 
an  interesting  story;  understand  a  simple  calculation 
of  figures  or  narrative  of  facts.  The  attempt,  par- 
ticularly if  it  be  a  sustained  one,  to  master  and  con- 
verge the  attention  to  the  subject  which  he  is  trying 
to  seize,  very  frequently  increases  the  pre-existing  con- 
fusion of  mind,  producing  eventually  physical  sensa- 
tion of  brain  lassitude  and  headache."* 

Many  general  paralytics,  after  having  passed 
through  the  period  of  intellectual  superactivity,  that 
of  gigantic  projects,  of  immoderate  purchases,  of  jour- 
neys without  a  motive,  and  of  incessant  loquacity, 
when  the  will  is  dominated  by  the  reflexes,  arrive 
at  last  at  the  period  when  it  is  impotent  from  atony; 
effort  lasts  only  a  moment,  until  this  ever  increasing 
passivity  ends  in  madness,  f 

*  Forbes  Winslow,  On  Some  Obscure  Diseases  of  the  Brain  and  Mind,  chap, 
xii  (French  translation,  p.  216). 

+  Among  this  class  of  patients,  some  rare  cases  pass  through  a  period  of 
struggle  which  shows  well  in  what  measure  the  will  is  mistress  and  how  it 
ends  by  succumbing.  "  I  have  seen  at  BicStre,"  says  Billod  (loc.  cit.).  "  a  gen- 
eral paralytic  whose  mania  of  greatness  was  as  pronounced  as  possible,  escape 
and  go  bare-footed  during  a  beating  rain  and  by  night  from  BicStre  to  Batig- 
nolles.  The  patient  remained  in  the  world  a  whole  year,  during  which  he 
struggled  with  all  his  will  against  his  intellectual  mania,  realising  perfectly 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  A  TTENTION.        79 

The  reader  can  see,  without  commentaries,  that  the 
diseases  of  voluntary  attention  are  reducible  to  the 
types  already  studied.  So  it  will  be  more  fruitful,  with- 
out multiplying  examples,  to  endeavor  to  ascertain 
what  light  that  state  of  mind  called  attention  can  throw 
upon  the  nature  of  the  will,  and  what  suggestions  it 
can  contribute  towards  the  conclusions  of  the  present 
work. 

I  do  not  need  to  make  a  study  of  attention,  how- 
ever interesting  and  little  known  this  subject  may  be. 
The  question  can  be  dealt  with  here  only  indirectly, 
that  is  to  say  only  so  far  as  it  touches  on  the  will.  I 
will  reduce  my  conclusions  on  this  point  to  the  fol- 
lowing propositions  : 

i)  Voluntary  attention,  that  whose  wonders  are 
usually  recounted,  is  only  an  artificial,  unstable  and 
precarious  imitation  of  spontaneous  attention. 

2)  The  latter  alone  is  natural  and  efficacious. 

3)  It  depends,  in  its  origin  and  its  continuance,  on 
certain  affective  states,  on  the  presence  of  agreeable 
or  disagreeable  feelings  ;  in  a  word,  it  is  sensitive  in 
its  origin,  which  assimilates  it  to  the  reflexes. 

4)  Inhibitive  acts  appear  to  play  an  important  but 
ill-comprehended  part  in  the  mechanism  of  attention. 

To  justify  these  propositions,  it  is  well  to  examine 
in  the  first  place  spontaneous  attention,  taking  it  under 
its  most  diverse  forms.  The  crouching  animal  watch- 
ing for  its  prey,  the  child  gazing  with  eagerness  at 
some  commonplace  spectacle,  the  assassin  waiting  for 
his  victim  at  the  corner  of  a  wood  (here  the  image  re- 
places the  perception  of  the  real  object),  the  poet  pos- 

that  at  the  first  false  idea  they  would  take  him  back  to  Bicetre.  He  returned 
there,  nevertheless.— I  have  met  several  other  examples  of  this  persistence  of 
the  integrity  of  the  will  for  a  considerable  time  in  general  paralytics." 


8o  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

sessed  by  an  interior  vision,  the  mathematician  seeking 
the  solution  of  a  problem  :*  all  present  essentially  the 
same  external  and  internal  characters. 

I  would  readily  define  the  intense  and  spontaneous 
state  of  attention,  with  Sergi,  as  a  differentiation  of 
perception  producing  a  greater  psychic  energy  in  cer- 
tain nervous  centres  with  a  sort  of  temporary  catalepsy 
of  other  centres,  f  But  it  is  not  the  attention  in  itself 
that  I  have  to  study ;  what  concerns  us  is  to  determine 
its  origin,  its  cause. 

It  is  clear  that  in  the  states  above  enumerated  and 
analogous  ones,  the  true  cause  is  an  affective  state,  a 
feeling  of  pleasure,  of  love,  of  hatred,  of  curiosity;  in 
short  a  more  or  less  complex  state,  agreeable,  disagree- 
able, or  mixed.  It  is  because  the  prey,  the  spectacle, 
the  idea  of  the  victim,  the  problem  to  be  resolved  pro- 
duce in  the  animal,  the  child,  the  assassin,  the  mathe- 
matician an  intense  and  sufficiently  durable  emotion 
that  they  are  attentive.  Take  away  the  emotion,  all 
disappears.  So  long  as  it  lasts,  attention  lasts.  Every- 
thing takes  place  here,  then,  in  the  manner  of  those 

♦There  is  question  here,  it  need  not  be  said,  only  of  those  who  are  poets 
or  mathematicians  by  nature,  not  by  education. 

t  "The  complicated  process  of  attention  is  determined  by  the  same  ana- 
tomico-physiological  conditions  of  the  encephalic  organs  which  are  met  with 
in  a  simpler  form  in  sensitive  excitation.  These  conditions  depend  upon  the 
continued  process  of  differentiation  that  the  nervous  elements  undergo.  We 
have  already  seen  a  first  process  of  differentiation  in  the  transition  from  the 
diffused  [nervous]  wave  to  the  restricted  wave,  that  is  to  say  in  the  transition 
from  sensation  to  distinct  perception  ;  which  implies  a  cerebral  localisation. 
It  is  a  process  of  still  greater  differentiation  that  we  call  attention.  The  exci- 
tatory wave  becomes  more  restricted  and  more  intense,  more  localised  and 
more  direct ;  whereupon  the  entire  phenomenon  takes  a  clear  and  distinct 
form."  (Sergi,  Teoria  fisiologica  della  percezione,  chap,  xii,  p.  216.  Besides 
this  substantial  chapter,  the  following  works  may  be  consulted  on  the  atten- 
tion studied  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  new  psychology:  hevies,  Problems 
o/Li/e  and  Mind,  third  series,  p.  184;  Maudsley,  Physiology  0/ Mind  (Vrench 
translation,  p.  457);  Wundt,  GrimdzUge  der  physiologischen  Psychologies  second 
edition,  p.  391  ;  Ferrier,  The  Functions  of  the  Brain,  §  102.) 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  ATTENTION.         8i 

reflexes  which  appear  continuous  because  an  excitation 
unceasingly  repeated  and  always  the  same  maintains 
them  up  to  the  moment  when  nervous  exhaustion  takes 
place. 

Is  a  confirmation  of  this  desired?  Let  it  be  ob- 
served that  children,  women,  and  light  minds  in  gen- 
eral are  capable  of  attention  only  during  a  very  short 
time,  because  things  awaken  in  them  only  superficial 
and  unstable  feelings  ;  that  they  are  completely  inat- 
tentive to  high,  complex,  and  profound  questions,  be- 
cause they  leave  them  cold  ;  that  they  are  on  the  con- 
trary attentive  to  insignificant  things  because  they  in- 
terest them.  I  might  recall  moreover,  that  the  orator 
and  the  writer  hold  the  attention  of  their  public  by  ap- 
pealing to  their  feelings  (satisfaction,  terror,  etc.). 
The  question  can  be  looked  at  from  every  side  and  the 
same  conclusion  forces  itself  upon  us.  I  would  not 
insist  upon  so  evident  a  fact  if  the  authors  who  have 
studied  the  attention  did  not  appear  to  me  to  have  for- 
gotten this  most  important  influence. 

On  this  account  it  should  be  said  that  spontaneous 
attention  gives  a  maximum  of  result  with  a  minimum 
of  effort,  while  voluntary  attention  gives  a  minimum 
of  result  with  a  maximum  of  effort ;  and  that  this  oppo- 
sition is  so  much  the  more  marked  as  the  one  is  more 
spontaneous  and  the  other  more  voluntary.  In  its 
highest  degree,  voluntary  attention  is  an  artificial  state 
in  which,  by  the  aid  of  assumed  feelings,  we  maintain 
with  great  difficulty  certain  states  of  consciousness 
which  tend  only  to  disappear  (for  example,  when  we 
follow,  for  politeness  sake,  a  very  tiresome  conversa- 
tion). In  one  case  what  determines  this  specialisation 
of  consciousness  is  our  whole  individuality;  in  the  sec- 


82  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

ond  it  is  an  extremely  weak  and  limited  portion  of 
our  individuality. 

Many  questions  would  arise  here  ;  but,  I  repeat,  I 
do  not  need  to  study  attention  in  itself.  I  simply  had 
to  show  (regarding  which  I  hope  ther^  remains  no 
doubt)  that  it  is  in  its  origin  of  the  same  nature  as  the 
reflexes  ;  that  in  its  spontaneous  form  it  has  their  regu- 
larity and  their  power  of  action ;  that  in  its  voluntary 
form  it  is  much  less  regular  and  powerful ;  but  that,  in 
both  cases,  it  is  a  sensitive  excitation  which  causes  it, 
maintains  it,  and  measures  it. 

We  see  once  more  that  the  voluntary  is  bound  up 
with  the  involuntary,  supports  itself  on  it,  draws  from  it 
its  force,  and  is  in  comparison  with  it  very  weak.  The 
education  of  attention  consists  only  in  arousing  and 
developing  these  factitious  sentiments  and  in  trying  to 
render  them  stable  by  repetition  ;  but  as  there  is  no 
creation  ex  nihilo,  they  must  have  a  natural  basis, 
however  slight  it  may  be.  To  conclude  this  point,  I 
will  admit  that  I  accept,  for  my  part,  the  paradox  of 
Helvetius,  so  often  combated,  "that  all  the  intellectual 
differences  among  men  come  from  attention  alone," 
with  the  reservation  that  there  is  question  only  of  spon- 
taneous attention  ;  but  then  it  amounts  to  no  more 
than  to  say  that  the  differences  among  men  are  innate 
and  natural. 

After  having  shown  how  attention  is  produced  it 
remains  to  ascertain  how  it  is  kept  up.  The  difficulty 
arises  only  in  the  case  of  voluntary  attention.  We  have 
seen,  in  fact,  that  the  maintenance  of  spontaneous  at- 
tention explains  itself.  It  is  continuous  because  the  ex- 
citation which  causes  it  is  continuous.  On  the  contrary, 
the  more  voluntary  attention  is,  the  more  effort  it  re- 
quires and  the  more  unstable  it  is.    Both  cases  reduce 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  ATTENTION.        83 

themselves  to  a  struggle  between  different  states  of 
consciousness.  In  the  first  case,  one  state  of  conscious- 
ness (or  to  say  better,  a  group  of  states)  is  so  intense 
that  no  struggle  against  it  is  possible  and  that  it  im- 
poses itself  by  its  living  force.  In  the  second  case,  the 
group  has  not  in  itself  a  sufficient  intensity  to  impose 
itself ;  it  is  enabled  to  do  this  only  by  an  additional  force, 
which  is  the  intervention  of  the  will.  By  what  mechan- 
ism does  it  act?  As  it  would  seem,  by  an  arrest  of 
movements.  We  are  thus  brought  back  to  the  prob- 
lem of  inhibition,  more  obscure  here  than  anywhere 
else.  Let  us  see  what  can  be  supposed  in  regard  to 
this.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  recall 
that  the  brain  is  a  motor  organ,  that  is  to  say  that  a 
great  number  of  its  elements  are  devoted  to  the  pro- 
duction of  movement  and  that  there  is  not  a  single 
state  of  consciousness  which  does  not  in  some  degree 
contain  motor  elements.  Hence  it  follows  that  every 
state  of  attention  implies  the  existence  of  these  ele- 
ments. "In  movements  of  the  limbs  and  trunk  the 
feelings  of  operation  are  very  conspicuous  ;*  they  are 
less  so  in  the  delicate  adjustment  of  the  eye,  ear, 
etc.,  and  are  only  inductively  recognisable  in  the 
still  more  delicate  adjustments  of  .attention  and  com- 
prehension, which  are  also  acts  of  the  mind  in  more 
than  a  metaphorical  sense.  The  purest  intellectual 
combinations  involve  motor  impulses  (feelings  of  ope- 
ration) quite  as  necessarily  as  the  combination  of 
muscles  in  manipulation.  The  feelings  of  effort  and 
relief  in  seeking  and  finding  our  way  through  an  ob- 
scure and  tangled  mass  of  ideas  —  the  tentatives  of 
hypothesis  and  induction — are  but  fainter  forms  of  the 
feelings  in  seeking  and  finding  our  way  along  a  dark 

*  Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  of  Mind,  third  series,  p.  397. 


84  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

road  or  thick  forest."  Let  us  recall  once  more  that 
every  state  of  consciousness,  especially  when  it  is  very 
intense,  tends  to  pass  into  action,  to  express  itself  in 
movements,  and  that,  as  soon  as  it  enters  into  its  mo- 
tory  phase,  it  loses  its  intensity,  it  is  in  decline,  it  tends 
to  disappear  from  consciousness. — But  a  present  state 
of  consciousness  has  another  manner  of  expending  it- 
self, which  is  to  transmit  its  tension  to  other  states  ac- 
cording to  the  mechanism  of  association.  It  is,  if  you 
like,  an  internal  expenditure  in  place  of  an  external 
one.  At  the  same  time  the  association  which  starts 
from  the  present  state  does  not  take  place  in  one  way 
only.  In  spontaneous  attention,  certain  associations 
prevail  alone  and  of  themselves,  by  their  own  intensity. 
In  voluntary  attention  (reflexion  represents  its  highest 
form),  we  are  conscious  of  an  irradiation  in  several 
directions.  Better  yet,  in  the  cases  where  we  have 
much  trouble  to  be  attentive,  the  prevailing  associa- 
tions are  those  that  we  do  not  wish,  that  is  to  say  which 
are  not  chosen,  affirmed  as  the  ones  that  ought  to  be 
maintained. 

By  what  means,  then,  are  the  weaker  ones  main- 
tained? In  order  to  represent  to  ourselves  so  far  as 
possible,  what  takes  place  in  such  a  case,  let  us  con- 
sider some  facts  which  are  analogous  but  of  a  more 
palpable  kind.  Let  us  take  a  man  who  is  learning  to 
play  on  an  instrument  or  to  handle  a  tool,  or  better  still, 
a  child  who  is  learning  to  write.  At  the  outset  he  pro- 
duces a  great  number  of  completely  useless  movements; 
he  moves  his  tongue,  his  head,  his  face,  his  legs,  and  it 
is  only  little  by  little  that  he  learns  to  hold  his  organs 
in  subjection  and  to  limit  himself  to  the  necessary 
movements  of  the  hands  and  eyes. 

In  voluntary  attention  things  take  place  in  an  analo- 


IMPAIRMENTS  OF  ATTENTION.         85 

gous  manner.  The  associations  which  diffuse  them- 
selves in  all  directions  may  be  likened  to  these  useless 
movements.  The  problem,  in  one  case  as  in  the  other, 
is  to  substitute  a  limited  and  restrained  diffusion  for  an 
unlimited  diffusion.  For  that  purpose,  we  check  the 
associations  which  do  not  serve  our  end.  Properly 
speaking,  we  do  not  suppress  states  of  consciousness, 
but  we  prevent  them,  from  surviving  and  awakening 
analogous  states,  and  from  propagating  themselves  in 
their  own  way.  We  know,  moreover,  that  this  attempt 
is  often  unsuccessful,  always  difficult,  and  in  certain 
cases  has  to  be  incessantly  repeated.  At  the  same  time 
that  we  prevent  this  diffusion  in  all  directions,  the  dis- 
ponible  nervous  force  is  economised  to  our  profit.  To 
diminish  the  useless  diffusion  is  to  augment  the  useful 
concentration. 

Such  is  the  idea  that  one  obtains  of  this  obscure 
phenomenon  when  one  tries  to  penetrate  its  mechan- 
ism, in  place  of  having  recourse  to  a  pretended  "fac- 
ulty" of  attention  which  explains  nothing.  We  must, 
however,  recognise  with  Ferrier  that  on  what  phys- 
iological basis  this  psychological  faculty  rests,  is  an 
extremely  difficult  question,  and  one  hardly  capable 
of  an  experimental  determination.*  We  would  add 
that  the  preceding  pretends  only  to  be  an  approxima- 
tion, not  an  explanation. 

*Op.  cit.,  chapter  xii.  For  a  more  detailed  study  of  this  question,  we  would 
refer  to  our  Psychology  of  Attention  [second  edition,  The  Open  Court  Pub. 
Co.,  Chicago,  1894]. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  REALM  OF  CAPRICES. 

To  WILL  is  to  choose  in  order  to  act ;  such  is  for  us 
the  formula  of  the  normal  will.  The  anomalies  hitherto 
studied  reduce  themselves  to  two  great  groups  :  either 
the  impulse  is  lacking,  and  no  tendency  to  action  is 
produced  (abulia)  ;  or  a  too  rapid  or  too  intense  im- 
pulse prevents  a  choice.  Before  examining  the  cases 
of  obliteration  of  the  will,  that  is  to  say  those  in  which 
there  is  neither  choice  nor  acts,  we  will  study  a  type  of 
character  in  which  the  will  does  not  constitute  itself  at 
all  or  does  so  only  in  a  wavering,  unsteady  and  ineffica- 
cious form.  The  best  example  of  it  that  can  be  given 
is  the  hysterical  character.  Properly  speaking  we  en- 
counter here  not  so  much  a  disorder  as  a  constitutional 
state.  The  simple  irresistible  impulse  is  like  an  acute 
disease  ;  the  permanent  and  invincible  impulses  resem- 
ble a  chronic  disease  ;  the  hysterical  character  is  a  dia- 
thesis. It  is  a  state  in  which  the  conditions  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  will  are  nearly  always  lacking. 

I  borrow  from  the  picture  of  the  character  of  hys- 
terics that  Dr.  Huchard  has  recently  drawn,  the  fea- 
tures which  relate  to  our  subject :  "A  primary  trait  of 
their  character  is  mobility.  From  day  to  day,  from 
hour  to  hour,  from  minute  to  minute,  they  pass  with 
an  incredible  rapidity  from  joy  to  sadness,  from  laugh- 


THE  REALM  OF  CAPRICES.  87 

ter  to  tears ;  versatile,  fantastic  or  capricious,  they 
speak  at  certain  moments  with  an  astonishing  loqua- 
city, while  at  others  they  become  gloomy  and  taciturn, 
keep  a  complete  silence,  or  remain  plunged  in  a  state 
of  reverie  or  of  mental  depression ;  they  are  then 
seized  with  a  vague  and  indefinable  feeling  of  sadness, 
with  a  sensation  of  pressure  in  the  throat,  of  a  rising 
ball,  or  of  epigastric  oppression ;  they  burst  into  sobs, 
or  they  go  to  hide  their  tears  in  solitude,  which  they 
crave  and  seek  ;  at  other  times,  on  the  contrary,  they 
begin  to  laugh  in  an  immoderate  manner  without  se- 
rious motives.  'They  behave,'  says  Ch.  Richet,  'like 
children  that  one  sets  to  laughing  with  noises  when 
they  still  have  on  their  cheeks  the  tears  that  they  have 
just  shed.' 

<' Their  character  changes  like  the  figures  of  a  ka- 
leidoscope, which  has  led  Sydenham  to  say  with  rea- 
son that  the  most  constant  thing  about  them  is  their 
inconstancy.  Yesterday  they  were  lively,  amiable  and 
gracious  ;  to-day  they  are  ill-humored,  susceptible  and 
irascible,  vexed  at  everything  and  at  nothing,  capri- 
ciously disagreeable  and  sulky,  discontented  with  their 
lot ;  nothing  interests  them,  they  are  wearied  with  every- 
thing. They  experience  a  very  great  antipathy  toward 
a  person  whom  yesterday  they  loved  and  esteemed,  or, 
on  the  contrary,  show  an  incomprehensible  sympathy 
for  some  one  else  ;  so  they  follow  certain  persons  with 
their  hatred  with  as  much  bitterness  as  they  had  for- 
merly had  persistence  in  surrounding  them  with  affec- 
tion. .  .  . 

"Sometimes  their  sensibility  is  exalted  by  the  most 
trivial  motives  when  it  is  hardly  touched  by  the  great- 
est emotions;  they  remain  almost  indifferent,  impas- 
sible even,  at  the  announcement  of  a  real  misfortune. 


88     THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

and  they  shed  tears  abundantly  and  abandon  them- 
selves to  the  profoundest  despair  on  account  of  a  sim- 
ple word  falsely  interpreted,  and  transform  into  an  of- 
fence the  lightest  pleasantry.  This  sort  of  ?fwral  ataxia 
is  observed  even  in  regard  to  their  dearest  interests  : 
one  has  the  most  complete  indifference  towards  the 
misconduct  of  her  husband  ;  another  remains  cold  be- 
fore danger  which  menaces  her  fortune.  In  turn  gen- 
tle and  passionate,  says  Moreau  (of  Tours),  kind  and 
cruel,  impressionable  to  excess,  rarely  mistresses  of 
their  first  movements,  incapable  of  offering  resistance 
to  impulses  of  the  most  opposite  nature,  presenting  a 
lack  of  equilibrium  between  the  superior  moral  facul- 
ties, will  and  conscience,  and  the  inferior  faculties,  the 
instincts,  passions,  and  desires. 

"This  extreme  mobility  in  their  state  of  mind  and 
their  affective  dispositions,  this  instability  of  character, 
this  lack  of  fixity,  this  absence  of  stability  in  their  ideas 
and  their  volitions,  explain  the  incapacity  which  they 
experience  of  giving  their  attention  very  long  to  read- 
ing, study,  or  any  kind  of  work. 

"All  these  changes  follow  each  other  with  the 
greatest  rapidity.  In  this  class  of  patients  the  im- 
pulses are  not,  as  in  the  case  of  epileptics,  absolutely 
uncontrolled  by  the  intellect,  but  they  are  rapidly  fol- 
lowed by  action.  This  is  the  explanation  of  those 
sudden  movements  of  anger  and  indignation,  those 
headlong  enthusiasms,  those  fits  of  despair,  those  ex- 
plosions of  mad  gaiety,  those  great  bursts  of  affection, 
those  quick  accessions  of  tenderness,  or  those  sudden 
transports  during  which,  acting  like  spoiled  children, 
they  stamp  with  their  feet,  break  furniture,  feel  an  irre- 
sistible need  of  striking  something.  .  .  . 

"Hysterical  patients  act  as  they  are  led  by  their 


THE  REALM  OF  CAPRICES.  89 

passions.  Almost  all  the  various  inconstancies  of  their 
character,  of  their  mental  state,  can  be  summed  up  in 
these  words  :  they  do  not  know  how  to  use  their  will, 
they  cannot  and  will  not  do  it.  It  is,  indeed,  because 
their  will  is  always  unsteady  and  faltering,  because  it 
is  unceasingly  in  a  state  of  unstable  equilibrium,  be- 
cause it  turns  at  the  least  wind  like  the  weather-vane 
on  our  roofs ;  it  is  for  all  these  reasons  that  hysterical 
patients  have  such  mobility,  such  inconstancy,  and 
such  changeableness  in  their  desires,  their  ideas,  and 
their  affections."* 

This  portrait  is  so  complete  that  we  need  not  pro- 
long our  comments.  It  has  put  before  the  readers' 
eyes  that  state  of  incoordination,  of  broken  equili- 
brium, of  anarchy,  of  "moral  ataxia  ";  but  we  have  yet 
to  justify  the  statement  that  we  made  at  the  outset : 
that  there  is  here  a  constitutional  impotence  of  the 
will ;  that  it  cannot  arise  because  the  conditions  of  its 
existence  are  lacking.  For  the  sake  of  clearness  I  will 
anticipate  what  is  to  be  established  with  more  details 
and  proofs  at  the  close  of  this  work. 

If  we  take  an  adult  person,  endowed  with  an  ave- 
rage will,  we  will  observe  that  his  activity  (that  is  to 
say,  his  power  of  producing  acts)  forms  in  general  three 
planes  :  on  the  lowest  are  the  automatic  acts,  simple 
or  composite  reflexes,  habits  ;  above  are  acts  produced 
by  the  feelings,  emotions,  and  passions  ;  higher  still 
are  rational  acts.  This  last  stage  presupposes  the 
other  two,  rests  on  them.,  and  consequently  depends 
upon  them,  although  it  gives  them  co-ordination  and 
unity.  The  capricious  characters  of  which  the  hys- 
teric is  the  type  have  only  the  two  lower  forms  ;  the 

*  Axenfeld  and  Huchard,  Traiti  des  nivroses  (second  edition,  18H3),  pp. 
958-971. 


go  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

third  is,  as  it  were,  atrophied.  By  nature,  save  in  rare 
exceptions,  the  rational  activity  is  always  the  least 
strong.  It  obtains  the  mastery  only  on  the  condition 
that  the  ideas  awaken  certain  feelings  which  are  much 
more  apt  than  they  to  express  themselves  in  acts.  We 
have  seen  that  the  more  abstract  ideas  are,  the  weaker 
their  motory  tendencies.  In  hysterical  patients  the 
regulative  ideas  do  not  arise  or  remain  sterile.  It  is 
because  certain  notions  of  the  rational  order  (utility, 
propriety,  duty,  etc.)  remain  in  the  state  of  mere  con- 
ceptions, because  they  are  not  felt  by  the  individual, 
because  they  produce  in  him  no  affective  response,  do 
not  enter  into  his  substance,  but  remain  like  something 
brought  in  from  outside ;  it  is  on  these  accounts  that 
they  are  without  action  and  for  all  practical  purposes  as 
if  they  did  not  exist.  The  power  of  individual  action  is 
maimed  and  incomplete.  The  tendency  of  the  feelings 
and  passions  to  show  themselves  in  acts  is  doubly 
strong,  both  in  itself  and  because  there  is  nothing 
above  it  which  checks  and  counterbalances  it ;  and  as 
it  is  a  characteristic  of  the  feelings  to  go  straight  to 
the  goal,  after  the  manner  of  reflexes,  to  have  an 
adaptation  in  one  single  direction,  unilateral  (just  the 
contrary  to  rational  adaptation,  which  is  multilateral), 
the  desires,  born  quickly  and  immediately  satisfied, 
leave  free  room  for  others,  analogous  or  opposed,  ac- 
cording to  the  perpetual  variations  of  the  individual. 
There  exist  only  caprices,  at  most  desires,  a  rough  out- 
line of  volition.* 

This  fact,  that  desire  goes  in  a  single  direction  and 
tends  to  expend  itself  without  delay,  does  not,  how- 

*Let  us  note  in  passing  how  necessary  it  is  in  psychology  to  take  account 
of  the  ascending  gradation  of  phenomena.  Volition  is  not  a  clear  and  well- 
defined  state  which  either  exists  or  does  not  exist ;  there  are  sketches  and 
attempts. 


THE  REALM  OF  CAPRICES.  91 

ever,  explain  the  instability  of  the  hysteric,  nor  his  ab- 
sence of  will.  If  a  desire  always  satisfied  springs  up 
again  continually,  there  is  stability.  The  predomi- 
nance of  the  affective  life  does  not  necessarily  exclude 
the  will :  an  intense,  stable,  permitted  passion  is  the 
very  basis  of  all  energetic  wills.  It  is  found  in  the 
great  men  of  ambition,  in  the  martyr  unshaken  in  his 
faith,  in  the  red-skin  bidding  defiance  to  his  enemies 
in  the  midst  of  torments.  It  is  necessary,  then,  to  seek 
more  deeply  the  cause  of  this  instability  in  the  hysteric, 
and  this  cause  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  state  of  the 
individuality,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  final  reckoning,  of 
the  organism.  We  call  that  will  strong  whose  end, 
whatever  be  its  nature,  is  fixed.  When  circumstances 
change,  means  are  changed  ;  there  take  place  succes- 
sive adaptations  to  the  new  environment,  but  the  cen- 
tre towards  which  all  converges  does  not  change.  Its 
stability  expresses  the  permanency  of  character  in  the 
individual.  If  the  same  end  continues  to  be  chosen, 
approved,  it  is  because  that  at  bottom  the  individual 
remains  the  same.  Let  us  suppose,  on  the  contrary, 
an  organism  with  unstable  functions,  whose  unity — 
which  is  only  a  consensus — is  continually  dissolved 
and  reconstituted  on  a  new  plan,  according  to  the  sud- 
den variation  of  the  functions  that  make  it  up ;  it  is 
clear  that  in  such  a  case  choice  can  hardly  arise,  can- 
not last,  and  there  remain  only  whims  and  caprices. 
This  is  what  takes  place  in  the  hysteric.  The  in- 
stability is  a  fact.  Its  very  probable  cause  is  in  func- 
tional disorders.  Anaesthesia  of  special  senses  or  of 
the  general  sensibility,  hyperaesthesia  in  its  various 
forms,  motor  disorders,  contractures,  convulsions,  pa- 
ralyses, derangements  of  the  organic  functions,  vaso- 
motor, secretory,  etc.,  occurring  successively  or  simul- 


92  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

taneously,  keep  the  organism  in  a  perpetual  state  of 
unstable  equilibrium,*  and  the  character,  which  is  only 
the  psychic  expression  of  the  organism,  correspond- 
ingly varies.  A  stable  character  upon  such  an  unsteady 
foundation  would  be  a  miracle.  We  find,  therefore, 
the  true  cause  of  impotence  of  will  to  be  here,  and  this 
impotence  is,  as  we  have  said,  constitutional. 

Some  facts  contradictory  in  appearance  really  con- 
firm this  thesis.  Hysterical  patients  are  sometimes 
possessed  by  a  fixed  idea,  which  cannot  be  conquered. 
One  refuses  to  eat,  another  to  speak,  another  to  see, 
because  the  labor  of  digestion,  or  the  exercise  of  the 
voice  or  the  sight  would  bring  about,  as  they  suppose, 
some  suffering.  One  meets  more  frequently  with  that 
kind  of  paralysis  which  has  been  called  "psychic"  or 
"ideal."  The  hysteric  stays  in  bed  for  weeks,  months, 
and  even  years,  believing  herself  unable  to  stand  up 
or  to  walk.  A  moral  shock,  or  the  mere  influence  of 
some  one  who  gains  her  confidence  or  acts  with  author- 
ity effects  a  cure.  One  begins  to  walk  at  the  announce- 
ment of  a  fire,  another  gets  up  and  goes  to  meet  a 
long-absent  brother,  another  decides  to  eat  out  of  fear 
of  the  physician.  Briquet,  in  his  "  Traite  de  I'hys- 
t6rie,"  reports  several  cases  of  women  whom  he  healed 
by  inspiring  them  with  faith  in  their  recovery.  There 
might  also  be  mentioned  a  good  number  of  those  cures 
called  miraculous  which  have  attracted  the  public  curi- 
osity from  the  time  of  the  deacon  Paris  to  our  own  day. 

The  physiological  causes  of  these  paralyses  are 
much  in  dispute.  In  the  psychological  order  we  ob- 
serve the  existence  of  a  fixed  idea  the  result  of  which 
is  an  inhibition.  As  an  idea  does  not  exist  by  itself 
and  without  certain  cerebral  conditions,  as  it  is  only  a 

*  For  the  details  of  the  facte  see  the  work  cited,  pp.  987-1043. 


THE  REALM  OF  CAPRICES.  93 

part  of  a  psycho-physiological  whole — the  conscious 
part — it  must  be  admitted  that  it  corresponds  to  an 
abnormal  state  of  the  organism,  perhaps  of  the  motor 
centres,  and  that  it  draws  thence  its  origin.  However 
that  may  be,  it  is  not,  as  certain  medical  men  have  per- 
sistently maintained,  an  ' '  exaltation  "  of  the  will ;  it  is, 
on  the  contrary,  its  absence.  We  are  recurring  to  a 
morbid  type  already  studied,  which  differs  from  irresis- 
tible impulses  only  in  form  ;  it  is  inhibitory.  But  there 
is  no  direct  reaction  against  the  fixed  idea  on  the  indi- 
vidual's own  part.  It  is  an  influence  from  without 
which  imposes  itself  and  produces  a  contrary  state  of 
consciousness,  with  the  concomitant  feelings  and  phys- 
iological states.  There  results  from  this  a  powerful 
impulse  to  action,  which  suppresses  and  replaces  the 
inhibitory  state  ;  but  it  is  hardly  a  volition  ;  at  best  it 
is  a  volition  with  another's  aid. 

This  group  of  facts  brings  us,  then,  to  the  same 
conclusion  :  an  impotence  of  the  will  to  form  itself.* 

*  For  the  facts  see  Briquet,  Traite  de  I' hystirie,  cha.^.  n;  Axenfeld  and 
Huchard,  op.  cit..  pp.  967-1012;  Cruveilhier,  Anatotnie  paihologique,  book 
XXXV,  p.  4  ;  Macario,  Annates  medico-psychologiques,  vol.  iii,  p.  62  ;  Ch.  Richet, 
in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Jan.  15,  1880  ;  P.  Richer,  Etudes  clintques  sur  V hys- 
t^ro-^pilefsie,  etc.,  part  third,  chap,  ii,  and  the  historic  notes. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE  WILL. 

The  cases  of  extinction  of  the  will,  upon  whose 
study  we  are  now  to  enter,  are  those  in  which  there  is 
neither  choice  nor  action.  When  all  the  psychic  ac- 
tivity is  or  seems  to  be  completely  suspended,  as  in 
deep  sleep,  artificial  anaesthesia,  coma,  and  analogous 
states,  it  is  a  return  to  the  vegetative  life ;  we  have 
nothing  to  say  of  this  ;  the  will  disappears,  because 
everything  disappears.  Here  we  have  to  do  with  cases 
where  a  form  of  mental  activity  persists,  although 
there  is  no  possibility  of  choice  followed  by  action. 
This  annihilation  of  the  will  is  met  with  in  ecstasy  and 
in  somnambulism. 


Various  kinds  of  ecstasy  have  been  distinguished  : 
profane,  mystical,  morbid,  physiological,  cataleptic, 
somnambulic,  etc.  These  distinctions  do  not  concern  us 
here,  the  mental  state  remaining  the  same  at  bottom. 
Most  ecstatics  reach  that  state  naturally,  as  a  result  of 
their  constitution.  Others  assist  nature  by  artificial 
processes.  The  religious  and  philosophical  literature 
of  the  Orient,  of  India  in  particular,  abounds  in  docu- 
ments from  which  it  has  been  possible  to  gather  a  sort 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WIJ.L.       95 

of  working  manual  for  the  attainment  of  ecstasy.  To 
remain  motionless,  to  gaze  fixedly  at  the  sky,  a  lumi- 
nous object,  the  end  of  the  nose,  or,  one's  navel  (like 
the  monks  of  Mount  Athos  called  omplialopsychi),  to 
repeat  continually  the  monosyllable  Dm  (Brahm), 
while  contemplating  the  Supreme  Being  ;  "to  retain 
the  breath,"  that  is  to  say,  to  slacken  one's  respiration  ; 
"not  to  concern  oneself  either  with  time  or  with 
place";  such  are  the  means  which  "  make  one  resem- 
ble the  placid  light  of  a  lamp  set  in  a  place  where  the 
wind  does  not  blow."  * 

When  this  state  is  attained,  the  ecstatic  presents 
certain  physical  characteristics  :  sometimes  motionless 
and  mute,  sometimes  expressing  the  vision  that  pos- 
sesses him  by  words,  songs,  and  attitudes.  He  rarely 
moves  from  his  position.  His  physiognomy  is  ex- 
pressive ;  but  his  eyes,  even  though  open,  do  not  see. 
Sounds  no  longer  affect  him  ;  save,  in  some  cases,  the 
voice   of   a  particular  person.     General  sensibility  is 

*  Bhagavad-gita,  chap.  vi.  The  Buddhist  teachers  say  that  there  are  four 
degrees  in  the  contemplation  which  leads  to  the  terrestrial  Nirvana. 

The  first  degree  is  the  inward  feeling  of  happiness  which  arises  in  the 
soul  of  the  ascetic  when  he  considers  himself  to  have  at  length  come  to  dis- 
tinguish the  nature  of  things.  The  yogi  is  then  detached  from  every  desire 
but  that  of  Nirvana  ;  he  still  reasons  and  exercises  judgment ;  but  he  is  freed 
from  all  the  conditions  of  sin  and  vice. 

In  the  second  degree  he  is  equally  unstained  by  vice  and  sin,  but  in  addi- 
tion he  has  put  aside  judgment  and  reasoning;  his  intellect  fixes  itself  upon 
Nirvana  alone,  and  simply  feels  the  pleasure  of  interior  satisfaction  without 
judging  of  it  or  even  understanding  it. 

In  the  third  degree  the  pleasure  of  satisfaction  has  disappeared,  and  the 
sage  has  become  indifferent  in  regard  to  the  happiness  that  his  intellect  still 
experiences.  The  only  pleasure  which  remains  to  him  is  a  vague  sense  of 
physical  well-being  with  which  his  whole  body  is  inundated;  he  has  still  a 
confused  consciousness  of  himself. 

Finally,  in  the  fourth  degree,  the  yogi  no  longer  possesses  this  sense  of 
physical  well-being,  obscure  as  it  is  ;  he  has  also  lost  all  memory;  he  has  even 
lost  the  sense  of  his  indifference.  Free  from  all  pleasure  and  from  all  suffer- 
ing, he  has  attained  to  impassibility,  and  is  as  near  to  NirvRna  as  he  can  be 
during  this  life.  (Barth.  Saint-Hilaire,  Le  Bouddha  et  sa  religion,  pp.  136,  137.) 


96  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

extinct ;  no  contact  is  felt ;  neither  pricking  nor  burn- 
ing causes  pain. 

What  he  inwardly  experiences,  the  ecstatic  alone 
can  tell,  and  were  it  not  that  he  retains  at  waking  a 
very  distinct  recollection  of  it,  the  profane  would  be 
reduced  to  inductions  regarding  it.  The  narratives  and 
writings  of  ecstatics  show,  in  the  midst  of  differences 
of  race,  of  belief,  of  mind,  of  time  and  of  place,  a 
striking  uniformity.  Their  mental  state  reduces  itself 
to  one  image-idea,  either  alone  or  constituting  the 
nucleus  of  a  single  group  which  engrosses  the  entire 
consciousness  and  maintains  itself  in  it  with  an  ex- 
treme intensity.  Several  mystics  have  described  this 
state  with  great  delicacy,  above  all  St.  Teresa.  I  there- 
fore extract  a  few  passages  from  her  autobiography,  in 
order  to  place  before  the  reader  an  authentic  descrip- 
tion of  the  ecstasy. 

For  uniting  oneself  to  God,  there  are  four  degrees  of 
"prayer,"  which  she  compares  to  four  methods,  each 
easier  than  the  preceding,  of  watering  a  garden  :  <■<■  the 
first  by  drawing  water  from  a  well  by  strength  of  arm 
which  is  severe  labor ;  the  second,  by  drawing  it  up 
with  a  noria  (a  hydraulic  machine),  in  which  way 
there  is  obtained  with  less  fatigue  a  greater  quantity  of 
water  ;  the  third  by  conducting  the  water  from  a  river 
or  brook ;  the  fourth,  and  incomparably  the  best,  is 
an  abundant  rain,  God  himself  undertaking  the  water- 
ing without  the  slightest  fatigue  on  our  part "  (chap.  xi). 
In  the  two  first  degrees,  there  are  as  yet  only  at- 
tempts at  ecstasy  which  the  saint  notes  in  passing  : 
"Sometimes  while  reading  I  was  suddenly  seized 
with  a  feeling  of  the  presence  of  God.  It  was  abso- 
lutely impossible  for  me  to  doubt  that  he  was  within 
me,  or  that  I  was  wholly  lost  in  him.     This  was  not  a 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL.       97 

vision.  ...  It  suspends  the  soul  in  such  wise  that  it 
seems  to  be  utterly  beside  itself.  The  will  loves,  mem- 
ory appears  to  me  almost  gone,  the  understanding  does 
not  act,  and  nevertheless  it  does  not  lose  itself."  In  a 
higher  degree  which  is  "neither  a  rapture  nor  a  spiri- 
tual sleep,"  "  the  will  alone  acts,  and,  without  knowing 
how  it  becomes  captive,  it  simply  gives  to  God  its  con- 
sent, that  he  may  imprison  it,  secure  of  falling  into  the 
fetters  of  Him  whom  it  loves.  .  .  .  The  understanding 
and  memory  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  will,  that  it 
may  render  itself  more  and  more  capable  of  enjoying 
so  great  a  good.  Sometimes,  however,  their  aid  serves 
only  to  trouble  it  in  this  intimate  union  with  God. 
But  then  the  will,  without  allowing  itself  to  be  dis- 
turbed by  their  importunity,  should  keep  itself  in  the 
delight  and  the  profound  calm  which  it  is  enjoying.  To 
try  to  fix  its  two  powers  [faculties]  would  be  to  carry 
them  away  with  it.  They  are  then  like  doves  which, 
discontented  with  the  food  that  their  master  gives 
them  without  any  effort  on  their  part,  go  to  look  for 
some  elsewhere,  but  which,  after  a  vain  search,  hasten 
to  return  to  the  dove-cote."  In  this  degree,  "  I  re- 
gard it  as  a  very  great  advantage,  when  I  write,  to  find 
myself  actually  in  the  prayer  of  which  I  am  treating, 
for  I  see  clearly  then  that  neither  the  expression  nor 
the  thought  comes  from  me  ;  and  when  it  is  written,  I 
can  no  longer  understand  how  I  have  been  able  to  do 
it,  which  happens  to  me  often." 

In  the  third  degree  we  come  to  the  ecstasy:  "This 
state  is  a  sleep  of  the  powers  [faculties]  wherein,  with- 
out being  entirely  lost  in  God,  they  nevertheless  do 
not  understand  how  they  operate.  ...  It  is  like  some 
one  who,  sighing  after  death,  holds  already  in  the  hand 
the  blessed  candle  and  has  only  one  breath  more  to  ex- 


98  THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

-fe. . 

hale  in  order  to  see  itself  at  the  consajiiriiation  of  its  de- 
sires. It  is  for  the  soul  an  agony  full  of  mexpressible  de- 
light, wherein  it  feels  itself  almost  entirely  dying  to  all 
the  things  of  earth  and  reposes  with  rapture  Sfi  the  en- 
joyment of  its  God.  I  find  no  other  terms  to  depict  or 
explain  what  it  experiences.  In  this  state  it  6^s  not 
know  what  to  do  :  it  does  not  know  whether  it  is  ^^ak- 
ing  or  is  silent ;  whether  it  laughs  or  weeps  ;  it  is  a 
glorious  delirium,  a  celestial  madness,  a  supremely  de- 
licious kind  of  enjoyment.  .  .  .  While  it  thus  seeks  its 
God,  the  soul  feels  itself  with  a  very  keen  and  very  sweet 
pleasure  almost  fainting  away;  it  falls  into  a  species  of 
swoon  which  little  by  little  deprives  the  body  of  re- 
spiration and  of  all  its  strength.  It  cannot,  without  a 
very  painful  effort  make  even  the  slightest  movement 
of  the  hands.  The  eyes  close  without  its  wishing  to 
close  them,  and,  if  it  keeps  them  open,  it  sees  almost 
nothing.  It  is  incapable  of  reading,  had  it  the  de- 
sire to ;  it  indeed  perceives  the  letters,  but,  as  the 
mind  does  not  act,  it  can  neither  distinguish  nor  asso- 
ciate them.  When  spoken  to,  it  hears  the  sound  of 
the  voice,  but  not  distinct  words.  So  it  receives  no 
service  from  its  senses.  .  .  .  All  exterior  forces  abandon 
it :  feeling  thereby  its  own  increase  it  can  better  enjoy 
its  glory.  ...  In  truth,  to  judge  of  it  by  my  experience, 
this  prayer  is  at  first  of  such  short  duration  that  it  does 
not  reveal  itself  in  so  manifest  a  wav  by  external  signs 
and  the  suspension  of  the  senses.  It  is  to  be  remarked, 
at  least  in  my  opinion,  that  this  suspension  of  all  the 
powers  never  lasts  long ;  it  is  very  much  when  it 
reaches  a  half  hour,  and  I  do  not  think  that  with  me 
it  has  ever  lasted  so  long.  It  must  be  admitted,  how- 
ever, that  it  is  difficult  to  judge  of  it,  since  one  is  at 
the  time  deprived  of  feeling.      I  wish  simply  to  make 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL.       99 

this  observation  ;  whenever  this  general  suspension 
takes  place,  very  little  time  elapses  in  which  one  or 
another  of  the  powers  does  not  return  to  itself.  The 
will  is  the  one  which  maintains  itself  best  in  the  divine 
union,  but  the  two  others  very  soon  begin  to  importune 
it.  As  it  is  in  the  calm,  it  brings  them  back  and  sus- 
pends them  anew ;  they  remain  thus  tranquil  some 
minutes  and  then  take  up  again  their  natural  life.  The 
prayer,  with  these  alternations,  can  and  does  prolong 
itself,  in  fact,  for  some  hours.  .  .  .  But  that  state  of  com- 
plete ecstasy,  in  which  the  imagination,  which  I  hold 
to  be  equally  rapt,  does  not  wander  to  any  external  ob- 
ject, is,  I  repeat,  of  short  duration.  I  would  add  that 
the  powers  returning  to  themselves  only  imperfectly, 
they  may  remain  in  a  sort  of  delirium  for  some  hours, 
during  which  God  from  time  to  time  enraptures  them 
anew,  and  fixes  them  in  himself.  .  .  .  What  transpires 
in  this  secret  union  is  so  hidden  that  one  would  not 
know  how  to  speak  of  it  more  clearly.  The  soul  then 
sees  itself  so  near  God  and  possesses  such  a  certainty  of 
it,  that  it  cannot  have  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  real- 
ity of  such  a  favor.  All  its  powers  lose  their  natural 
activity;  they  have  no  knowledge  of  their  operations. . . . 
That  troublesome  butterfly  of  memory  sees  then  its 
wings  scorched  here,  and  it  is  no  longer  able  to  flit 
hither  and  thither.  The  will  is  no  doubt  occupied  in 
loving,  but  it  does  not  understand  how  it  loves.  In 
regard  to  the  understanding,  if  it  understands,  it  is  by 
a  mode  which  remains  unknown  to  it,  and  it  can  com- 
prehend nothing  of  what  it  understands."  * 

I  will  not  follow  St.  Teresa  in  her  description  of 


*  Vie  dt  Saint e  Thfrise  (crite  par  elU-m?me ,  translated  by  Rev.  Father 
Bouix  (tenth  edition),  pp.  90,  91,  96,  138,  142,  157,  177-180.  Compare  also  Plo- 
tinus,  Enniades,  vi  ;   Tauler,  Institution  chritienne,  chapters  zii,  xxvi,  zxxv. 


loo         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

the  "rapture  "  (chapter  xx),  "that  divine  eagle,  which 
with  a  sudden  impetuosity  seizes  you  and  carries  you 
off."  These  extracts  suffice,  and  any  one  who  reads 
them  with  attention  will  not  hesitate  to  attribute  to 
them  all  the  value  of  a  good  psychological  observa- 
tion.* 

In  examining  the  detailed  narratives  of  other  ec- 
statics  (which  I  cannot  recount  here),  I  find  that  for 
our  purposes  may  be  conveniently  established  two  cate- 
gories. 

In  the  first,  motility  persists  to  a  certain  extent. 
The  ecstatic  follows  in  its  development  and  reproduces 
with  appropriate  movements  the  Passion,  the  Nativity, 
or  some  other  religious  drama.  There  is  a  series  of  very 
intense  images,  having  an  invariable  point  of  departure, 
an  order  of  succession  which  repeats  itself  each  time 
with  perfect  automatism.  Maria  von  Moerl  and  Louise 
Lateau  are  well  known  examples  of  this. 

The  other  category  is  that  of  ecstasy  in  repose. 
Ideas  alone  reign,  ordinarily  abstract  or  metaphysical : 
God  for  St.  Teresa  and  Plotinus,  better  still  the  Nir- 
vana of  the  Buddhists.  Movements  are  suppressed  ; 
henceforth  one  feels  "only  a  residuum  of  interior  agi- 
tation." 

*  St.  Teresa  thus  describes  her  physical  state  during  her  "  raptures ": 
"Often  my  body  became  so  light  that  it  no  longer  possessed  weight ;  some 
times  it  was  so  to  such  a  point  that  I  no  more  felt  my  feet  touching  the  ground. 
So  long  as  the  body  is  in  the  rapture,  it  remains  as  if  dead  and  often  is  abso- 
lutely powerless  to  act.  It  preserves  the  attitude  in  which  it  has  been  sur- 
prised :  thus  it  remains  standing  or  seated,  the  hands  open  or  closed,  in  a  word 
in  the  state  in  which  it  was  overtaken  by  the  rapture.  Although  ordinarily  one 
does  not  lose  feeling,  it  has  happened  to  me,  however,  to  be  entirely  deprived 
of  it.  This  has  been  rare  and  has  lasted  only  a  very  short  time.  Most  fre- 
quently feeling  remains  ;  but  one  experiences  an  indefinable  trouble,  and,  al- 
though it  is  impossible  to  perform  any  external  act,  one  does  not  cease  to 
hear :  it  is  like  a  confused  sound  coming  from  a  distance.  Moreover,  even  this 
kind  of  hearing  ceases  when  the  rapture  is  at  its  highest  degree."  (Ibid.,  p. 
206.) 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL.     loi 

Let  us  remark  in  passing  how  well  this  agrees  with 
what  has  been  previously  said  :  that  in  abstract  ideas 
the  tendency  to  movement  is  at  its  minimum  ;  that 
these  ideas  being  representations  of  representations, 
pure  schemata,  the  motor  element  is  weakened  in  the 
same  degree  as  the  representative  element. 

But  in  both  cases  the  mental  state  of  ecstasy  is  a 
complete  infraction  of  the  laws  of  the  normal  mechan- 
ism of  consciousness.  Consciousness  exists  only  under 
the  condition  of  a  perpetual  change  ;  it  is  essentially 
discontinuous.  An  homogeneous  and  continuous  con- 
sciousness is  an  impossibility.  Ecstasy  realises  all 
that  is  possible  of  this  continuity;  but  St.  Teresa  has 
just  told  us  that  either  consciousness  disappears,  or 
else  understanding  and  memory — that  is  to  say,  dis- 
continuity— come  back  at  intervals  and  revive  the  con- 
sciousness. 

This  psychological  anomaly  is  complicated  with 
another.  Every  state  of  consciousness  tends  to  expend 
itself  in  proportion  to  its  intensity.  In  the  highest  ec- 
stasy, the  expenditure  is  null  or  nearly  so,  and  it  is 
thanks  to  the  absence  of  this  motor  phase  that  the  in- 
tellectual intensity  is  maintained.  The  brain,  in  the 
normal  state  an  intellectual  and  motor  organ  at  the 
same  time,  ceases  to  be  motor.  Moreover,  in  the  in- 
tellectual order,  the  heterogeneous  and  manifold  states 
of  consciousness  which  constitute  the  ordinary  life 
have  disappeared.  The  sensations  are  suppressed  ; 
with  them,  the  associations  that  they  awaken.  One 
unique  representation  absorbs  all.  If  the  normal 
psychic  activity  be  compared  to  a  circulating  capital, 
continually  modified  by  receipts  and  expenses,  it  may 
be  said  that  here  the  capital  is  massed  in  one  sum  ; 
diffusion  becomes  concentration,  the  extensive  is  trans- 


I02         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

formed  into  intensive.  There  is  nothing  astonishing 
then,  if  in  this  state  of  intellectual  erethism,  the  ec- 
static appears  transfigured,  above  herself  Certainly 
the  visions  of  the  rude  peasant  girl  of  Sanderet  who 
saw -a  Virgin  all  of  gold  in  a  paradise  of  silver,  have 
little  resemblance  to  those  of  a  St.  Teresa  or  a  Ploti- 
nus ;  but  every  intellect  at  the  moment  of  ecstasy  yields 
its  maximum. 

Is  it  very  necessary  now  to  investigate  why,  in  this 
state,  there  is  neither  choice  nor  action?  How  could 
there  be  choice,  since  choice  supposes  the  existence  of 
that  complex  whole  called  the  ego,  which  has  disap- 
peared ;  since,  the  personality  being  reduced  to  one 
idea  or  a  single  vision,  there  is  no  state  which  can  be 
chosen,  that  is  to  say,  incorporated  in  the  whole,  to  the 
exclusion  of  others  ;  since,  in  a  word,  there  is  nothing 
which  can  choose,  nothing  which  can  be  chosen?  As 
well  might  an  election  be  supposed  without  electors  or 
candidates. 

Action  is  thus  dried  up  in  its  source,  annihilated. 
There  remain  of  it  only  the  elementary  forms  (respira- 
tory movements,  etc.),  without  which  organic  life  would 
be  impossible.  We  have  here  a  curious  case  of  psy- 
chological correlation  or  antagonism  :  all  that  one  func- 
tion gains  is  lost  by  another  ;  all  that  is  gained  by 
thought  is  lost  by  movement.  In  this  respect,  ecstasy 
is  the  opposite  of  the  states  in  which  motility  triumphs, 
such  as  epilepsy,  chorea,  and  convulsions.  Here,  we 
see  a  maximum  of  movement  with  minimum  of  con- 
sciousness ;  there,  intensity  of  consciousness,  with 
minimum  of  movement.  There  is  at  any  moment  only 
a  certain  nervous  and  psychic  capital  disponible ;  if  it 
be  absorbed  by  one  function,  it  is  to  the  detriment  of 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL,     103 

the  others.      Its  employment  in  one  direction  or  the 
other  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  individual. 

After  having  studied  the  annihilation  of  the  will  in 
its  highest  form,  let  us  remark  that  in  contemplation 
and  profound  reflexion  may  be  found  modified  and 
diminishing  forms  of  this  annihilation.  The  inapti- 
tude of  contemplative  minds  for  action  has  physiologi- 
cal and  psychological  reasons  of  which  ecstasy  has 
given  us  the  secret. 

II. 

It  would  be  as  interesting  for  the  psychologist  as 
for  the  physiologist  to  know  what  produces  abolition 
of  consciousness  in  natural  or  provoked  somnambu- 
lism, and  from  what  organic  conditions  it  results. 
In  spite  of  the  labors  carried  on  with  ardor  during 
these  last  years  there  only  exist  theories  on  this  point, 
and  one  can  take  one's  choice  among  several  hy- 
potheses. Some,  like  Schneider  and  Berger,  make 
it  a  result  of  "expectant  attention,"  producing  a  one- 
sided and  abnormal  concentration  of  consciousness. 
Preyer  sees  in  it  a  special  case  of  his  theory  of  sleep. 
Others,  like  Rumpf,  suppose  that  there  are  reflex 
changes  in  the  cerebral  circulation,  phenomena  of 
hyperaemia  and  anaemia  in  the  surface  of  the  hemi- 
spheres of  the  brain.  Heidenhain,  who  combats  this 
last  theory,  explains  hypnotism  by  an  inhibitive  action. 
There  might  take  place  a  suspension  of  activity  in  the 
cortical  nerve-cells,  perhaps  by  a  change  in  molecular 
arrangement :  in  this  way  the  functional  movement  of 
the  grey  matter  would  be  interrupted.  This  last  hy- 
pothesis is  that  which  appears  to  gain  the  most  adher- 
ents.    As  it  is  hardly  more  than  a  simple  statement  of 


I04         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

fact,  from  the  psychological  point  of  view  at  least,  we 
may  adhere  to  it. 

It  would  be  useless  to  describe  a  state  so  often  and 
so  carefully  described  before.*  We  simply  remark 
that  the  terms  somnambulism,  hypnotism,  and  their 
analogues,  do  not  designate  a  state  identical  every- 
where and  in  all.  This  state  varies  in  the  same  indi- 
vidual from  simple  drowsiness  to  profound  stupor ; 
and  from  one  individual  to  another,  according  to  the 
constitution,  habit,  pathological  conditions,  etc.  So  it 
would  be  illegitimate  to  affirm  that  there  is  always 
annihilation  of  the  power  of  will.  We  shall  see  that 
there  are  some  very  doubtful  cases. 

Let  us  first  take  hypnotism  in  the  form  that  several 
authors  have  called  lethargic.  The  mental  inertia  is 
absolute ;  consciousness  is  abolished  ;  the  reflexes  are 
exaggerated,  an  exaggeration  which  goes  on  concur- 
rently with  the  enfeeblement  of  the  higher  activity. 
At  the  voice  of  the  operator  the  hypnotised  subject 
stands  up,  walks,  sits  down,  sees  absent  persons,  trav- 
els, describes  landscapes.  He  has,  as  the  phrase  goes, 
no  will  but  that  of  the  operator.  That  signifies,  in 
more  precise  terms  :  In  the  empty  field  of  conscious- 
ness a  state  is  called  up  ;  and,  as  every  state  of  con- 
sciousness tends  to  pass  into  act, — immediately  or 
after  having  awakened  associations, — the  act  ensues. 
This  is  only  one  case  of  a  well-known  law  which  is  the 
analogue  in  the  psychological  order  of  the  reflex  in 
the  physiological  order ;  and  the  passing  into  action  is 
here  so  much  the  easier  as  there  is  nothing  to  hinder 
it,  neither  inhibitive  power  nor  antagonistic  state,  the 
suggested  idea  reigning  alone  in  the  slumbering  con- 

*  See  in  particular  the  articles  by  Mr.  Ch.  Richet  in  the  Revue philoso- 
pkique  for  October  and  November,  1880,  and  for  March,  1883. 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL.     105 

sciousness. — Some  facts  stranger  in  appearance  are 
explained  in  the  same  way.  We  know  that  by  giving 
to  the  members  of  a  hypnotised  person  certain  appro- 
priate postures  there  is  awakened  in  him  an  emotion 
of  pride,  terror,  humihty,  or  piety;  that  if  they  are 
placed  in  a  position  for  climbing,  he  attempts  to  gojup 
a  ladder ;  and  that  if  there  is  put  into  his  hands  any 
instrument  of  customary  labor,  he  goes  to  work.  It  is 
clear  that  the  position  imposed  upon  the  members 
awakens  in  the  cerebral  centres  th?  corresponding 
states  of  consciousness,  with  which  the)'  have  become 
associated  by  numerous  repetitions.  The  idea  once 
awakened  is  in  the  same  condition  as  that  arising  from 
a  command  or  a  direct  suggestion  of  the  operator.  All 
these  cases,  therefore,  are  reducible  to  the  same  for- 
mula :  the  hypnotised  subject  is  an  automaton  which 
is  made  to  move  according  to  the  nature  of  its  organi- 
sation. There  is  an  absolute  annihilation  of  the  will, 
the  conscious  personality  being  reduced  to  one  single 
and  unique  state,  which  is  neither  chosen  nor  repu- 
diated, but  undergone,  imposed. 

In  natural  somnambulism  the  automatism  is  spon- 
taneous, that  is  to  say,  it  has  as  its  antecedent  some 
particular  excitation  in  the  organism.  Here  the  autom- 
atism is  often  of  a  superior  kind  ;  the  series  of  states 
aroused  is  long,  and  each  term  of  the  series  is  com- 
plex. As  a  type  of  this  there  can  be  given  the  singer 
whose  history  Mesnet  has  related.*  If  one  offer  him 
a  cane  that  he  takes  for  a  gun,  his  military  recollections 
are  revived  ;  he  loads  his  weapon,  lies  flat  upon  his 
stomach,  takes  careful  aim  and  fires.  If  a  roll  of  paper 
be  handed  to  him,  the  memories  of  his  present  calling 

* De  I'autom-atisme  de  In  mdtnoire  et  du  souvenir  dans  h  somnambulisme 
pathologique  (Paris,  1874).    See  also  P.  Richer,  op.  cit.,  p.  391  et  seqq. 


io6         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

are  aroused  ;  he  unrolls  it  and  sings  in  a  loud  voice. 
But  the  unvarying  repetition  each  time  of  the  same  acts 
in  the  same  order,  gives  to  all  these  facts  the  character 
of  a  very  clear  automatism,  from  which  all  will  is  ex- 
cluded. 

There  are,  however,  equivocal  cases.  Burdach  tells 
us  of  a  "very  fine  ode,"  composed  in  a  state  of  som- 
nambulism. The  story  has  often  been  cited  of  that 
abb6  who,  composing  a  sermon,  corrected  and  touched 
up  his  sentences,  and  changed  the  place  of  epithets. 
Another  person  tries  several  times  to  commit  suicide, 
and  at  each  attack  employs  new  means.  The  facts  of 
this  kind  are  so  numerous  that,  even  making  allowance 
for  credulity  and  exaggeration,  it  is  impossible  to  re- 
ject them. 

It  may  be  said  :  Such  acts  suppose  a  comparison, 
followed  by  a  choice,  a  preference  ;  and  this  is  what 
is  called  a  volition.  There  would  then  exist  a  volun- 
tary power,  that  is  to  say,  a  true  reaction  of  the  indi- 
vidual— faint,  obscure,  limited,  but  active  nevertheless. 

But  it  can  also  be  maintained  that  automatism  by 
itself  is  sufficient.  Is  it  not  a  recognised  truth  that, 
in  the  normal  state,  intellectual  work  is  often  automatic 
and  that  it  is  only  worth  more  on  that  account?  What 
poets  call  inspiration,  is  it  not  a  cerebral  labor  which 
is  involuntary,  almost  unconscious,  or  which,  at  least, 
reaches  the  consciousness  only  in  the  form  of  results? 
We  read  over  our  own  writings,  and  our  corrections 
are  often  spontaneous,  that  is  to  say,  the  movement  of 
thought  brings  a  new  association  of  words  and  ideas 
which  substitutes  itself  immediately  for  the  other.  So 
it  may  be  that  the  individual,  as  a  being  that  chooses 
and  prefers,  counts  in  it  for  nothing.  On  more  minute 
examination,  it  may  be  held  that  all  these  cases  are  not 


THE  EXTINCTION  OE  THE   WIIL.      107 

rigorously  comparable  ;  that,  if  for  composing  an  ode 
automatism  suffices,  for  correcting  it  it  does  not  suffice  ; 
and  that,  in  this  last  case,  there  is  a  choice,  however 
rapid  and  insignificant  we  may  suppose  it  to  be.  In 
place  of  a  zero  of  will,  we  should  have  a  minimum  of 
will.  This  opinion  would  come  to  the  same  thing  as  the 
first  one,  or  would  be  separated  from  it  only  by  a  shade. 

The  reader  may  choose  between  these  two  inter- 
pretations. I  pass  on  to  cases  where  the  data  are  clearer. 

There  are  among  hypnotised  subjects  numerous 
instances  of  resistance.  An  order  is  not  obeyed,  a 
suggestion  does  not  immediately  impose  itself.  The 
magnetisers  of  the  last  century  recommended  to  the 
operator  a  tone  of  authority  and  to  the  subject  the 
faith,  the  confidence  which  produces  consent  and  pre- 
vents resistance. 

"While  in  a  state  of  somnambulism,  B.  performed 
certain  acts  at  command,  but  refused  to  perform  others. 
Most  frequently  she  would  not  read,  although  we  satis- 
fied ourselves  that  she  could  see,  in  spite  of  the  ap- 
parent occlusion  of  the  eyelids.  .  .  .  When  her  hands 
were  placed  in  the  attitude  of  prayer  her  mind  was  im- 
pressed accordingly.  When  questioned,  she  replied 
that  she  was  praying  to  the  Holy  Virgin,  but  that  she 
did  not  see  her.  As  long  as  her  hands  remained  in 
that  position,  she  continued  her  prayer  and  did  not 
disguise  her  displeasure  if  any  one  sought  to  distract 
her.  On  displacing  her  hands,  the  pra3^er  ceased  im- 
mediately. As  inevitable  as  it  is,  the  prayer,  in  this 
case,  is  in  some  sort  rational,  since  the  patient  resists 
distractions  and  is  able  to  carry  on  a  discussion  with 
any  one  who  tries  to  interrupt  her."  * 

One  of  Ch.  Richet's  subjects  who  allowed  himself 

*  p.  Richer,  Etude  sur  VhystiroSpilepsie,  pp.  426,  427. 


io8         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE    WILL. 

without  any  difficulty  to  be  metamorphosed  into  an 
officer,  a  sailor,  etc.,  refused  on  the  contrary,  with 
tears  in  his  eyes,  to  be  changed  into  a  priest ;  which 
the  character  and  habits  of  the  subject  and  the  environ- 
ment in  which  he  had  lived  sufficiently  explained. 

There  are,  then,  phases  in  which  two  states  coex- 
ist :  one  produced  by  an  influence  from  without,  the 
other  by  an  influence  from  within.  We  know  the  auto- 
matic power  of  the  first.  Here  the  contrary  state  in- 
terferes with  it ;  there  exists  something  which  resem- 
bles a  power  of  inhibition.  But  this  power  is  so  weak 
that  it  ordinarily  yields  to  repeated  attacks,  and  so 
vague  that  its  nature  cannot  be  determined.  Is  it  more 
than  an  antagonistic  state  of  consciousness  aroused  by 
the  suggestion  itself,  in  such  wise  that  all  would  be 
reduced  to  the  coexistence  of  two  contrary  states?  Is 
it  more  complex,  and  must  it  be  admitted  that  it  rep- 
resents the  sum  of  the  tendencies  still  existing  in  the 
individual  and  some  remains  of  what  constitutes  his 
character? — If  Heidenhain's  theory  be  accepted  there 
must  be,  in  the  state  called  lethargic,  a  complete  ar- 
rest of  the  functional  activity;  the  command  or  sug- 
gestion would  bring  into  play  an  exceedingly  limited 
number  of  neural  elements  in  the  cortical  layer;  finally, 
in  the  state  of  resistance  there  would  arise  from  their 
sleep  some  of  those  elements  which,  in  the  normal  state, 
form  the  physiological  and  psychological  basis  of  the  in- 
dividual, being  the  synthetic  expression  of  its  organism. 
It  must  be  avowed  that,  even  admitting  this  second 
hypothesis,  what  would  remain  of  voluntary  power,  of 
capacity  in  the  individual  to  react  according  to  his  na- 
ture would  be  an  embryo,  a  power  so  denuded  of  effi- 
cacy that  it  can  hardly  be  called  a  will. 

We  would  further  remark  that,  if  it  is  difficult  for 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   Will.     109 

the  observer  to  divine  what  power  of  reaction  persists 
in  the  person  who  resists,  the  latter  is  a  still  worse 
judge  of  it. 

"An  attentive  analysis  of  the  phenomena,  such  as 
can  be  made  by  educated  and  intelligent  men,  who 
have  consented  to  undergo  the  action  of  the  magne- 
tism, show  how  difficult  it  is  even  for  the  hypnotised 
subject  to  make  himself  understand  that  he  is  not  sim- 
ulating. To  make  these  observations  the  sleep  need 
not  be  very  profound.  ...  At  the  period  of  lethargy, 
the  consciousness  is  preserved,  and  yet  a  commence- 
ment of  automatism  is  very  manifest. 

"A  physician  of  Breslau  had  affirmed  to  Mr.  Hei- 
denhain  that  the  magnetism  made  no  impression  upon 
him  ;  but  after  he  had  been  thrown  into  the  lethargic 
state  he  could  not  pronounce  a  single  word.  When 
awakened,  he  declared  that  he  could  have  spoken 
easily  enough  and  that,  if  he  had  said  nothing,  it  was 
because  he  had  not  wished  to  say  anything.  Being 
lethargised  anew  by  a  few  passes,  he  was  again  unable 
to  speak.  He  was  awakened  once  more  and  had  to 
recognise  that,  if  he  had  not  spoken,  it  was  because 
he  could  not  speak. 

' '  One  of  my  friends,  having  been  merely  lethargised 
and  not  altogether  put  to  sleep,  studied  closely  this 
phenomenon  of  impotence  coinciding  with  the  illusion 
of  power.  When  I  indicate  to  him  a  movement  he 
always  executes  it,  even  when  before  being  magnetised 
he  had  fully  determined  to  resist  me.  This  he  has 
the  utmost  difficulty  in  understanding  on  awakening. 
'Certainly,'  he  said  to  me,  'I  could  resist,  but  I  have 
not  the  will  to  do  so.'  So  he  is  sometimes  tempted  to 
believe  that  he  is  simulating.  '  When  I  am  lethargised, ' 
he  said  to  me,  '  I  feign  automatism,  although  I  could, 


no         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

it  seems  to  me,  do  otherwise.  I  come  with  the  firm 
determination  not  to  pretend,  and,  in  spite  of  myself, 
as  soon  as  the  sleep  begins  it  seems  to  me  that  I  do  it.' 
It  can  be  seen  that  this  kind  of  simulation  of  a  phe- 
nomenon is  absolutely  indistinguishable  from  the  real- 
ity of  that  phenomenon.  Automatism  is  proven  by  the 
single  fact  that  persons  in  good  faith  are  unable  to  act 
otherwise  than  as  automata.  It  signifies  little  that 
they  imagine  themselves  able  to  resist.  They  do  not 
resist.  That  is  the  fact  which  should  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, and  not  the  illusion  that  they  cherish  of 
their  alleged  power  of  resistance."  '■' 

This  power  of  resistance,  however,  as  feeble  as  it 
is,  is  not  equal  to  zero  ;  it  is  a  last  survival  of  the  in- 
dividual reaction,  extremely  reduced  ;  it  is  on  the 
threshold  of  extinction,  but  without  passing  over  it. 
The  illusion  of  this  feeble  power  of  inhibition  must 
correspond  to  some  physiological  state  equally  preca- 
rious. Upon  the  whole,  the  state  of  natural  or  pro- 
voked somnambulism  may  justly  be  regarded  as  an 
abolition  of  the  will.  The  exceptional  cases  are  rare 
and  obscure ;  yet  they  contribute  their  share  of  in- 
struction. They  show  once  more  that  volition  is  not 
an  invariable  quantity,  but  that  it  decreases  to  a  point 
where  it  may  be  equally  maintained  either  that  it  does 
or  does  not  exist. 

I  will  mention  in  passing  a  fact  which  hardly  enters 
into  the  pathology  of  the  will,  but  which  furnishes 
matter  for  reflexion.  There  may  be  given  to  certain 
hypnotised  subjects  an  order  to  perform  an  action  later 
on,  at  a  given  moment  in  the  day,  or  even  at  a  more 
distant  date  (in  eight,  ten  days).  Having  returned 
to  themselves  they  carry  out  the  order  at  the  hour  re- 

*  Ch.  Richet,  article  cited,  pp.  348,  349. 


THE  EXTINCTION  OF  THE   WILL,     iii 

quired,  on  the  prescribed  day,  ordinarily  declaring 
"that  they  do  not  know  why."  In  some  more  curious 
cases  these  persons  give  specious  reasons  to  explain  their 
conduct,  to  justify  this  act  which  does  not  spring  from 
their  own  spontaneity,  but  is  imposed  upon  them  with- 
out their  knowledge. 

I  cite  a  case  that  came  under  my  own  observation. 
A  young  man  at  ten  o'clock  ordered  his  mistress,  who 
was  in  the  hypnotic  state,  to  leave  him  at  three  o'clock 
in  the  morning  ;  then  he  restored  her  to  the  normal 
state.  Toward  three  o'clock  she  awoke  and  made 
ready  to  go,  and  though  he  begged  her  to  stay,  she 
found  reasons  to  excuse  and  justify  her  going  at  that 
unreasonable  hour.* 

"Our  illusion  of  free  will,"  says  Spinoza,  "is  only 
ignorance  of  the  motives  which  make  us  act."  Do  not 
this  fact  and  analogous  ones  confirm  this?f 

*  This  paragraph,  though  left  out  of  the  eighth  French  edition,  was  pres- 
ent in  the  early  ones.     It  is  retained  for  the  sake  of  completeness.—  Trans. 

+  The  state  of  the  will  in  hypnotised  persons  has  given  rise  lately  to  very 
warm  discussions  of  much  practical  importance.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  easy 
during  hypnosis  to  require  of  certain  subjects  acts  which  they  are  to  perform 
at  a  date  determined.  There  is  a  complete  forgetfulness  of  the  injunction  on 
awakening  and,  as  it  would  seem,  up  to  the  moment  when  the  specified  time 
has  come.  Does  not  the  hypnotised  person  thus  become  a  passive  instrument 
in  the  operator's  hands  by  the  annihilation  of  his  will  ? 

Two  contrary  opinions  have  been  maintained.  According  to  the  School 
of  Nancy  (Liebault,  Beaunis,  Bernheim,  Liegeois)  the  confiscation  of  the  will 
is  complete,  and  all  resistance  to  the  injunctions  is  vanquished  in  the  long 
run,  in  the  freely  suggestible  person,  who  thus  becomes  pcrinde  ac  cadaver. 

The  School  of  Paris  (Charcot,  Brouardel,  etc.)  rejects  this  absolute  theory, 
"which  rests  only  upon  laboratory  crimes  "  (that  is  to  say,  ones  which  are 
factitious,  simulated,  executed  for  compliance  sake).  It  maintains  that  re- 
sistance is  possible.  Very  weak,  when  the  act  commanded  is  a  trivial  one,  it 
would  be  augmented  in  proportion  to  the  gravity  of  the  act  suggested.  This 
resistance  might  manifest  itself  in  several  manners  :  refusal  to  awaken  if  the 
command  is  not  revoked,  sleep  or  crisis  at  the  moment  when  it  is  to  be  car- 
ried out,  etc.  ' '  The  hypnotised  person  executes  only  what  he  has  no  objection 
to  doing."  For  this  discussion  consult  Beaunis,  Le  soinnambulisvie proToqu^; 
Bernheim,  De  la  suggestion,  etc.;  Lifigeois,  De  la  suggestion  et  du  somnautbu- 
lisme ;  Pitres,  Des  suggestions  hypnotiques  ;  Gilles  de  la  Tourette,  Vhypnotisnie 
et  Us  itais  analogues,  etc. 


CHAPTER   VI. 


CONCLUSION. 

I. 

Having  examined  the  various  morbid  types,  let  us 
see  whether  a  law  can  be  discovered  which  sums  up 
the  pathology  of  the  will  and  throws  some  light  upon 
its  normal  state. 

Volition  exists  only  as  a  fact,  that  is  to  say,  a  choice 
followed  by  acts.  For  it  to  be  produced,  certain  con- 
ditions are  necessary.  A  lack  of  impulse  or  inhibition, 
an  exaggeration  of  automatic  activity,  of  a  tendency,  a 
desire,  a  fixed  idea,  prevent  it  from  existing  for  a  mo- 
ment, an  hour,  a  day,  or  a  period  of  life.  The  sum  of 
these  conditions,  necessary  and  sufficient,  may  be  called 
will.  In  relation  to  the  volitions  it  is  a  cause,  although 
it  is  itself  a  sum  of  effects,  a  resultant  varying  with  its 
elements  ;  pathology  has  demonstrated  this  to  us. 

These  elements,  which  I  indicate  briefly,  are  : 

i)  The  tendencies  to  action  (or  to  inhibition)  which 
result  from  circumstances,  from  the  environment,  from 
advice,  from  education ;  in  a  word,  all  those  which  are 
the  effect  of  exterior  causes. 

2)  The  character,  which  is  the  principal  element, 
the  effect  of  interior  causes,  and  not  an  entity  but  the 
resultant  of  that  myriad  of  infinitely  minute  states  and 
tendencies  of  all  the  anatomical  elements  which  con- 


CONCLUSION.  113 

stitutes  a  certain  organism ;  in  shorter  terms,  charac- 
ter is  for  us  the  psychological  expression  of  a  certain 
organised  body,  drawing  from  it  its  peculiar  coloring, 
its  special  tone,  and  its  relative  permanence.  That  is 
the  ultimate  stratum  upon  which  rests  the  possibility 
of  the  will,  and  which  makes  it  energetic,  weak,  inter- 
mittent, commonplace,  extraordinary. 

Now,  if  we  consider  the  will  no  longer  in  its  con- 
stituent elements,  but  in  the  phases  that  it  passes 
through  in  forming  itself,  we  see  that  volition  is  the 
last  term  of  a  progressive  evolution  of  which  the  sim- 
ple reflex  is  the  first  round  ;  it  is  the  highest  form  of 
activity, — understood  always  in  the  precise  sense  of 
power  to  produce  acts,  power  of  reaction. 

It  has  for  its  basis  a  legacy  from  numberless  gen- 
erations, enregistered  in  the  organism  ;  this  is  the 
primitive  automatic  activity,  simply  co-ordinated,  al- 
most invariable,  and  unconscious,  although  it  must  in 
remote  ages  have  been  accompanied  by  a  rudiment  of 
consciousness  which  has  withdrawn  from  it  in  propor- 
tion as  the  co-ordination,  becoming  more  perfect,  has 
organised  itself  in  the  species. 

Upon  this  basis  rests  the  conscious  and  individual 
activity  of  the  appetites,  desires,  feelings,  and  passions, 
with  a  more  complex  and  much  less  stable  co-ordina- 
tion. 

Higher  still  is  the  ideo-motor  activity,  which  in  its 
extreme  manifestations  attains  a  co-ordination  at  once 
very  firm  and  very  complex, — this  is  complete  volition. 

It  may  therefore  be  said  that  it  has  as  its  fundamental 
condition  a  hicr-archic  co-ordination,  that  is  to  say,  that 
it  does  not  suffice  for  reflexes  to  be  co-ordinated  with 
reflexes,  desires  with  desires,  rational  tendencies  with 
rational  tendencies  ;  but  that  a  co-ordination  between 


114         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

these  different  groups  is  necessary, — a  co-ordination 
with  subordination,  such  that  all  converges  towards  a 
single  point  :  the  end  to  be  attained.  Let  the  reade^ 
recall  the  morbid  cases  studied  in  the  preceding  pagesij-'' 
in  particular  the  irresistible  impulses  which,  ^  them-'^- 
selves  alone,  represent  almost  the  entire  pat^^ogy  of 
the  will,  and  he  will  recognise  that  they  all  ma^^e,  re- 
duced to  this  formula  :  absence  of  hierarchic  co-ordina- 
tion, action  which  is  independent,  irregular,  isolated, 
anarchical. 

Hence  if  we  consider  the  will  either  in  its  constit- 
uent elements  or  in  the  successive  phases  of  its  gen- 
esis (and  the  two  aspects  are  inseparable),  we  see  that 
volition,  its  last  result,  is  not  an  event  appearing  one 
knows  not  whence,  but  that  it  plunges  its  roots  into 
the  profoundest  depths  of  the  individual  and,  beyond 
the  individual,  into  the  species,  and  into  all  species. 
It  does  not  come  from  above,  but  from  below  ;  it  is  a 
sublimation  of  inferior  elements.  I  would  compare 
volition,  once  afifirmed,  to  what  is  called  in  architec- 
ture the  keystone  of  an  arch.  To  it  the  arch  owes 
more  than  its  solidity, — its  existence  ;  but  this  stone 
derives  its  power  wholly  from  the  others  which  sustain 
it  and  shut  it  in,  as  in  its  turn  it  presses  upon  them 
and  holds  them  in  place. 

These  much  condensed  preliminaries  were  indis- 
pensable to  an  understanding  of  the  law  which  governs 
the  dissolution  of  the  will  ;  for,  if  the  preceding  con- 
siderations are  just,  then  since  dissolution  always  fol- 
lows the  inverse  order  of  evolution,  it  results  that  the 
more  complex  manifestations  of  will  must  disappear 
before  the  simpler  ones,  and  the  more  simple  before  the 
automatic  activity.  In  order  to  give  to  the  statement 
of  the  law  its  exact  form,  treating  volition,  not  as  a 


CONCLUSION.  115 

singular  event,  but  as  the  highest  manifestation  of  ac- 
tivity, we  will  say  :  Dissolution  pursues  a  regressive 
course  from  the  more  voluntary  and  more  complex  toward 
the  less  voluntary  and  simpler,  that  is  to  say,  toward  the 
automatic. 

We  have  now  to  show  that  this  law  is  verified  by 
the  faclis.      We  have  only  to  choose  among  many. 

In  1868,  Hughlings  Jackson,  while  studying  cer- 
tain disorders  of  the  nervous  system,  called  attention, 
for  the  first  time  I  think,  to  the  fact  "that  the  most 
voluntary  and  specialised  movements  and  faculties  are 
attacked  first  and  more  than  the  others."*  This  "prin- 
ciple of  dissolution  "  or  "of  reduction  to  a  more  auto- 
matic state  "  was  laid  down  by  him  as  the  correlative 
of  Herbert  Spencer's  doctrines  regarding  the  evolution 
of  the  nervous  system.  He  takes  one  of  the  simplest 
cases,  general  hemiplegia  from  lesion  of  the  corpus 
striatum.  A  clot  of  blood  has  made  for  us  an  experi- 
ment. We  see  that  the  patient  whose  face,  tongue, 
arm,  and  leg  are  paralysed  has  lost  the  more  voluntary 
movements  of  a  portion  of  his  body,  without  losing  the 
more  automatic  ones.  "The  study  of  cases  of  hemi- 
plegia shows  us  in  effect  that  the  external  parts  that 
suffer  the  most  are  those  which,  psychologically  speak- 
ing, are  the  most  under  the  command  of  the  will,  and 
which,  physiologically  speaking,  imply  the  greatest 
number  of  different  movements,  produced  with  the 
greatest  number  of  different  intervals, "  in  place  of  being 
simultaneous  like  automatic  movements.  If  the  lesion 
is  more  serious,  and  if  it  affect  not  only  the  more  volun- 
tary parts  of  the  body  (face,  arm,  leg),  but  those  also 
which  are  less  voluntary  (loss  of  certain  movements  of 

*  Clinical  and  Physiological  Researches  on  the  Nervous  System  (London, 
1875). 


ii6         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL, 

the  eyes  and  of  the  head,  and  of  one  side  of  the  chest), 
the  more  voluntary  parts  are  found  to  be  much  more 
paralysed  than  the  others. 

Ferrier  remarks*  similarly  that  the  general  destruc- 
tion of  the  motor  region  in  the  cortex  of  the  brain,  like 
that  of  the  corpus  striatum,  produces  ''the  same  rela- 
tive disorders  of  the  different  movements,  those  being 
the  most  affected  and  paralysed  which  are  most  under 
the  influence  of  the  will,  at  least  after  the  first  shock 
is  passed.  Facial  paralysis  has  its  seat  specially  in 
the  lower  facial  region,  attacking  the  more  independent 
movements,  the  frontal  and  orbicular  muscles  being 
only  slightly  affected.  The  movements  of  the  leg  are 
less  affected  than  those  of  the  arm,  those  of  the  arm 
less  than  those  of  the  hand." 

The  same  author,  drawing  a  distinction  between 
the  different  kinds  of  movements  and  their  respective 
centres,  "  those  which  imply  consciousness  and  which 
we  call  voluntary  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  "  (the 
higher  cortical  centres)  and  those  "which  are  described 
as  automatic,  instinctive,  responsive,  including  the  mo- 
tor adaptations  of  equilibrium  and  of  motor  co-ordina- 
tion, and  the  instinctive  expression  of  emotions,  and 
which  are  organised  more  or  less  completely  in  the  cen- 
tres subjacent  to  the  cortex,"  observes  that  these  latter 
have  a  relative  independence  which  is  at  a  maximum  in 
the  lower  vertebrates  (the  frog,  the  pigeon),  and  at  a 
minimum  in  the  monkey  and  the  man.  "  I  ventured  to 
predict,"  he  adds,  "that  in  animals  whose  motor  fac- 
ulties did  not  seem  to  suffer  much  from  a  destructive 
lesion  of  the  nervous  centres,  those  movements  must 
be  paralysed   which   imply  consciousness    (voluntary 

♦  Ferrier,  Localisation  of  Diseases  of  the  Brain   (French  translation,   p. 

142). 


CONCLUSION.  117 

movements)  and  are  not  automatically  organised.  This 
has  been  fully  confirmed  by  the  researches  of  Goltz. 
He  has  shown  that,  although  the  paw  of  a  dog  ma)' 
not  be  positively  paralysed  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  organ  of 
locomotion,  by  a  lesion  of  the  cortex,  it  is  so,  in  so  far 
as  it  serves  as  a  hand  and  is  employed  as  such.  "  * 

This  last  experiment  is  of  the  greatest  interest  for 
us ;  it  shows  us  that,  in  one  same  organ  adapted  at 
once  to  locomotion  and  to  prehension,  the  first  function 
persists,  although  impaired,  when  the  latter,  the  more 
delicate  one,  has  disappeared. 

The  instability  of  the  action  that  is  voluntary,  com- 
plex, superior  (which  all  comes  to  the  same  thing),  in 
comparison  wuth  the  automatic,  simple,  inferior  action, 
shows  itself  again  in  a  progressive  form  in  the  general 
paralysis  of  the  insane.  "The  first  imperfections  of 
motility,"  says  Foville,  "  those  which  show  themselves 
as  a  barely  incipient  defect  in  the  harmon}'  of  the  mus- 
cular contractions,  are  so  much  the  more  appreciable 
as  they  concern  more  delicate  movements,  requiring  a 
greater  precision  and  perfection  in  their  performance. 
So  it  is  not  astonishing  that  they  express  themselves 
first  in  the  very  delicate  muscular  operations  which 
co-operate  in  phonation."  It  is  known  that  an  impedi- 
ment in  speech  is  one  of  the  first  symptoms  of  this 
malady.  At  first  so  slight  that  only  a  practised  ear 
is  capable  of  detecting  it,  the  trouble  in  pronunciation 


*  Ferrier,  pp.  36,  37.  In  the  experiment  of  Goltz,  if  the  lesion  is  made  in 
the  left  brain,  in  any  movement  in  which  the  dog  is  accustomed  to  use  the 
front  paw  as  a  hana,  he  neglects  the  use  of  the  right  paw.  Thus  he  will  hold 
a  bone  with  the  left  fore  paw  only  ;  and  it  is  this  paw  only  that  he  will  use  to 
dig  in  the  ground  or  to  reach  up  to  his  wound.  If  the  animal  has  been  trained 
to  give  his  paw  on  command,  after  the  mutilation  he  will  give  only  his  left 
paw,  while  he  will  hold  the  right  one  as  if  nailed  to  the  ground.  (Goltz,  in 
Dktionnaire  encydophiique  des  sciences  iiiidicales,  article  "  Nerveux,"  p.  588.) 


ii8         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

increases  progressively  and  finally  results  in  an  unin- 
telligible jabber. 

"  The  muscles  which  contribute  to  articulation  have 
lost  all  their  harmony  of  action  ;  they  can  no  longer 
contract  except  with  effort ;  and  the  speech  has  be- 
come unrecognisable, 

"In  the  members,  the  lesions  of  motility  affect  at 
first  only  the  movements  involving  the  most  of  minu- 
tiae and  of  precision.  The  patient  can  take  long  walks 
and  use  his  arms  in  kinds  of  work  which  require  only 
co-ordinated  movements  ;  but  he  can  no  longer  execute 
little  delicate  operations  of  the  fingers,  without  trem- 
bling a  little  and  trying  several  times  over ;  it  is  par- 
ticularly noticeable  when  he  is  asked  to  pick  up  a  pin 
from  the  ground,  to  wind  his  watch,  etc.  Artisans  ac- 
customed in  their  trade  to  tasks  of  precision,  are  in- 
capacitated for  occupation  much  sooner  than  those 
who  have  only  coarse  labors  to  perform.  When  there 
is  writing  to  be  done  the  pen  is  held  with  an  indecision 
which  manifests  itself  by  a  more  or  less  pronounced 
irregularity  of  the  characters  traced.  The  farther  the 
malady  progresses  in  its  course  the  more  tremulous 
and  irregular  the  hand-writing  becomes  ;  so  that,  by 
comparing  a  series  of  letters  written  at  different  epochs, 
one  may  follow  the  successive  stages  of  the  affection 
until  the  patient  has  become  incapable  of  writing. 

"Later  on,  the  indecision  of  the  upper  members 
extends  even  to  the  general  movements  ;  the  trembling 
and  enfeeblement  prevent  the  patient  from  carrying 
his  food  directly  to  his  mouth,  from  taking  out  his 
handkerchief,  from  putting  it  back  in  his  pocket,  etc. 

"In  the  lower  members  the  progression  is  analo- 
gous ;  at  the  outset,  the  paralytic  insane  walk  with 
vigor  when  going  straight  ahead,  but  if  they  have  to 


CONCLUSION.  119 

turn  to  the  right  or  the  left,  and  especially  to  wheel 
around  in  order  to  retrace  their  steps,  the  hesitation 
and  lack  of  precision  make  themselves  apparent.  Later 
on,  even  when  walking  ahead,  they  advance  with  a 
heavy  and  ill-coordinated  step.  Still  later  they  have 
difficulty  in  walking  even  a  few  steps."  * 

Let  us  recall  again  the  troubles  in  motility  which 
follow  the  abuse  of  alcohol.  Tremor  is  one  of  the  earliest 
phenomena,  ''  The  hands  are  the  first  parts  affected, 
then  the  arms,  the  legs,  the  tongue  and  the  lips.  In  pro- 
portion as  it  increases,  the  tremulousness  is  generally 
complicated  with  another  graver  disorder,  muscular 
debility.  It  affects  at  first  the  upper  members  ;  that  is 
an  almost  constant  character.  The  fingers  become  un- 
skilful, awkward  ;  the  hand  holds  objects  imperfectly 
and  lets  them  slip.  Then  this  weakness  extends  to  the 
forearm  and  the  arm  ;  the  patient  is  thus  unable  to  use 
his  upper  members  except  in  a  very  imperfect  way ; 
he  comes  at  last  to  be  no  longer  able  to  eat  alone. 
Later  these  phenomena  extend  to  the  lower  members  ; 
standing  becomes  difficult,  the  walk  is  uncertain,  stag- 
gering ;  and  all  these  symptoms  go  on  increasing.  The 
muscles  of  the  back  are  attacked  in  their  turn  .... 
and  the  unfortunate  paralytic  is  condemned  to  keep 
his  bed."t 

We  might  recall  again  what  takes  place  in  convul- 
sions, chorea,  etc.  This  progress,  which  for  the  phy- 
sician has  only  a  clinical  interest,  has  for  us  a  psycho- 
logical interest.  These  facts  of  daily  experience  will 
suffice,  I  hope,  to  produce  the  conviction,  nay  to  dem- 
onstrate, that  the  law  of  dissolution  does  indeed  pursue 

*  Foville,  Dictionnaire  ,fe  tiMecine,  etc.,  article  "  Paralysie  ge'nerale,"  pp. 
97-99- 

tFournier,  ibid.,  article  "Alcoholism,"  pp.  636,  637, 


I20         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

a  course  from  the  complex  to  the  simple,  from  the 
voluntary  to  the  automatic,  and  that  the  last  term  of 
evolution  is  the  first  of  dissolution.  We  have  studied 
hitherto,  it  is  true,  only  a  disorganisation  of  move- 
ments ;  but  those  who  treat  psychology  as  a  natural 
science  will  find  here  nothing  that  needs  to  be  restated. 
As  volition  is  not  for  us  an  imperative  entity,  reigning 
in  a  world  apart  and  distinct  from  its  acts,  but  rather 
the  ultimate  expression  of  a  hierarchic  co-ordination, 
and  as  each  movement  or  group  of  movements  is  rep- 
resented in  the  neural  centres,  it  is  clear  that  with 
each  group  that  is  paralysed  one  element  of  the  co- 
ordination disappears.  If  the  dissolution  is  progres- 
sive, the  co-ordination,  continually  despoiled  of  some 
element,  will  become  continually  more  and  more  re- 
stricted ;  and,  as  experience  shows  that  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  movements  is  in  direct  proportion  to  their 
complexity  and  their  delicacy,  our  thesis  is  verified. 
We  may  moreover  follow  out  this  verification  of  our 
law  by  recalling  what  takes  place  in  the  diseases  of 
speech,  and  here  we  penetrate  into  the  inmost  mechan- 
ism of  the  mind.  I  shall  not  go  over  a  subject  that  I 
have  treated  at  length.*  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
that  many  cases  of  aphasia  result  from  a  motor  amnesia, 
that  is  to  say,  from  a  forgetfulness  of  motor  elements,  of 
those  movements  which  constitute  articulate  speech.  I 
will  recall  what  Trousseau  had  already  remarked,  that 
"aphasia  is  always  reducible  to  a  loss  of  memory  either 
of  the  vocal  signs,  or  of  the  means  by  which  the  words 
are  articulated ;  that  W.  Ogle  also  distinguishes  two 
verbal  memories  :  a  first  one,  recognised  by  everybody, 
whereby  we  are  conscious  of  the  word,  and  a  second  in 

*  See  Les  maladies  de  la  nihitoire,  p.  iig  et  seqq.     (English  translation, 
vol.  41,  International  Scientific  Series.) 


CONCLUSION.  121 

addition,  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  utter  it."  This 
forgetfulness  of  the  movements,  although  it  is  pri- 
marily a  disease  of  the  memory,  reveals  to  us  also  a 
weakening  of  motor  power,  a  disorder  of  voluntary  co- 
ordination. The  patient  wishes  to  express  himself ; 
his  volition  has  no  result  or  expresses  itself  imper- 
fectly, that  is  to  say,  the  sum  of  the  co-ordinated  ten- 
dencies which  at  the  present  moment  constitute  the 
individual  in  so  far  as  he  wishes  to  express  himself,  is 
partially  hindered  in  its  passage  into  action  ;  and  expe- 
rience teaches  us  that  this  impotence  of  expression 
first  attacks  the  words,  that  is  to  say,  rational  language  ; 
afterwards  the  exclamatory  phrases,  the  mterjections, 
what  Max  Miiller  designates  by  the  name  of  emotional 
language  ;  and  finally,  in  very  rare  cases,  the  gestures 
Here  again,  then,  the  dissolution  proceeds  from  the 
more  complex  to  the  less  complex  and  the  simple,  from 
the  voluntary  to  the  semi-voluntary  and  the  automatic, 
which  latter  is  alinost  always  left  intact. 

One  might  go  farther  still  into  the  purely  psychic  life; 
but  here  all  becomes  vague  and  uncertain.  As  we  can 
no  longer  connect  each  volition  with  a  group  of  move- 
ments of  the  vocal,  locomotor,  or  prehensile  organs, 
we  are  in  the  dark.  However,  it  is  impossible  not  to 
observe  that  the  highest  form  of  volition,  voluntary 
attention,  is  the  rarest  and  most  unstable  of  all.  If,  in 
place  of  considering  the  voluntary  attention*  after  the 
fashion  of  the  subjective  psychologist  who  studies  him- 
self and  goes  no  farther,  we  consider  it  in  the  mass  of 
healthy  adult  human  beings,  in  order  to  determine 
approximately  what  part  it  takes  in  their  mental  life. 


♦  It  must  be  understood  that  there  is  no  question  of  involuntary  attention, 
which  is  natural,  spontaneous  ;  we  have,  moreover,  made  ourselves  clear  else- 
where on  this  point  (see  p.    oi  et  seqq.). 


122         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

we  shall  see  how  rarely  it  occurs  and  for  how  short  a 
time.  If  it  were  possible  for  a  given  period  of  time  to 
compare  in  humanity,  taken  as  a  whole,  the  total  num- 
ber of  acts  produced  by  voluntary  attention  with  the 
total  number  of  those  produced  without  it,  the  ratio 
would  be  nearly  as  zero  to  infinity.  By  reason  of  its 
very  superiority  of  nature  and  its  extreme  complexity, 
it  is  a  state,  a  co-ordination,*  which  can  rarely  come 
into  existence  and  which  always  tends  to  dissolution 
as  soon  as  it  arises. 

To  confine  ourselves  to  indubitable  facts,  is  it  not 
well  known  that  an  incapacity  for  sustained  attention  is 
one  of  the  first  symptoms  of  every  impairment  of  the 
mind,  whether  temporary,  as  in  fever,  or  permanent, 
as  in  madness?  The  highest  form  of  co-ordination  is 
therefore  indeed  the  most  unstable,  even  in  the  purely 
psychological  order. 

What  is  this  law  of  dissolution,  moreover,  if  not 
one  instance  of  that  great  biological  law  already  de- 
scribed in  connexion  with  the  memory :  the  functions 
acquired  last  are  the  first  to  degenerate.  In  the  indi- 
vidual the  automatic  co-ordination  precedes  that  born 
of  the  desires  and  passions,  which  itself  precedes  vol- 
untary co-ordination,  the  simple  forms  of  which  pre- 
cede the  more  complex  ones.  In  the  development  of 
species  (if  the  theory  of  evolution  be  admitted)  the 
lower  forms  of  activity  for  ages  existed  alone  ;  then, 
with  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  co-ordinations, 
there  came  a  time  when  there  was  will.  A  return  to 
the  reign  of  impulses,  by  whatever  brilliant  qualities 

*Just  as  groups  of  simple  movements  have  to  be  organised  and  co-ordi- 
nated to  permit  that  higher  co-ordination  from  which  the  delicate  and  com- 
plex movements  arise,  in  like  manner  must  groups  of  simple  states  of  con- 
sciousness be  organised,  associated,  and  co-ordinated  to  permit  that  higher 
co-ordination  which  is  the  attention. 


CONCLUSION.  123 

of  mind  it  may  be  accompanied,  is  therefore  in  itself  a 
retrogression.  In  this  respect  the  following  passage 
from  Herbert  Spencer  will  serve  us  as  a  summary  and 
as  a  conclusion  upon  this  point :  "In  the  chronically 
nervous,  whose  blood,  deteriorated  in  quality  and  feebly 
propelled,  fails  to  keep  up  a  due  activity  of  molecu- 
lar change,  .  .  .  irascibility  ...  is  matter  of  common 
remark ;  and  irascibility  implies  a  relative  inactivity  of 
the  superior  feelings.  It  results  when  a  sudden  dis- 
charge, sent  by  a  pain  or  annoyance  through  those 
plexuses  which  adjust  the  conduct  to  painful  and  anv 
noying  agencies,  is  unaccompanied  by  a  discharge 
through  those  plexuses  which  adjust  the  conduct  to 
many  circumstances  instead  of  a  single  circumstance. 
That  deficient  genesis  of  nervous  fluid  accounts  for 
this  loss  of  emotional  balance,  is  a  corollary  from  all 
that  has  gone  before.  The  plexuses  which  co-ordinate 
the  defensive  and  destructive  activities,  and  in  which 
are  seated  the  accompanying  feelings  of  antagonism 
and  anger,  are  inherited  from  all  antecedent  races  of 
creatures  and  are  therefore  well  organised — so  well 
organised  that  the  child  in  arms  shows  them  in  action. 
But  the  plexuses  which,  by  connecting  and  co-ordinat- 
ing a  variety  of  inferior  plexuses,  adapt  the  behavior 
to  a  variety  of  external  acquirements,  have  been  but 
recently  evolved  ;  so  that,  besides  being  extensive  and 
intricate,  they  are  formed  of  much  less  permeable  chan- 
nels. Hence  when  the  nervous  system  is  not  fully 
charged,  these  latest  and  highest  structures  are  the  first 
to  fail.  Instead  of  being  instant  to  act,  their  actions, 
if  appreciable  at  all,  come  too  late  to  check  the  actions 
of  the  subordinate  structures."  * 


*  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  i,  S  262. 
lb 


124         ^-^-^  DISEASES  OF  J  HE   WILL. 


II. 

After  having  followed  step  by  step  the  dissolution 
of  the  will,  the  fundamental  result  which  has  appeared 
to  us  to  spring  from  it  is  that  it  is  a  co-ordination 
variable  in  complexity  and  degree ;  that  this  co-ordi- 
nation is  the  condition  of  the  existence  of  all  volition, 
and  that,  according  as  it  is  totally  or  partially  de- 
stroyed, volition  is  annihilated  or  impaired.  It  is  upon 
this  result  that  we  would  now  like  to  insist,  confining 
ourselves  to  brief  indications  on  certain  points,  as  it 
is  not  our  aim  to  write  a  monograph  of  the  will. 

i)  Let  us  examine  in  the  first  place  the  material 
conditions  of  this  co-ordination.  The  will,  which  in 
some  privileged  persons  attains  a  power  so  extraordi- 
nary and  does  such  great  things,  has  a  very  humble 
origin.  This  is  found  in  that  biological  property  in- 
herent in  all  living  matter  and  known  as  irritability, 
that  is  to  say,  reaction  against  external  forces.  Irrita- 
bility— the  physiological  form  of  the  law  of  inertia — 
is  in  somewise  a  state  of  primordial  indifferentiation 
whence  shall  spring,  by  an  ulterior  differentiation,  sen- 
sibility properly  so  called  and  motility,  those  two  great 
bases  of  psychic  life. 

Let  us  remember  that  motility  (which  alone  con- 
cerns us  here)  manifests  itself,  even  in  the  vegetable 
kingdom,  under  divers  forms :  by  the  movements  of 
certain  spores,  of  the  sensitive  plant,  of  the  Dioncea, 
and  of  many  other  plants  to  which  Darwin  has  devoted 
a  well-known  work. — The  protoplasmic  mass,  homo- 
geneous in  appearance,  of  which  certain  rudimentary 
beings  are  exclusively  composed,  is  endowed  with  mo- 
tility.    The  amoeba   and   the  white  corpuscle  of  the 


CONCLUSION.  125 

blood  move  ahead  little  by  little  by  the  aid  of  the  pro- 
cesses which  they  emit.  These  facts,  which  may  be 
found  described  in  abundance  in  special  works,  show 
us  that  motility  appears  long  before  the  muscles  and 
the  nervous  system,  even  in  their  most  rudimentary 
form. 

We  need  not  follow  the  evolution  of  these  two  in- 
struments of  improvement  through  the  animal  series. 
Let  us  merely  note  that  the  researches  on  the  localisa- 
tion of  the  motor  centres,  so  important  in  the  mecha- 
nism of  the  will,  have  led  some  savants  to  study  the 
state  of  these  centres  in  the  newly  born.  "  This  in- 
vestigation, very  carefully  made  by  Soltmann,  in  1875, 
has  furnished  the  following  results.  In  rabbits  and 
dogs  there  exists  immediately  after  birth  no  point  in 
the  cerebral  cortex  the  electric  irritation  of  which  is 
capable  of  producing  movement.  It  is  only  on  the 
tenth  day  that  the  centres  for  the  anterior  members 
develop.  On  the  thirteenth  day  the  centres  for  the 
posterior  members  appear.  On  the  sixteenth,  these 
centres  are  already  quite  distinct  from  each  other 
and  from  those  of  the  face.  One  conclusion  to  be 
drawn  from  these  results  is,  that  the  absence  of  volun- 
tary motor  direction  coincides  with  the  absence  of  the 
appropriate  organs,  and  that,  in  measure  as  the  ani- 
mal becomes  more  master  of  its  movements,  the  cere- 
bral centres  in  which  the  elaboration  of  will  takes 
place  acquire  a  more  manifest  independence.* 

Flechsig  and  Parrot  have  studied  the  development 
of  the  encephalon  in  the  fcctus  and  the  infant.  From 
the  researches  of  the  latter  f  it  appears  that,  if  one  fol- 

*  Dictionnaire  encyclopiditiue  iffs  sciences  m^dicales,  Fran^ois-Franck,  ar- 
ticle "  Nerveux,"  p.  585. 

t  Archives  de  physiologie ,  1879,  pp.  505-520. 


126         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

lows  the  development  of  the  white  matter  of  an  entire 
hemisphere,  it  can  be  seen  to  rise  successively  from  the 
peduncle  to  the  optic  thalami,  then  to  the  internal  cap- 
sule, to  the  hemispheric  centre,  and  finally  to  the  cere- 
bral mantle.  So  those  parts  whose  development  is  the 
slowest  have  the  highest  functional  destiny. 

The  formative  period  passed,  the  mechanism  of 
volitional  action  appears  to  be  constituted  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner  :  the  incitation  starts  from  the  regions 
of  the  cortical  layer  called  motor  (parieto-frontal  re- 
gion), and  follows  the  pyramidal  fasciculus,  called  vol- 
untary by  some  authors.  This  fasciculus,  which  consists 
in  the  grouping  of  all  the  fibres  arising  in  the  motor 
convolutions,  descends  across  the  oval  centre,  forms  a 
small  part  of  the  internal  capsule,  which,  as  we  know, 
penetrates  into  the  corpus  striatum,  "like  a  wedge 
into  a  piece  of  wood."  This  fasciculus  follo\ys  the 
cerebral  peduncle  and  the  medulla,  where  it  undergoes 
a  more  or  less  complete  decussation,  and  passes  down 
the  opposite  side  of  the  spinal  cord,  thus  constituting 
a  great  commissure  between  the  motor  convolutions 
and  the  grey  matter  of  the  cord  from  which  the  motor 
nerves  are  given  out.*  This  rough  sketch  gives  some 
idea  of  the  complexity  of  the  elements  requisite  for 
volitional  action  and  the  intimate  solidarity  which 
unites  them. 

There  are,  unfortunately,  some  differences  of  inter- 
pretation regarding  the  real  nature  of  the  cerebral  cen- 
tres whence  the  incitation  starts.  To  Ferrier  and  many 
others  they  are  motor  centres,  in  the  strict  sense  ;  that 
is  to   say,   that  in  them   and  by  them  the  movement 

*Huguenin,  Anatomic  des  centres  nerveux,  (translated  from  the  German 
by  Keller).  Brissaud,  De  Ui  contracture  pertnanente  des  hSntiplegiques ,  1880,  p. 
g,  at  seq. 


CONCLUSION.  127 

commences.  Schiff,  Hitzig  and  Nothnagei,  Charlton 
Bastian,  and  Munk  have  given  other  interpretations 
which  are  neither  equally  probable  nor  equally  clear. 
In  general,  however,  they  amount  to  a  regarding  of 
these  centres  as  rather  of  "  a  sensory  nature,"  the  mo- 
tor function  proper  being  relegated  to  the  striated 
bodies.  "  The  nervous  fibres  that  descend  from  the 
cerebral  cortex,  in  higher  animals  and  in  man,  down 
to  the  corpora  striata,  are  in  their  nature  strictly  com- 
parable with  the  fibres  connecting  the  'sensory'  and 
the  'motor'  cells  in  an  ordinary  nervous  mechanism 
for  reflex  action."*  In  other  words,  there  are  sup- 
posed to  exist  in  the  cerebral  cortex  "circumscribed 
regions  the  experimental  excitation  of  which  produces 
in  the  opposite  side  of  the  body  determinate  localised 
movements.  These  points  seem  as  if  they  should 
much  rather  be  considered  as  centres  of  voluntary  asso- 
ciation than  as  motor  centres,  properly  so  called.  They 
would  in  this  view  be  the  seat  of  incitements  to  volun- 
tary movements  and  not  the  true  points  of  departure 
of  the  motion.  They  ought  rather  to  be  assimilated  to 
the  peripheral  organs  of  sense  than  to  the  motor  appa- 
ratus of  the  anterior  cornua  of  the  medulla.  .  .  .  These 
centres  would  then  be  psycho-motor,  because  by  their 
purely  psychic  action  they  command  veritable  motor 
apparatus.  .  .  .  We  believe  that  the  different  points 
indicated  as  motor  centres  for  the  members,  the  face, 
etc.,  correspond  to  the  apparatus  which  receive  and 
transform  into  voluntary  incitation  the  sensations  of 
peripheral  origin.  They  would  thus  be  volitional  cen- 
tres and  not  true  motor  ones. "I 

Notwithstanding  this  pending  question,  the  solu- 

•  Charlton  Bastian,  Brain  as  an  Organ  of  the  Mind,  chapter  xxvi. 
t  Fran9ois-Franck,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  577,  578. 


128         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

tion  of  which  concerns  psychology  at  least  as  much  as 
physiology,  and  in  spite  of  disagreements  in  detail  that 
we  have  neglected,  especially  the  uncertainties  regard- 
ing the  function  of  the  cerebellum,  we  may  say  with 
Charlton  Bastian  that,  "if  since  Hume's  time  we  have 
not  learned  in  any  full  sense  of  the  term  'the  means  by 
which  the  motion  of  our  bodies  follows  upon  the  com- 
mand of  our  will, '  we  have  at  least  learned  something  as 
to  the  parts  chiefly  concerned,  and  thus  as  to  the  paths 
traversed  by  vohtional  stimuli."* 

2)  In  examining  the  question  on  its  psychological 
side,  volitional  co-ordination  assumes  so  many  forms 
and  is  susceptible  of  so  many  gradations  that  only  its 
principal  stages  can  be  noticed.  It  would  be  natural 
to  begin  with  the  lowest ;  but  I  think  it  useful,  for  the 
sake  of  clearness,  to  follow  the  inverse  order. 

The  most  perfect  co-ordination  is  that  of  the  high- 
est wills,  of  the  great  men  of  action,  whatever  be  the 
order  of  their  activity:  Caesar,  or  Michael  Angelo,  or 
St.  Vincent  de  Paul.  It  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few 
words  :  unity,  stability,  power.  The  exterior  unity  of 
their  life  is  in  the  unity  of  their  aim,  ahvays  pursued, 
creating  according  to  circumstances  new  co-ordina- 
tions and  adaptations.  But  this  outer  unity  is  itself 
only  the  expression  of  an  interior  unity,  that  of  their 
character.  It  is  because  they  remain  the  same  that 
their  end  remains  the  same.  Their  fundamental  ele- 
ment is  a  mighty,  inextinguishable  passion  which  en- 
hsts  their  ideas  in  its  service.  This  passion  is  them- 
selves ;  it  is  the  psychic  expression  of  their  constitu- 
tion as  nature  has  made  it.  So  all  that  lies  outside  of 
this  co-ordination,  how  it  remains  in  the  shade,  ineffica- 
cious, sterile,  forgotten,  like  a  parasitic  vegetation  ! 

*Loc.  cit. 


CONCLUSION.  129 

They  present  the  type  of  a  life  always  in  harmony  with 
itself,  because  in  them  everything  conspires  together, 
converges,  and  consents.  Even  in  ordinary  life  these 
characters  are  met  with,  without  making  themselves 
spoken  cf,  because  the  elevation  of  aim,  the  circum- 
stances, and  especially  the  strength  of  the  passion,  have 
been  lacking  to  themj  they  have  preserved  only  its 
stability. — In  another  way,  the  great  historic  stoics, 
Epictetus,  Thraseas,  (I  do  not  speak  of  their  Sage,  who 
is  only  an  abstract  ideal,)  have  realised  this  superior 
type  of  will  under  its  negative  form, — inhibition, — con- 
formably to  the  maxim  of  the  school :  Endure  and  re- 
frain. 

Below  this  perfect  co-ordination,  there  are  lives  tra- 
versed by  intermission,  whose  centre  of  gravity,  ordi- 
narily stable,  nevertheless  oscillates  from  time  to  time. 
One  group  of  tendencies  makes  a  temporary  secession 
with  limited  action,  expressing,  so  far  as  they  do  exist 
and  act,  one  side  of  the  character.  Neither  for  them- 
selves nor  for  others  have  these  individuals  the  unity 
of  the  great  wills,  and  the  more  frequent  and  complex 
in  nature  are  these  infractions  of  perfect  co-ordination, 
the  more  the  volitional  power  diminishes.  In  reality, 
all  these  degrees  are  met  with. 

Descending  still  lower,  we  reach  those  lives  by 
double  entry,  in  which  two  contrary  or  merely  different 
tendencies  dominate  in  turn.  There  are  in  the  indi- 
vidual two  alternate  centres  of  gravity,  two  points  of 
convergence  for  successively  preponderating  but  only 
partial  co-ordinations.  Taking  everything  together,  that 
is  perhaps  the  most  common  type,  if  one  looks  around 
one,  and  if  one  consults  the  poets  and  moralists  of  all 
times,  who  vie  with  each  other  in  repeating  that  there 
are  two  men  in  us.     The  number  of  these  successive 


I30         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL, 

co-ordinations  may  be  still  larger ;  but  it  would  be 
idle  to  pursue  this  analysis  further. 

One  step  more,  and  we  enter  into  pathology.  Let 
us  recall  the  sudden  irresistible  impulses  which  at 
every  moment  hold  the  will  in  check  ;  it  is  a  hypertro- 
phied  tendency  which  continually  breaks  the  equilib- 
rium, and  the  intensity  of  which  is  too  great  to  permit 
it  any  longer  to  be  co-ordinated  with  the  others ;  it 
goes  out  of  the  ranks,  it  commands  instead  of  being 
subordinated.  Then  when  these  impulses  have  come 
to  be  no  longer  an  accident  but  a  habit,  no  longer  one 
side  of  the  character  but  the  character  itself,  there  are 
henceforth  only  intermittent  co-ordinations  ;  it  is  the 
will  that  becomes  the  exception. 

Lower  still,  it  becomes  a  mere  accident.  In  the 
indefinite  succession  of  impulses  varying  from  one 
minute  to  the  other  a  precarious  volition  finds  with 
difficulty  at  long  intervals  its  conditions  of  existence. 
Only  caprices  then  exist.  The  hysteric  character  has 
furnished  the  type  of  this  perfect  incoordination.  Here 
we  reach  the  other  extreme. 

Beneath  this  there  are  no  more  diseases  of  the  will, 
but  an  arrest  of  development  which  prevents  it  from 
ever  arising.  Such  is  the  state  of  idiots  and  imbeciles. 
We  will  say  a  few  words  regarding  them  here  in  order 
to  complete  our  pathological  study. 

"In  profound  idiocy,"  says  Griesinger,  "efforts 
and  determinations  are  always  instinctive  ;  they  are 
chiefly  provoked  by  the  need  of  nourishment ;  most 
frequently  they  have  the  character  of  reflexes  of  which 
the  individual  is  hardly  conscious.  Certain  simple 
ideas  may  still  provoke  efforts  and  movements,  for  ex- 
ample, to  play  with  little  pieces  of  paper.  .  .  .  Without 
speaking  of  those  who  are  plunged  in  the  profoundest 


CONCLUSION.  131 

idiocy,  we  ask  ourselves  :  Is  there  in  them  anything 
that  represents  the  will  ?  What  is  there  in  them  that 
can  will? 

"In  many  idiots  of  this  last  class  the  only  thing 
that  seems  to  arouse  their  minds  a  little  is  the  desire 
to  eat.  The  lowest  idiots  manifest  this  desire  only  by 
agitation  and  groans.  Those  in  whom  the  degeneracy 
is  less  profound  move  their  lips  and  hands  a  little,  or 
else  weep  :  it  is  thus  that  they  express  a  desire  to 
eat.  .  .  . 

*' In  slight  idiocy  the  foundation  of  the  character 
is  inconstancy  and  obtuseness  of  feeling,  and  weakness 
of  will.  The  disposition  of  these  individuals  depends 
upon  their  surroundings  and  the  treatment  they  receive: 
it  is  docile  and  obedient  when  they  are  taken  care  of,  ill- 
natured  and  malicious  when  they  are  badly  treated."* 

Before  bringing  this  subject  to  an  end,  we  will 
again  remark  that  if  the  will  is  a  co-ordination,  that  is 
to  say  a  sum  of  relations,  it  may  be  predicted  a  priori 
that  it  will  be  produced  much  more  rarely  than  the 
simpler  forms  of  activity,  because  a  complex  state 
has  much  fewer  chances  of  originating  and  enduring 
than  a  simple  state.  And  such  are  the  real  facts  in  the 
case.  If  in  each  human  life  we  count  up  what  should 
be  credited  to  the  account  of  automatism,  of  habit,  of 
the  passions,  and  above  all  of  imitation,  we  shall  see 
that  the  number  of  acts  that  are  purely  voluntary,  in 

•  Griesinger,  Traiti  des  maladies  meniales  (translated  from  the  German), 
pp.  433.  434-  For  a  complete  study  of  the  question  consult  the  recent  work  by 
Father  Sollier  :  Psychologic  de  tidiot  et  de  I'itnbtciU.  It  will  be  seen  that  in 
them  the  will  cannot  be  formed  because  the  conditions  of  its  existence  are  lack- 
ing. The  atrophy  of  the  intellectual  and  affective  faculties  renders  the  appari- 
tion of  voluntary  activity  impossible  :  which  proves  once  more  that  it  is  not  a 
primordial  "faculty,"  but  an  acquired  and  complex  state  resulting  from  an 
evolution.  These  weak-minded  persons  cannot  go  beyond  the  period  of  reflexes, 
affective  and  intellectual ;  the  world  of  will  is  a  promised  land  into  which 
they  will  never  enter. 


132         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 

the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  is  very  small.  For  the 
majority  of  men,  imitation  suffices  ;  they  are  contented 
with  what  Jias  been  will  in  others,  and,  as  they  think 
with  the  ideas  of  the  world  at  large,  they  act  with  its 
will.  Between  the  habits  which  render  it  useless  and 
the  maladies  that  mutilate  or  destroy  it,  the  will,  as 
we  have  said  above,  must  be  taken  as  a  happy  acci- 
dent. 

Is  it  necessary,  finally,  to  remark  how  close  a  re- 
semblance there  is  between  this  increasingly  complex 
co-ordination  of  tendencies  which  forms  the  different 
stages  of  the  will,  and  the  increasingly  complex  co- 
ordination of  perceptions  and  images  which  constitutes 
the  various  degrees  of  the  intellect,  one  having  for  its 
basis  and  fundamental  condition  the  character,  and  the 
other  the  "forms  of  thought";  both  being  a  more  or 
less  complete  adaptation  of  the  being  to  its  environ- 
ment, in  the  order  of  action  or  in  the  order  of  knowl- 
edge? 

* 
*  * 

We  are  now  prepared  for  the  general  conclusion  of 
this  work,  already  indicated  several  times  in  passing. 
It  will  illuminate,  I  trust,  with  a  retrospective  light 
the  road  which  we  have  traversed. 

Volition  is  a  final  state  of  consciousness  which  re- 
sults from  the  more  or  less  complex  co-ordination  of  a 
group  of  states,  conscious,  subconscious,  or  uncon- 
scious (purely  physiological),  which  all  united  express 
themselves  by  an  action  or  an  inhibition.  The  princi- 
pal factor  in  the  co-ordination  is  the  character,  which 
is  only  the  psychic  expression  of  an  individual  organ- 
ism. It  is  the  character  which  gives  to  the  co-ordina- 
tion its  unity, — not  the  abstract  unity  of  a  mathemat- 
ical point,  but  the  concrete  unity  of  a  consensus.    The 


CONCLUSION.  133 

act  by  which  this  co-ordination  is  made  and  affirmed 
is  choice,  founded  on  an  affinity  of  nature. 

The  volition  that  subjective  psychologists  have  so 
often  observed,  analysed,  and  commented  upon  is  then 
for  us  only  a  simple  state  of  consciousness.  It  is  merely 
an  effect  of  that  psycho-physiological  activity,  so  often 
described,  only  a  part  of  which  enters  into  conscious- 
ness under  the  form  of  a  deliberation.  Furthermore, 
//  /.$•  7iot  the  cause  of  anything.  The  acts  and  movements 
which  follow  it  result  directly  from  the  tendencies,  feel- 
ings, images,  and  ideas  which  have  become  co-ordinated 
in  the  form  of  a  choice.  It  is  from  this  group  that  all 
the  efficacy  comes.  In  other  terms, —  and  to  leave  no 
ambiguity, — the  psycho-physiological  labor  of  delib- 
eration results  on  the  one  hand  in  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness, the  volition,  and  on  the  other  in  a  set  of  move- 
ments or  inhibitions.  TJie  "/  wiir'  testifies  to  a  con- 
dition, but  does  not  produce  it.  I  should  compare  it 
to  the  verdict  of  a  jury,  which  may  be  the  result  of  a 
very  long  criminal  examination,  and  of  very  passionate 
pleadings,  and  which  will  be  followed  by  grave  conse- 
quences extending  over  a  long  future,  but  which  is  an 
effect  without  being  a  cause,  being  in  law  only  a  simple 
statement. 

If  one  insists  on  making  of  the  will  a  faculty,  an 
entity,  all  becomes  obscurity,  perplexity,  contradiction. 
One  is  caught  in  the  snare  of  a  badly  stated  question. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  we  accept  the  facts  as  they  are,  we 
disembarrass  ourselves  at  least  of  factitious  difficul- 
ties. One  does  not  have  to  ask  oneself,  like  Hume 
and  so  many  others,  how  an  "I  will"  can  make  my 
members  move.  This  is  a  mystery  which  need  not  be 
cleared  up,  since  it  does  not  exist,  as  volition  is  in  no 
degree  a  cause.      It  is  in  the  natural  tendency  of  feel- 


134         THE  DISEASES  OF  THE    WILL. 

iugs  and  images  to  express  themselves  in  movements 
that  the  secret  of  acts  produced  should  be  sought.  We 
have  here  only  an  extremely  complicated  case  of  the  law 
of  reflexes,  in  which,  between  the  period  called  that 
of  excitation  and  the  motor  period  there  appears  a 
most  important  psychic  fact — volition — showing  that 
the  first  period  is  ending  and  the  second  beginning. 

Let  it  be  remarked  also  how  easily  that  strange 
malady  called  abulia  can  now  be  explained,  and  with 
it  the  analogous  forms  considered  above,*  and  even 
that  mere  weakness  of  will,  scarcely  morbid,  so  frequent 
among  persons  who  say  that  they  will  and  yet  do  not 
act.  It  is  because  the  individual  organism,  the  source 
from  which  all  springs,  had  two  effects  to  produce  and 
produces  only  one  of  them  :  the  state  of  consciousness, 
choice,  affirmation  ;  while  the  motor  tendencies  are 
too  weak  to  express  themselves  in  acts.  There  is  suf- 
ficient co-ordination,  but  insufficient  impulse.  In  irre- 
sistible acts,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  impulse  which  is 
exaggerated,  and  the  co-ordination  which  grows  weak 
or  disappears. 

We  owe,  therefore,  to  pathology  two  principal  re- 
sults: one,  that  the  "  I  will  "  is  in  itself  wholly  with- 
out efficacy  in  causing  action  ;  the  other,  that  the  will 
in  the  rational  man  is  an  extremely  complex  and  un- 
stable co-ordination,  fragile  by  its  very  superiority, 
because  it  is  "the  highest  force  which  nature  has  yet 
developed — the  last  consummate  blossom  of  all  her 
marvellous  works."! 

*  See  chapter  i. 

t  Maudsley,  The  Physiology  of  Mind,  p.  456. 


INDEX. 


Abstract  ideas,  8. 

Abulia,  28  et  seq.,  40  et  seq.,  77,  134. 

Adaptation,  ig. 

Affinity,  ai. 

Agoraphobia,  43. 

American  quarryman,  69, 

Aafcelo,  Michael,  128. 

Anger,  13. 

Aphasia,  130. 

Aritfamomania,  58. 

Association,  84. 

Ataxia,  moral,  88. 

Atbos,  Monks  of  Mount,  95. 

Automatism,  106,  no. 

Aienfeld,  89,  93. 

Barth,  53. 

Bastian,  Charlton,  127,  128, 
Beauais,  in. 
Bennett's  case,  Dr.,  29. 
Berger,  103. 
Bemheim,  iii. 
Bhagavad-Gita,  53,  95. 
Billod,  32  et  seq.,  43,  5f).  ;8. 
Brain,  lesions  o{  the,  6ti. 
Briquet,  92. 
Brissaud,  12O. 
Brouardel,  iii. 
Buddhists,  100. 
Burdach,  106. 

Casar,  128. 

Calmeil,  59. 

Caprices,  87. 

Carlyle,  76. 

Carpenter,  44,  yi. 

Charactar,  science  of,  tj,  iis. 

CbarcAt,  4c,  jS,  in. 


Choice,  20  et  seq. 
Coleridge,  72  et  seq. 
Consciousness,  abolition  of,  lej. 
Co-ordination,  113,   132;    the  will  a, 

124-H8. 
Cordes,  44. 

Cortex,  lesion  of  the,  117  et  seq. 
Cruveilhier,  93. 
Cyon,  II. 

Delboeuf,  52. 

De  Quincey,  Thomas,  case  of,  30  et 

seq. 
Desire,  4. 
Dietl,  68. 
Dipsomania,  61. 
Disease,  37. 

Diseases  of  speech,  120. 
Dissolution,  i,  115,  122;  of  the  will, 

114. 
Doubting-insanity,  46. 
Drunkenness,  67,  76. 
Du  Saulle,  Legrand,  44,  46. 

Ecstasy,  94  et  seq. 

Education,  17. 

ESort,  the  feeling  of  muscular,  49  at 

seq. ;  volitional,  50  et  seq. 
Ego,  the,  23,  24  et  seq.;  66,  loa. 
Epictetus,  129. 
Epileptics,  56. 
Erotomania,  61. 
Esquirol,  29,  38,  48. 
Ethnology,  23. 
Exner,  68. 

Fear  of  places,  4). 

Perrier,  12,  50,  68,  71,  80,  8j,  118,  n6. 


136 


THE  DISEASES  OF  THE   WILL. 


Fixed  ideas,  6,  58,  91. 

Flechsig,  i2j. 

Fontana,  20. 

Fournier,  iig. 

Foville,  55,  62,  117,  119. 

Franck  (Francois),  14,  127. 

Free  will,  2,  iii. 

Frontal  convolutions,  lesion  of,  68. 

Fumbling  mania  (Griibehucht),  46. 

Gilles  de  la  Tourette,  iii. 

Gldnadel,  case  of,  59. 

Goltz,  II,  117. 

Griesinger,  Wilhelm,  29,  46,  130. 

Griibeltutht ,  46. 

Guislain,  28,  48,  59. 

Hazlitt,  76. 

Heart,  the,  10. 

Heidenbain,  103,  108. 

Helvetius,  82. 

Herzen,  n. 

Hitzig,  127. 

Homicidal  impulses,  58  at  seq. 

Huchard,  Dr.,  86,  89,  93. 

Huguenin,  126. 

Hypnotism,  103  et  seq. 

Hysterics,  86  et  seq. 

Ideas,  6. 

Ideo-motor,  s,  113. 

Idiocy,  130  et  seq. 

Incoordination,  89,  130. 

Inhibition,  10-18,  83. 

Intellect,  the,  19. 

Intellectual  adaptation.  54  et  seq. 

Irresistible  impulses,  61. 

Irresolution,  26. 

Italian  woman,  case  of  young,  38. 

Jackson.  Hughlings,  115. 
James,  W.,  49. 
Janet,  Pierre,  4X 
Judgment,  20. 

Kant,  2. 

Kleptomania,  61. 
Krftpelin,  68. 

Lateau,  Louise,  100. 
Lupine,  69. 


Lesions  of  the  brain,  68,  117  et  seq. 

Lethargy,  104. 

Leubuscher,  29. 

Lewes,  10,  12,  80,  83, 

Li^bault,  III. 

Li^geois,  in, 

Luys,  55. 

Lypemania,  41. 

Macario,  93. 

Magistrate,  case  of  a,  29. 

Magnan,  58. 

Marc,  58. 

Marseilles,  33,  35. 

Maudsley,  10,  44,  61,  80,  134. 

Melancholia,  41. 

Memory,  1. 

Mesche  ie,  64. 

Mesnet,  105. 

Metaphysical  mania,  46. 

Metaphysics,  2. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  23. 

Moerl,  Maria  von,  100. 

Monks  of  Mount  Athos,  95, 

Moral  ataxia,  88. 

Moreau,  77,  SS. 

Morel,  47,  61. 

Motor,  elements,  5 ;  images,  41  et  seq 

Muller,  Max,  121. 

Munk,  127. 

Mystics,  96  et  seq. 

Nirvana,  95,  100. 
Nothnagel,  127. 

Obersteiner,  68. 
Ogle,;W.,  120. 
Om,  95. 

Omphalopsychi,  95. 
Onomatomania,  58. 
Opium,  abuse  of,  30. 

Paralytics,  78. 

Parrot,  125. 

Passions,  7. 

Pathology,  112,  134;  of  the  will,  aS  el 

seq. 
Perez,  B.,  16. 
Personality,  the,  loj. 
Pius  IX.,  36. 
Places,  fear  of.  43. 


INDEX. 


137 


Plotinus,  99,  100,  10]. 
Prayer,  96. 
Pr«yer,  103. 
Psychic  paralyses,  43. 
Pyromania,  61. 

Rapture,  100. 

Rational  activity,  7. 

Reflexes,  4,  19,  113. 

Renouvier,  2. 

Retrof^ression,  123. 

Reynolds,  42. 

Richer,  P.,  93,  105, 107. 

Richet,  Ch.,  52,  87,  93,  104,  107. 

Ritti,  46. 

Rosenthal,  57. 

Rumpf,  103. 

Saint-Hilaire,  Barth.,  95. 

Schiff,  II,  127. 

Schneider,  3,  103. 

SehQle,  61. 

Sergi,  80. 

Setschenow,  11. 

SoUier,  Father,  131. 

Soltmann,  125. 

Somnambulism,  103,  no. 

Speech,  diseases  of,  120. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  115,  123. 

Spinal  being,  3. 

Spinoza,  in. 

Spontaneous  attention,  79  et  seq. 

Starr,  Allen,  70. 

St.  Peter,  feast  of,  36. 

St.  Teresa,  96  et  seq. 

St.  Vincent  de  Paul,  128. 

Suicidal  monomania,  bi. 

Sydenham,  87. 


Tauler,  99. 

Thraseas,  125. 
Tr^lat,  61. 
Trousseau,  120. 

Unity,  of  aim,  128;  of  volition,  132. 

Vintschgau,  68. 

Virchow,  3. 

Volition,  22,  112  ;    the  last  term  of  a 

progressive  evolution,  113;  defined, 

132  ;  unity  of,  132. 
Volitional,  efifcrt,  50  et  seq.;  action, 

mechanism  of,  126;  co-ordination, 

128. 
Voluntary  act,  composed  of  two  ele- 
ments, 39. 
Voluntary  attention,  impairments  of, 

72;  acquired  impairment  of,  76  et 

seq.,  79  et  seq. 

Weber,  E.  P.,  80. 

Westphal,  43,  63. 

Will,  the  term,  i;  defined,  9,  25  et 
seq.,  112;  pathology  of  the,  28  et 
seq.;  impairment  of  the,  by  defect 
of  impulse,  28  et  seq.;  impairment 
of  the,  by  excess  of  impulse,  54  et 
seq.;  causes  of  impotence  of  the, 
37;  paralysis  of  the,  44;  the,  its 
evolution,  64;  impotence  of  the, 
93  ;  the  extinction  of  the,  94;  anni- 
hilation of  the,  105;  pathology  0° 
the,  112;  dissolution  of  the,  114; 
the,  a  co-ordination,  124. 

Winslow,  Forbes,  781 

Wundt,  12.  80. 

Yogi,  9J, 


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